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CAUSES OF THE WAR

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
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CAUSES OF THE WAR

AN EXAMINATION INTO THE CAUSES
OF THE EUROPEAN WAR, WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO RUSSIA AND SERBIA

BY

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PREFACE.

The war has come to an end and the free exchange of opinion is gradually once more resuming its sway. Three years have already passed since the greater part of these notes was written but much had to be omitted that was overtaken by the actual events. The following pages do not pretend to present the facts in their entirety. It would be impossible to do so where, as in the matters discussed, events were of such an extraordinary and transient a character and of so wide a scope. The book's purpose will be attained if it is able to make even a small contribution toward clearing up the history of events immediately preceding the war. It must expose the dangers of secret diplomacy,¹⁾ it must throw light upon the personal antagonisms of former rulers and statesmen in the various countries concerned in the war, it must call attention to the moral concepts hitherto existing in the relations of the States to one another, and it must incite a greater interest in the search for truth. Furthermore it is my purpose to show in the following pages that it is not possible to draw convincing conclusions with respect to the responsibility and blame for the war from the officially published documents of the individual States, but on the contrary one can judge correctly of the political relations that led to war only by having knowledge of the unpublished secret documents, and by an examination into the actions of individual statesmen (reports, statements). It is particularly essential that the events which led to the war, should not be considered in the light of the developments immediately preceding its outbreak, but should be brought into some kind of organic connection with events lying much further back in the past. One especially extensive field of inquiry has been left almost entirely untouched, namely, that which has to do with the relations of the Western Powers towards Germany. For the main part, what follows is based upon personal observations and investigations whose verity has been established

¹⁾ See Appendix XXI.

in a way that permits of the initiated drawing the necessary conclusions.

In view of my long years of official service in Germany and thanks to the personal trust that was placed in me, I was in a situation to learn of many occurrences that are of importance in forming a critical judgment of events immediately preceding the war.

It would have been no easy task for me to give publicity to my views if the war had taken the turn which up to August 1918 seemed most probable. But as it is, it seems to me a lighter task to do justice to our opponents, and in doing so to place myself in direct contradiction to all hitherto accepted traditions. In the face of the tremendous and extraordinary character of the events to be passed upon we must allow no consideration for the systems and personages of the past to influence our judgment if we are to erect anew, strong and healthy foundations upon the ruins of the old Europe. I am very deeply conscious that the views hereinafter advanced and supported by me are absolutely true and just. In my view of events, judgment has been pronounced, but the corroboration of others is necessary before it attains to the status of an historical belief. Time has always corrected many historical errors of the past and it will do so once again. Questions that have to do with the responsibility for the war are bound to be discussed in all countries, even in those of the victors. Sources of research and investigation there will be in plenty at which the objective truth may be sought and found, and it is every man's duty to do what he can in aid of this work regardless of the feelings of the present-day rulers of some of the States involved whom we may already begin to regard as belonging to a past epoch. Those of them who have brought this unutterable misery upon mankind, and whatever their motives may have been, will not be able to avoid feeling and giving expression to their remorse for the deed. Thoughts of self-accusation and vindication, thoughts of doubt and uncertainty of the immediate future will occupy and plague their minds to an ever growing extent until some day the feeling of remorse will have seized upon one or the other of these men with such elemental force as will compel him to complete confession.

I. THE RUSSO-AUSTRIAN ANTAGONISM.

The French thought of revenge, the Anglo-German and the Russo-Austrian antagonism with respect to Balkan problems, these were the three political problems which have for years menaced the European peace.

The Russo-Austrian antagonism was the inducing cause of the European war.

When by the decisions of the Congress of Berlin, the stipulations contained in the Treaty of San Stefano were rendered nugatory and the execution of them frustrated, there was aroused in all Russian statesmen who successively took over the conduct of Foreign Affairs, a feeling of disillusionment and disappointment—a feeling that dictated the acceptance and pursuit of a line of politics which not only had for its object the destruction of Turkey, but also that of Austria-Hungary as a Balkan-rival and Slavic State, and finally, after almost forty years of restless effort, led to the European war arousing to the highest the Russian hope of attainment of the longed-for goal.

Just in the last years before the outbreak of the war and particularly in the high places of authority in England and Germany, it was insufficiently recognized—so far as it was necessary to do so in the interest of the maintenance of European peace—that there still existed a latent antagonism between Russia and Austria, and the danger was recognized too late to prevent the war. And so it came about that the troubles and difficulties in the Balkans which led to the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913, were weighed and considered almost entirely from the standpoint of the interests of the Balkan States, and not sufficiently from the standpoint of deeper causes lying in the antagonisms just referred to.

In order to afford the reader a clear comprehension of the Russo-Austrian antagonism it will be necessary to give a brief review of Russia's politics during the last few decades and of her relations with Austria.

Each of the two rival Eastern Powers, recognizing properly

its own geographical situation, took pains to make its own influence felt upon such of the Balkan States as lay nearest to its borders. Accordingly we perceive that already at the time of the meeting of the Congress of Berlin, Austria-Hungary had taken Serbia under her wing, and it was to the good offices of Count Andrassy that Serbia was indebted for receiving, under the terms of the Berlin Treaty, territory which Russia had already in the Treaty of San Stefano promised to the newly established principality of Bulgaria. The same thing happened once again in the Serbo-Bulgarian war in 1885, when Count Khevenhueller, the Austrian minister at Belgrade, placed a check on the further advance of Bulgarian troops.

During the reign of King Milan of Serbia, Serbia came to stand directly under Austrian, and Bulgaria at that time under Russian influence. Russia's brutal manner of making her influence felt in Bulgaria requires no better demonstration than Alexander of Battenberg's abdication under Russian pressure. His successor, Ferdinand of Coburg came to the Bulgarian throne, having successfully put through his candidacy with the secret support of Austria and with the approval of the Hungarians to whom he was particularly *persona grata*. Upon his accession he held himself in power by his support of the powerful anti-Russian movement which had taken such a hold upon the Bulgarian people under the leadership of Stambulow, and accordingly was as vigorously opposed by Russia as was his predecessor in office, until the moment when Ferdinand, abandoning his former policy, succeeded in effecting the famous atonement and reconciliation with Russia (i.e. the re-baptism of Crown Prince Boris and the restoration to favor of the traitorous Bulgarian officers) and thereby made sacrifice of the Bulgarian nation's efforts to attain to complete national independence. All the history of the agitatory activity of Russia in Bulgaria during this period, as well as of the authorship of the deed of assassination upon Stambulow and indeed the whole story of the policy of King Ferdinand must be examined in the writings of those who have a call to deal with the subject.

In Serbia, likewise, Russia gave evidences of extraordinary activity in the direction of extending her influence at Austria's expense, with this difference, namely, that here Russia's activities were employed not so much to the conversion of the king to

Russian aims, but on the contrary all influences were directed against the person of King Milan, and his overthrow was plotted and attained.

I now regard it of importance to set forth briefly the measures taken by Russia to increase her influence in Serbia, as follows:—note the activities of the Russian Ministers, particularly Hitrowos, in Bucharest—during the 80's one of Russia's agitation centres—the interference in the internal affairs of Serbia as shown by Russia's excitation and subvention of Serbian politicians against King Milan (the Radical Party, Paschitsch, the revolt of Zajetschar); the intrigues surrounding the divorce proceedings between King Milan and Queen Natalie who was of Russian birth; the attempts upon the life of King Milan; the attempt to woo the favor of Montenegro—Prince Nicholas of Montenegro the "only friend" of Tsar Alexander III; the attitude and conduct of the Russian Minister Schadowski, at Belgrade, toward King Milan; the standing-sponsor by Tsar Nicholas II at the marriage of King Alexander with Draga Maschin; the immediate recognition of the Karageorgewich dynasty by Russia right upon the heels of King Alexander's assassination; and finally the activities of Russia during the past few years before the war when Serbian Statesmen had become willing tools of Russian policy that sooner or later was to cause the breaking out of the European war. Elsewhere, in the pages to follow, will be found an account of Russia's exertions for the creation of a Balkan League. And dark is the picture of the moral and cultural standards exhibited by those who controlled the fate of the Russian people, if one studies the full chapters of Russian political history during this period.

Furthermore, an examination of facts cited discloses that the controlling factors of the Russian policy were to be found in the absolutist motives comprised in such purely personal feelings as inclination, aversion, and hatred rather than motives having for their basis the promotion of the real and the true interests of the Russian State.

Several of the published documents of revolutionary Russia (Isvestia, Pravda, Diary of Tsar Nicolas II) furnish additional verification of the foregoing contentions.

Side by side with the revenge-policy directed toward Austria

and Turkey by reason of the disregard of the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano and the setting-aside of its provisions by the Powers, there existed in Russian statecraft a parallel policy of Expansion in the Far East, and dependent upon the rise or fall of this or that influence at the Russian Court, the one or the other of these two policies at times attained the upper hand.

And this circumstance seems especially worthy of observation if we throw the accent upon what was at one and the same time the instability and the audacity of the Russian policy which set itself two such great goals for attainment, for it became firmly bound to both.

The alliance with France made it possible for Russia to secure France's ever growing support for her Expansion policy, besides affording additional strength to Russian influence in the Balkans as against Austria, especially in the financial sense, and securing for Russia an amelioration of English hostility hitherto maintained in full strength against the Empire of the Tsar. Moreover as a safeguard against a flank attack by Austria, treaties of so-called "re-insurance" had been entered into with the German Chancellor Bismarck.

In order to gain time for securing a solution of the Far Eastern problem, Count Muraviev caused Tsar Nicolas II to make his famous proposal for securing the world's peace at the first Peace Conference in the Hague. And right here the question arises, how came it that a State like Russia, which of all the Great Powers had undoubtedly pursued the most imperialistic of Expansion policies, was to make such a proposal? (Balkan hegemony, Dardanelles question, Baltic question, Far Eastern hegemony).

In the spirit of the same lack of uprightness, Russia in 1903 concluded with Austria, at Mürzsteg, an agreement with respect to Macedonia, with the sole object of securing a free hand for her Expansionist policy in the Far East¹⁾.

If statesmen had already at that time examined into the true and deeper reasons of the Russian proposal, instead of occupying themselves with the inopportune questions of eternal peace,

¹⁾ Historically there can be no doubt that in the Russo-Japanese war (1904—05) Russia was the aggressor notwithstanding that Japan began hostilities without a previous declaration of war.

disarmament and compulsory arbitration which in the face of the still unsolved questions of European politics could only become a *cura posterior*, it would have been possible to shut the door on Russian Expansionism much sooner and at a cost to humanity of incomparably fewer sacrifices¹⁾.

So long as it was not yet certain which one of her two great aims Russia would first pursue, and when Russia decided to secure for herself the solution of the Far Eastern problem before attempting the other, no immediate menace to European peace was to be feared. But when the decision of arms in the Far East fell out in Russia's disfavor, then there arose immediate reason to fear, from the point of view of Russian prestige, that the Empire of the Tsar, so soon as it should recover from its defeats—and this ensued quickly thanks to the enormous resources at its command—would seek with redoubled exertion to attain the second object of its ambition. The second Peace Conference of 1907 presented Russia with a new and welcome occasion for exhibiting herself in the role of the peace-loving State, but in reality here again her object was to gain time.

When, in 1909, a provisional settlement of the Bosnian crisis was attained by Germany's intervention, Russia was obliged to postpone carrying out her designs against Austria, in view of her war preparations not being sufficiently advanced; but when, in 1914, there burst upon the world the assassination of the Austrian heir to the throne and his consort, the talkative Russian Minister of War, Suchomlinow, announced *urbi et orbi*, that Russia was prepared in the fullest sense of the word, and the world was soon to see that Russia did not delay a single moment in accepting the full consequences of her preparedness.

Austria's policy since the time of Count Andrassy had been directed toward lending support to Serbia whose enlargement of territory (Nish, Vranja, Pirot) had been due to the intervention of Austria at the Berlin Congress. In King Milan she had found a personality who, schooled by the politically important men of Serbia (Pirotjanaz, Garaschanin, N. Christitsch) to a

1) King Milan had already at the time of the first Hague Conference called attention to the dangers of Russian Expansionism, and had uttered his thoughts with considerable scepticism with respect to Russia's aims and objects.

just recognition of the political and economic requirements of the land, sought to bring to pass an honest political and economic relationship with the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. For, when Russia was unable to have the Treaty of San Stefano recognized by the other great European Powers, her policy was directed toward creating a greater Bulgaria at the expense of Serbia and the other Balkan States, and for a long time she favored the aspirations of Bulgaria to the acquisition of Macedonia much to Serbia's and Greece's disadvantage¹⁾.

Furthermore, and this fact is important, Russia was not in a position economically, to extend economic assistance to the Balkan states to whom she was striving to extend her protection.

Many factors acting in combination prevented the stabilizing of a political situation which, from the standpoint of Real Politik would have been only natural and of advantage to both sides. Such factors were the personal misfortunes encountered by King Milan, the illiberality of the Hungarian Agrarians, the many errors and blunders of the Austrian foreign policy which was lacking in a true understanding of how to derive a benefit out of the politically favorable situation in Serbia—Count Goluchowski, for example often treated the Balkan States like school-boys and lectured and scolded their delegations like a school-master.

Supported by Russian monies and Pan-Slavic influences, a political party had been organized in Serbia, and upon Russian initiative its task was to be to combat King Milan and to hold up Austria-Hungary as the arch-enemy of Serbian interests because as a State made up of various nationalities it had under its sovereignty Serb-Kroatian territory of greater territorial extent than the Kingdom of Serbia itself possessed. All that Austria had hitherto done culturally to develop Serbdom, and all the damage that a hostile, neighboring great Power, driven by natural forces, might commit against a small State whose development was only in the creative period,—all these circumstances were left entirely out of consideration by the Russophiles.

At this period of its growth the patriarchal Serbian nation, a

1) See in this connection, Article 6 of the Russo-Bulgarian Military Convention of December 1909 Appendix I.

nation standing, so far as its organization as a modern State is concerned, at the very threshold of its development, was indispensably in need of an upright, enlightened Absolutism, if I may so express it, but in place of it the nation was being offered such blessings as revolutionary-socialistic ideas, the democratic principles of Switzerland, (where some of the leaders of the Radicals, men lacking in education and possessing a deficient foundational school training, nevertheless pursued their studies at the institutions of higher education) and the glorifying of the principle of nationality.

Austria had failed to serve her own interests in Serbia by fostering as Russia had done, a lively political agitation in her own favor. Persisting in her traditional spirit of friendship toward King Milan, and embracing within her confidence likewise the son of the monarch, Austria, while displaying every consideration for the Obrenovich dynasty, now had to stand with crossed arms and helplessly take note of how the influence of the Radicals in Serbia went on increasing from day to day, of how they had attained even to the seat of government (after the abdication of King Milan) and of how they have with small intermissions (régime of Vladan Georgevich) controlled the fate of the country down to the present day.

And from this time on we perceive that the relation of mutual trust, between those who were guiding Austro-Hungarian politics and the successive Radical Serbian Ministries no longer subsisted, and could no longer be created or renewed, and this, in spite of the recognition by some of Serbia's high political personages, even of the most pronounced diverse political views (Milowanowich, Weljkowich, Peritsch), that it was a necessity of Serbian politics to come to an understanding with Austria.

Although, as against the greater influence gained with the Serbian people by Russia, Austria could recover no lost ground, she nevertheless found it expedient to maintain friendly relations with the ruling monarch, and accordingly Emperor Franz Joseph did not fail to display evidences of his personal good-will even toward King Alexander. It was only after the latter had lost all the respect of the people because of his marriage with Draga Maschin, had done great injury to the monarchical principle, and had acted in a most inhuman manner towards his father King Milan who preserved Emperor Franz Joseph's paternal good-

will until his death (the funeral obsequies of King Milan, the first Serbian King to be interred at Kossovo forms a sad chapter of Serbian history) it was only after such occurrences as these that Austria turned entirely away from King Alexander, and perceiving the possibility of improved relations with Serbia only in a new dynasty, supported from this time forth all intrigues directed against King Alexander and his consort and in favor of Prince Peter Karageorgevich.

The Karegeoregvich dynasty would never have attained to power, had it not received the active support of Count Goluchowski, whose hands held the reins of Austrian foreign policies at that time. One Müller¹⁾, at that time chief of the Bureau of Information of the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and later Civil Inspector in Macedonia, now for the purposes mentioned placed himself in direct touch with a cousin of King Peter's, one Nenadowich, later Minister at Constantinople, and with the former Serbian Minister of Finance Vukaschin Petrowitsch, both of whom lived in Vienna at that time. King Peter and his cousin likewise had meetings upon Austrian soil with the Serbian conspirators among his followers (At Graz, Linz, Vienna. With Novakowitsch, Gentschitsch, Hadji-Thoma) and it was King Peter himself who demanded, as a condition of his accession to the throne, the assassination of King Alexander (subsequently carried out, as we know, in a most senselessly brutal manner) in order that by the death of the last representative of the Obrenovich dynasty, the dynastic problem in Serbia might finally for all time be settled. It would seem that already at that time King Peter perceived that he would never by means of his own abilities be able to wipe out the memory of the services rendered by the Obrenovich dynasty to Serbia.

For employment in the negotiations with the Austrian Government and with the Serbian politicians and military leaders,

¹⁾ A few years after the accession of King Peter, Müller died suddenly leaving his family consisting of a wife and children in poor circumstances. Nenadowich thereupon, in view of Müller's services in bringing about the restoration of the Karegeoregvich dynasty applied to King Peter to make a present of a sum of money to the family as an expression of his appreciation. But all representations were made in vain.

King Peter had provided Nenadowich with general powers written and signed by him in autograph, with respect to which Nenadowich before his death at Zurich in 1915 left instructions to the effect that they should be delivered after his death, not to King Peter but to his son, the Crown Prince Alexander.

By these means he wished to afford eloquent testimony to his own displeasure at the ingratitude shown by King Peter towards himself and family.¹⁾

There has been noted a tendency to ascribe the overthrow of the Obrenovich dynasty to purely internal political influence in Serbia, the same having been carried out by the aid of Russian support, and likewise to proclaim the Serbian Army men who had performed the deed, as a band of hired assassins. Erroneous views such as these need to be set right, all the more in view of the fact that the Army men who had participated in the deed, acted, with a few exceptions, in the complete conviction that they were about to put an end to an unbearable situation, as indeed it was.²⁾

This was the one reason why Austria immediately extended her recognition of the new situation in Serbia—I recall in this connection the debates in the Hungarian Parliament in June 1903. For these reasons accordingly, Austria rightfully expected a loyal attitude toward herself on the part of the new ruler. King Peter, on the contrary, ruler of Serbia by the grace of Austria's and his cousin's acts, felt himself absolutely free from any obligation of thanks toward Austria, although he must have known that his father Alexander Karageorgevich had already been the recipient of important favors from Austria after the assassination

¹⁾ It is quite understandable that the publication of these facts should be disagreeable to the Karageorgevich dynasty. Some years ago when a merchant by the name of Steva Lukatschewitsch known as one of the participators in the dynastic conspiracy, began publication of the compromising documents touching the matter in question, King Peter caused a large sum to be paid to him by way of 'hush money'.

²⁾ It was just those very Army men who had participated in the act of conspiracy, whom we find later, while affairs were attaining a further development and particularly during the Serbian wars, performing their duties as patriotic, efficient and gallant officers.

of Prince Michael in 1868.¹⁾ Immediately upon his accession King Peter conducted himself as ruler of a Greater Serbia, who expects salvation alone in St. Petersburg and who, despite his moral obligations to Austria, does not hesitate to lend his support to Austrophobe propaganda in the Slavic Crown Lands, particularly in Bosnia, and to receive in his palace at Belgrade certain revolutionary elements of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy in order to conspire against Austria. Scarcely had he taken his place in the Government, when, for the purposes just mentioned, King Peter summoned to his side the Austrophobe Radicals and banished from his presence all Austrophile elements to whom both his cousin Nenadowich and his first Adjutant Damnjan Popowich belonged. And to add to all this, it seemed that now proper regard was no longer to be paid to Austria as a neighbor State, not even in purely commercial and economic questions, as for example in the matter of deliveries of military supplies. In this connection are to be mentioned the incidents of the years 1905—07 with respect to Serbia's orders for the purchase of artillery (Schneider, Creusot, Skoda, Krupp), the arbitrary corrections of the Military Commission's reports by the Serbian Government against Krupps' interests out of which arose the conflict of the Serbian Minister Wuitsch at Berlin with Minister-President Paschitsch in which the former charged Paschitsch with lying and denounced him as a liar. It was, accordingly, a quite comprehensible thing when Count Goluchowski inaugurated his economic contest against Serbia, a contest which Serbia could not have successfully carried on if she had not received economic succour from Germany and both economic and political succour from Turkey, particularly with respect to the transportation of the ordnance purchased in France—a succour which Serbia repaid with ingratitude.

And yet it is commonly believed down to this very moment that it was really only economic antagonisms that conspired to bring down upon Austria and Serbia a conflict so unfortunate for both of them, a conflict for which even in Germany Austria is so largely blamed, a conflict which, as subsequently intensified, led to the annexation of Bosnia and to the European war.

¹⁾ See Eduard von Wertheimer's Count Julius Andrassy, Vol. II p. 45.

Her political rivalry with Austria had impelled Russia not only to immediate recognition of the new régime in Serbia, but likewise to claim the credit, with special reference to her interest in the Serbian people, for establishing the new dynasty in the seat of Government. The Russian Minister Tscharikow had, from his window in the embassy opposite the Royal Palace beheld the events as they took place on the night of terror, when the Royal couple were assassinated, and had given expression to his satisfaction in a most cynical manner in order that he might gain the sympathy of the new dynasty and garner the fruits of his labours, namely, the utter banishment of Austrian influence in Serbia. Once again a characteristic example of the monstrous immorality of the Russian Imperial diplomacy.

And as a matter of fact the Russian Government actually succeeded in making the Serbian nation believe that Russia had freed it from the régime of King Alexander and Draga Maschin, and even abroad it was generally accepted that Russia was the spiritual protector of the new situation in Serbia.

Because of the family ties with the Italian Court, Italy recognized the new status in Serbia. The relations of King Peter toward his brother-in-law, the King of Italy, had been very cordial even during the time when he was only a pretender to the Serbian throne, and King Victor Emanuel had a high personal esteem for King Peter.

Out of consideration for their allies and likewise in consideration of the receipt of economic trade advantages, both Germany and France likewise lost no time in useless hesitation before recognizing the new order of affairs in Serbia.

England alone refused to extend recognition to the new situation in Serbia and broke off diplomatic relations. The same Sir Edward Grey who had formerly claimed to have incontrovertible proofs at hand, so far at least as concern King Peter being privy to the crime of King Alexander's assassination, afterwards and during the European war, whose immediate cause had likewise been an assassination, overwhelmed King Peter with evidence of his especial esteem for him. It required all the influence of the King of Italy at the Court of St. James to procure a change of sentiment in the English Government and to

enable negotiations to be entered upon between Sir Edward Goschen at that time British Ambassador at Vienna and Milowanic at that time the Serbian Minister at Rome—negotiations which eventually led to a favorable conclusion. And in the same connection it is interesting to note that the King of Italy, who must have known exactly how matters had gone at the assassination of King Alexander, continued to preserve his personal affection for King Peter, but as regards his cousin Nenadowich, refused any longer to receive him, although likewise he must have known that the latter had been only the executor of King Peter's commands.

I have considered it necessary to present these details, in order to demonstrate with what different motives one and the same circumstance may be examined by the Governments of the several States, and how great a part personal considerations play in such matters, and how greatly the commonly held conception of morality, which assuredly should be the same for all mankind, may suffer injury.

The whole manipulation of this dynastic overthrow in Serbia by Count Goluchowski being the fruit of his personal vengeance against King Alexander¹⁾, and pursuing only secondarily the political tendency having for its object the expulsion of Russian influence in Serbia,—all this, entirely without the knowledge or approval of her German ally, held within it the germ of heavy menace to the peace of Europe, whereas there was added to the already existing causes of antagonism towards Russia a new and secret cause of antagonism, which waxed in size with the passing of the years and which neither Germany nor England had any intimation of, thereby making it impossible for these two States in their political conferences of the ensuing years to give due consideration to the fact. Furthermore, the ungrateful conduct of King Peter towards Austria awakened so great a disillusionment, hatred and contempt among Austrian Statesmen,

¹⁾ Count Goluchowski had interested himself in the matter of bringing-about a marriage between King Alexander and a German Princess, and King Alexander had deceived him in an unprincipled manner, having personally assured him, only a few weeks before his marriage with Draga Maschin, that he consented to the marriage project.

as to make absolutely inevitable a future settlement of the differences by force.¹⁾

In establishing the historical facts, the new Austrian Government will perform a great service if it makes public, so far as is now practicable, the archives which relate to this part of the history immediately preceding the breaking out of the Great War.

And likewise the Constituent National Assembly of the newly created South-Slavic State should not evade its responsibility in the throwing of light upon important historical facts which had their influence on the creation of the new State.

¹⁾ Austria did nevertheless, attempt upon various occasions to improve her relations with Serbia. In this connection I recall the consent of Emperor Franz Joseph to receive King Peter at Budapest in 1911. Milowanowich had already made all preparations for the visit, even the day had been fixed, when suddenly King Peter declared his unwillingness to make the journey, his decision having been due partly to fear of the Serbian Comitadjis and partly to his weakness of character. His action made a bad impression not only in Vienna but also upon Mr. Milowanowich.

II. THE ANNEXATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA.

The unnatural feature about the inner situation of Serbia since King Peter's accession to the throne lies in the fact that the Radicals, who had performed absolutely no service in aid of the inauguration of the new régime, had attained to control of the Government as a result of King Peter's lack of strength and moral weakness, and have been united by indissoluble ties to King Peter's Government down to present times. And quite naturally there arose out of this situation a lack of mutual confidence and trust between the Radical Party and the dynasty, and on the other hand because of this undeserved partiality for the Radicals, King Peter lost the confidence of such of the military, the politicians and parties, as for example the Liberals, who had really helped him to his throne. The result was that the new dynasty enjoyed the sympathy of none of the people, and had no personal followers of any importance nor has it any at the present day. The new ruler was looked upon as something purely decorative, but even as a decoration King Peter was a failure, and as a result no one bothered much about the Court.

As a consequence of the insignificant character of the new ruler, the Radicals succeeded, with ever growing strength, in grasping the conduct of Foreign Affairs, and their leader Paschitsch was confident of being able to stage a grand political policy on big lines and with anticipated results that were replete of high future promise. And while striving to attain his objects by the employment of medieval political methods he was actually able to obtain some temporary successes against Austria, which, as later developments demonstrated, were purchased very dearly by the Serbian people. In view of the fact that Paschitsch, as chief representative of the Radicals and united to them by the closest ties since the creation of the Party, was able to cause his own conceptions of party morality and political methods to be adopted by the great majority of the Party, it will be quite within the scope of this work if I furnish the reader briefly with a sketch of his personality and his policies.

Paschitsch, of Bulgaro-Macedonian origin, studied at the Polytechnic in Zurich. By profession an engineer, he devoted himself in his early years entirely to politics and already in the 80's he became the leader of the Radicals. Since the beginning of his political career he has stood entirely under Russian influences and with his party behind him fought the policies of King Milan. After the revolt of Zajetschar, Paschitsch was sentenced to death in *contumaciam* because of his anti-dynastic intrigues, but betook himself to Bulgaria where he remained during the Serbo-Bulgarian war, was later pardoned by King Milan and again became the leader of the Radicals. In order to avoid a new sentence after the attempt upon the life of King Milan in 1899, Paschitsch retracted his former political views as leader of the Radicals, resigned from his old party and was thereupon given his release. Under the régime of King Alexander and Queen Draga he was even chosen to the then sitting Senate; after the assassination of the Royal couple, resuming leadership of the Radicals, he placed himself entirely at the disposal of the new dynasty with whom he had already communicated on several prior occasions¹⁾.

The meagre organizing abilities and successes of the Radical Governments in the internal administration and politics of Serbia are to be found exposed and clearly demonstrated by authorities elsewhere. And here too Paschitsch was clever enough to perform great services for the members of his own party by extending personal favours, by winning over personal enemies and by expending large sums of money to his adherents. Indeed, it would be very desirable in the interest of erecting the new South-Slavic State upon sound foundations, that in the immediate future a full light be thrown upon the methods employed in the internal politics of Serbia as above indicated.

The chief axiom of the foreign policies of the Radicals was: An enforced Great-Serbian Propaganda—whether or not the same was opportune was a matter of indifference—based entirely upon Russian influence, and directed,

¹⁾ A portion of the French press, and if I am not mistaken, the *Temps*, characterized Paschitsch like Venizelos as one of the greatest statesmen of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. One should beware of superlatives in times like these.

after the successes obtained against Turkey, exclusively against Austria-Hungary.

Under these circumstances Baron Aerenthal, who had succeeded Count Goluchowski in the conduct of Foreign Affairs for Austria-Hungary, had no choice other than to continue to pursue the Serbophobe policy of his predecessor. Serbian propaganda had succeeded in bringing ever wider areas within its sphere of influence in the South-Slavic Crown Lands. and now seriously menaced the peace and security of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.¹⁾

While there was yet peace between the two countries, it was clear that the incautious and imprudent methods employed by the Serbian propagandists were doing great harm to the more discreet elements of the Slavic population in the Danube monarchy, and as a result, all kinds of prosecutions and persecutions of innocent people were inaugurated by the Austro-Hungarian officials. And now the misery of the past four years of war justifies the Serb-Kroatian and the Czech peoples, thousands upon thousands of whom have been innocent sufferers and victims as compared to the few who are the guilty sufferers, to inquire whether the unification of the Slavs of the Serbian Kingdom with those of the Austrian monarchy might not have been compassed with fewer sacrifices, and whether this terrible sacrifice of the best manhood material and of irreplaceable cultural values as compared with what has been gained—is really worth while. I give an example:—What advantage is there to the Kroatians, who undoubtedly stand culturally higher than the Serbs, in becoming a subordinate member of the Serbian State, what interest can they have in merely exchanging the dynasty of a Habsburg for the dynasty of a Karageorgevich. Only in a union of equals with institutions quite other than the present-day Serbian ones, would union of the South-Slavs justify itself. But the goal has

¹⁾ The Friedjung trial affords us an insight into the Great-Serbian propaganda service. On the other hand it showed, too, what questionable means and what doubtful characters were being employed by Austrian diplomacy to combat the Serbian propaganda. This trial showed further, that in spite of the truth of many of the accusations, the same were not capable of proof in any court proceedings.

not been attained by merely baptising the new State as the "Kingdom of the Serbs, the Croatians and the Slovenes."

In rapid succession the causes of antagonism between Austria and Serbia ripened and came to a head.

Baron Aerenthal brought forward the Sandjak railroad project, but this was immediately countered from the Serbo-Russian side by the bringing forward of the Danube-Adriatic railroad.

As a result of this Austro-Russian antagonism Serbia's growth was prevented in the direction which it would have naturally taken if it followed the dictates of geography and those laws which nature had imposed, namely, the route to the Aegaean by way of the Vardar Valley, and she now saw herself compelled to seek an outlet to the sea through inhospitable territory in the direction of the Adriatic, where, as recent history only too clearly shows, Serbia will be troubled with a much more dangerous economic and political opponent than Austria ever was, to wit, the Kingdom of Italy.

New and artificial theories, unmaintainable in practice, with respect to the necessity of economic corridors had to be brought forward in order that the absurd geographic, political and economic change of direction might be established. The preponderating influence of Russia and blind hate against Austria had led to this goal.

Then came the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In this connection three historical facts must not be lost sight of. In the secret agreement concluded at Reichstadt¹⁾ July 8, 1876, Russia had secured the neutrality of Austria in the Russo-Turkish war in exchange for her consent to the annexation of Bosnia. In the Treaty of Berlin, all the signatories confirmed Austria-Hungary in her occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina under international law. Notwithstanding that Bosnia and Herzegovina are inhabited by a purely Serbian population of various religious faiths, these countries have never historically been a part of the Serbian domains.

As a consequence it must of course be clear that the objec-

¹⁾ See Sosnosky Balkanpolitik vol. I p. 151; Wertheimer (*supra*) vol. II pp. 296—330. Even Hanotaux in the *Histoire de la France contemporaine* says that Russia sacrificed Serbia to purchase Austria's neutrality.

tions of Russia to annexation and the claims of Serbia to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 must have rested upon some new basis.

Russia's opposition to the annexation became, in the year 1908 and 1909, so strong a one, not because it was a question of a purely Serbian population, but because the Buchlau agreements could not be kept, particularly those appertaining to questions of the Dardanelles, (principally by reason of England's opposition) and because there had arisen out of these matters a sharp personal conflict between Baron Aehrenthal and Iswolski, at that time the chief guide of Russian policies.

Even if we admit that it was not alone ambition, (the generally accepted theory in German Government circles at that time) but rather an actual menace to the security and existence of the Monarchy that forced Baron Aehrenthal to the annexation step, it is nevertheless clear that very little was actually accomplished by it aside from a change of name. It irritated Russia and provided her with a handle to indulge in further excitation of Serbia against Austria. It furnished a favorable pretext for increased agitation. Moreover the annexation had even caused Austria to suffer a territorial loss by reason of her simultaneously granted renunciation of her rights to the Sandjak, thereby abetting at one and the same time the connection of Serbia with Montenegro and the aggressive advances of Russia.

And, in fact, from this time forward, all the political activities of Russia were directed in the most intensive manner toward the creation of as large a combination of Powers as possible against Austria and Germany, with the very clearly recognizable purpose to compel a decision by force of arms at a chosen moment favourable to Russia.

The characteristic marks of this policy were:—Russia's efforts to involve England more and more in the Balkan conflicts; the designation of Iswolski as Ambassador at Paris in order to incite the French Government to renewed activities in the interests of Russian policies, and particularly of her Balkan policies; the zealous stirring up of family and diplomatic connections at the Italian Court—meeting at Racconigi, efforts to convert Italy to the Danube-Adriatic railroad project—; the agreement with Japan; the surrender of Russia's Far Eastern aspirations; efforts to induce Roumania to break away from the Triple Alliance; the

secret Russo-Bulgarian Military Convention of 1909; ¹⁾ the creation of the Balkan League under Russian co-operation and patronage; attempts of Tscharikow to win even Turkey over to the combination against Germany and Austria; zealous work and preparations in Montenegro; ²⁾ the various supplementary additions to the Franco-Russian Military Convention of 1892 and finally the Anglo-Russian Marine Convention of May 1911. The entire system of secret means employed in the drawing up of the various agreements show the guilty conscience of Russian diplomacy.

Already at the time of the annexation crisis, Serbian politicians stopping in St. Petersburg were informed that Russia would have to abandon Serbia upon this occasion because her military preparations were not as yet sufficiently advanced, but at the same time the assurance was given that in two or three years' time Russia would be so well armed that she would be able to conduct a war of offense even, with some prospect of success. Serbia must await that time with patience, and continue her work with expedition for the completion of her military preparations. ³⁾

If one adds to all this, all the material that has become public, derived from the secret diplomatic correspondence of Russian representatives abroad (See Appendix II), the frequent trips of Serbian Ministers to St. Petersburg; the redoubled exertions of the spy system months before the outbreak of the war—in Sweden, Germany, Austria, Switzerland; ⁴⁾ the continuous trial mobilizations since 1912 without subsequent

¹⁾ See Appendix I.

²⁾ See Appendices II, VII, XII.

³⁾ Statements of the Tsar, Iswolski and Sasonof to the Serbian Prince, Paschitsch, Milowanowich, Spalaikowich, who were at this time sojourning in St. Petersburg. Already once before, Russia had promised Serbia her aid on Bosnia's account. The former Regent Jovan Ristisch relates in his book *Diplomatic History of Serbia*, vol. II p. 250, that certain important political personages of Russia, among whom Shuwalof, had assured him that the occupation of Bosnia by Austria would last, at the longest, fifteen years, and thereupon Russia would settle her accounts with Austria without fail. See Appendix XV, XVI, XVII.

⁴⁾ Spionage affair of Colonel Redl in Austria, the spy activity in Geneva, the arrest of a Koenigsberg banker, the zealous labours of the Russian Military Attachés in Berlin.

demobilization; the disclosures of the Suchomlinow trial with respect to the history of events immediately preceding the war, and the Russian mobilizing order of the Autumn of 1912—from all these circumstances, Russia's plainly warlike tendency since the annexation becomes clearly apparent in spite of her hypocritical, albeit constant assurances of peace. Nor does it take a great amount of imagination to conceive how much more material of a similar nature would be made public if all Governments in the interests of historic truth should decide to make public all their documentary archives having to do with the political situation since 1908.

Because of the completely unsatisfactory status of military preparations, great satisfaction was expressed at that time in St. Petersburg that it had been possible to avoid bringing Austria-Hungary and Serbia into armed conflict by adopting a non-committal form of recognition of Bosnia's annexation¹⁾.

Although, contrary to what has been maintained, the German demarche directed to St. Petersburg in 1909 had by no means been put in a blunt, harsh form, rather however in a friendly tone, a fact acknowledged by the Russian Government to the German Government on more than one occasion, nevertheless this same Russian Government did at the very same time take the pains to represent the matter to other foreign Governments as a great humiliation and affront to Russia and as provocative of retaliation.

But in order to distract Germany from these matters and particularly from Balkan affairs, there took place, despite the previous friction, a rendezvous in June 1909, immediately after the termination of the Bosnian crisis, between the Emperor of Russia and Emperor William; and a meeting of the two rulers at Potsdam in November 1910 at which Sasonof was present, served the same purpose. To stir up Germany against Austria and to deceive Germany with respect to the Russian love of peace, these were the two leading basic ideas of Russian policy toward Germany. Again a classic example of the duplicity and dishonesty of Russian policy, so fateful for Europe!

Because of Emperor Franz Joseph's love of peace, because of

¹⁾ See Appendix XXI.

the restraining counsels and very vigorous representations of the German Government at Vienna¹), perhaps also because of the insufficient energy of Baron Aehrenthal, the Austrian Government avoided at this time accepting the uttermost consequences leading to the resistance of Serbian aspirations by force of arms.

Had it not been for the fact that both Germany and Austria were most firmly fixed in the belief that the peace of Europe, in consideration of the indeterminable consequences, would be maintained likewise in the future, they would most surely have chosen that particular moment for beginning war, as it was in a military and political sense a far more auspicious one than 1914, and what is more, it may confidently be asserted that, in all probability, despite the conflict between Serbia and Austria, the war would not have spread so as to engage all Europe.

In order that I may expose the shortsightedness of the Serbian statesmen who today yet are guiding the destinies of the country, I shall quote in this connection an utterance of M. Milowanowich, Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time, which he made to me during the time that he was staying in Berlin in connection with the Bosnian crisis, and which shows that he, too, had no illusions with respect to the lack of insight exhibited by the leaders of the political parties occupying the most responsible positions

¹⁾ The attitude of England towards the Bosnian crisis of 1908 requires special examination. Although England on the occasion of the Berlin Congress assured Austria of her entire support, (Convention of June 6, 1878: "Le Gouvernement de sa Majesté Britanique s'engage à soutenir toute proposition concernant la Bosnie que la Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois jugera à propos de faire au congrès.") she surpassed even Russia in 1909 in her Austrophobe attitude, reproached Russia because of her too yielding disposition, lent her diplomatic support to Serbia, abandoned her agreement with Serbia with respect to the pensioning off of the Army officers engaged in the conspiracy, hesitated at no financial expense for discovering the plans of the Austrian General Staff against Serbia and to communicate the same to Serbia. Austrian political circles sought the explanation for this extraordinary attitude of England in the fact that all endeavors of King Edward to separate Austria from her German alliance, had been fruitless. In this connection is to be mentioned the recall of the British Ambassador at Vienna, Cartwright, and the controversy of the German and English Governments in 1916 because of the attitude of the English Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Sir Arthur Nicholson, during the Bosnian crisis.

in Serbia. "Think of it, M. Paschitsch, at a meeting of the Privy Council which was to determine upon war or peace with Austria, although in a military sense we were entirely unprepared, declared for war. Mark what I say to you, this man will be fatal to the destinies of Serbia".

So far as Russia and Serbia are concerned, the war against Austria had already been decided upon at that time¹⁾,

1) In order to remove the source of worry which the Bosnian crisis had called forth at Berlin, the Austrian Government gave Germany the most binding assurances, that with respect to her Balkan aspirations, it was completely satiated, a fact which I, as chargé d'affaires called to the immediate attention of my Government.

III. THE BALKAN WARS (1912—1913).

As a result of Austria's annexation of Bosnia, Russia had an easy game to play in Serbia. To Hartwig, the newly appointed Russian Minister at Belgrade was assigned the task, as the principal object of his mission, to assist in furthering an understanding between Bulgaria and Serbia, and to effect the same at whatever cost. The thesis was propagated from St. Petersburg as a centre, to the effect that the annexation of Bosnia (as if it were a case of a new military occupation on a large scale) was evidence of the aggressive tendencies of Austria-Hungary toward the small Balkan States, and that the Balkan States would be able to protect themselves against the imminent danger only by mutually holding together, in other words, by means of a defensive alliance. This was the starting-point of Russian politics with respect to uniting the Balkan States, and particularly Bulgaria and Serbia; once happily united and the alliance would be used for aggressive purposes against Austria. Working in the same spirit, Tscharikow was actively busy at Constantinople, as the Bosnian annexation, according to the Russian interpretation of it, must likewise hit Turkey in a tender spot. The beautiful phrase "the Balkans for the Balkan States" was preached in all possible and impossible variants and forms, and it is significant of the mentality of the Serbian and Russian politicians (I have never believed in the uprightness of Bulgarian statesmen in this connection) that they went chasing after such Utopian dreams, and even deemed it possible that such divergent interests as existed in the Balkan States could be smoothed out and reconciled by means of an alliance—indeed they even went so far as to suggest a Confederation. But still more characteristic of the policies which the Russian statesmen supposed themselves obligated to carry out—recalling ancient methods and medieval intrigues—was the fact that they devoted themselves simultaneously to procure Turkey's admission into the League though at the same time making a division, at any rate on paper, (in the negotiations with Bulgaria and Serbia) of the Turkish Provinces of Old Serbia and Macedonia

among the three States Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece. But when the internal conditions in Turkey grew worse, they all agreed at once, that Turkey must be disregarded and that then they could successfully attack Austria.

The negotiations between Bulgaria and Serbia were very difficult, and the prospect held out by Russia of acquiring Bosnia, and Herzegovina for Serbia played a great part therein. (See Appendix III). The political aspirations, particularly of Bulgaria, to acquisitions in Macedonia were very great. The interesting thing about these negotiations was the fact that despite these aspirations it was found possible to glide over questions that affected the principle of nationality much more easily than had been the case at former negotiations, and accordingly what had formerly been recognized as purely Bulgarian territory was handed over to Serbia and vice versa. I make special reference to this fact in order to show how such ethnographical questions were formerly exploited (and are still being exploited today at the Paris Conference) although both sides are perfectly clear about it, that in Macedonia, aside from the Greek element, we have to do with a population that is a mixture of the Serbian and Bulgarian elements, which could be assimilated in the shortest possible time (a matter of a few years) by any State that rules them sensibly¹⁾. What attempts were made under the cloak of science and learning, to make Bulgars or Serbs of the Macedonians! What fools they made of the Great Powers with their alleged "proofs"! What a cross for Europe did the Macedonian question become with its fights among its lawless bands, its finance commissions and its inspectorates! In a manner that one can almost call absurd, great efforts had been made for decades, and that too on the part of Germany and Austria, to keep alive the fiction of maintaining the *Status quo* in the Balkans, and all this was done in the fond belief that thereby the maintenance of the peace of Europe was being served.

¹⁾ The question of nationality was to a great extent identical in Macedonia with the propaganda question, so that the members of one and the same family, for example a father and two sons, regarded themselves as belonging, each to a different nationality—the father a Greek, the one son a Serb, the other a Bulgarian—and indeed were set down in this way statistically.

And now, quite suddenly, an understanding had been reached upon an entirely different basis.

In Serbia there was considerable dissatisfaction with the outcome of the negotiations. On account of Bulgaria's promise of active military assistance against Austria, to the extent of 200,000 men, and in consideration of the prospect of acquiring Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia closed her eyes to the concessions to Bulgaria in Macedonia which were regarded as excessive from the nationality standpoint.

Furthermore if one keeps in view the associations that led to the making of this treaty, one observes at once that the treaty was concluded not at all from the standpoint of Serbo-Bulgarian interests, but exclusively from the standpoint of Russian interests which bore ever in mind the offensive tendency of Russian politics directed against Austria.

Already in March 1912, I had learned that the treaty had been concluded. Crown Prince Alexander of Serbia and the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Milowanowich had informed me of the execution and contents of the same.¹⁾ This fact could not help but cause the greatest anxiety to everyone that was conscious of the possible consequences. I did not conceal my misgivings from the Crown Prince and from Milowanowich. It was the fact of the preliminary negotiations before the execution of the treaty, the granting of important national concessions by

¹⁾ The details of the story of how I learned of the treaty are interesting. It was first Crown Prince Alexander who, on the occasion of my short stay in Belgrade, took me into his confidence and at the same time emphasized the fact that all parties, but particularly Russia, laid great stress upon strictest secrecy. Furthermore he expressed his astonishment at the territorial concessions to Bulgaria, and shared my views with respect to the great uncertainty that confronted us, and with respect to the incalculable consequences that might ensue. When I told Milowanowich that I had learned of the conclusion of the treaty from the Crown Prince, astonished and dissatisfied, he cried out: "How could the Crown Prince do such a thing!" Faced with an accomplished fact, he then spoke with me about it fully also, and emphasized the fact that the chief purpose of it was protection against Austria. I believe that I dare maintain that it was not lack of confidence in me that influenced him in not wishing me to know the inner contents of the treaty, but the fear that I would suspect the preponderatingly offensive Austrophobe tendency, and deduce prematurely the further plans of Russia and Serbia. See App. VII, VIII, IX.

Serbia to Bulgaria, in territory where Serbia's national aspirations would have followed a natural direction, and as compensation the assignment of territory to Serbia that belonged neither to Bulgaria nor to Russia and which Serbia would have to conquer by the sword from Austria, the extraordinary interest of Russia in causing the treaty to be made—all these factors contributed to awaken one's fears that Serbia was on the point of plunging herself into a very serious adventure, and, what was still more important, that with rapid steps we were approaching a general European war.¹⁾

On this occasion Crown Prince Alexander informed me—and this I regard it of historical importance to establish—that the Emperor of Russia had told him upon the occasion of the signing of the Treaty that now the aspirations of Serbia as against Austria-Hungary would soon be fulfilled. That this was not merely a 'manner of speaking', is proven by the whole business of the negotiations which conducted straight to a Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty under the aegis of Russia, and is proven further by all the activities of the Russian Government down to the outbreak of the European war to which I shall return later.

My stay in Belgrade at this time was to be the last time I was ever to see M. Milowanowich. A short time thereafter he died a sudden death, the circumstances of which still need to be cleared up, and from henceforth M. Paschitsch has guided the foreign policies of Serbia down to the present day, and bears likewise the responsibility for their consequences.

As Serbian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, I found myself, in view of the information with which I had been entrusted, in a very difficult position. In common with many others I regarded the agreement with Bulgaria as an extraordinarily dangerous one for Serbia and as a great menace to the peace of Europe. From the standpoint of Serbian interests as they were understood at that time in Belgrade, I had no right to be guilty of any indiscretion, particularly in view of the fact that we were faced with an accomplished act which it was now no longer possible to

1) Professor Cvijic, who was engaged as an expert to give his opinion upon the geographical delimitations and with whom I discussed the political motives of the treaty, told me that he too could not comprehend how Milowanowich could enter into such a treaty.

alter. There was therefore nothing left for me to do but to await developments, and, by warnings of a general nature, to prepare those men in authority in Berlin for the coming events in the Balkans, but only such men whom I assumed to be honestly devoted to the maintenance of peace, and among them I counted Secretary of State von Kiderlen and the French Ambassador Cambon.

I hoped thereby to make them more receptive to ideas which would serve the avoidance of a European conflict. And I had this advantage that I was dealing from my own personal initiative and that I was not bound by any instructions, but on the other hand I had the disadvantage of having to utter my fears as embodying only my personal views, without daring to appeal to the personages who were competent to correctly answer the questions involved. Moreover the death of Milowanowich robbed me of any possibility of exchanging views unrestrainedly and openly and thus to give effect to my observations and misgivings induced by what I learned and perceived in Berlin in the course of developments there.

It was clear to me that a European war (the outbreak of which could only be a matter of short delay) if it were possible by any means to avoid it, was only be prevented by a rapprochement of those Great Powers belonging to both combinations of Powers, France and England on the one hand, Germany on the other, who were not so deeply concerned in Balkan affairs—Italy had her own special interests.

Thanks to the good will and confidence unfailingly exhibited toward me by the German Secretary of State von Kiderlen, the opportunity often came to me to discuss political questions with him which ordinarily would not come within the sphere of the official utterances of the man who was acting as the pilot of German policies on the one hand, and of the man, who was acting as the representative of Serbia on the other. M. von Kiderlen displayed so high a degree of candour in his dealings with me that I considered it my duty to oppose to it the same degree of uprightness on my part, and I secured more advantage from this method of discussing political questions than I could have done from the methods of secrecy and intrigue still employed in some of the Cabinets even in this twentieth century.

By a fortunate chance, I was likewise able to maintain very cordial relations with the French and British Ambassadors in Berlin, relations which stood me in good stead in the discussion of problems which concerned the further development of political events in the Balkans and therefore directly concerned the development of the relations of the European Powers to one another, with particular regard to the menace to the peace of Europe.

It was in June 1912, only a few months after the conclusion of the secret treaty which in spirit was directed chiefly against Austria-Hungary, that King Ferdinand of Bulgaria found it necessary to make an official visit, first to Potsdam and then at the Court of the Emperor of Austria, and it was upon this occasion that I directed M. von Kiderlen's attention to the unseasonableness of this visit and warned him to particular caution.¹⁾ It went against my feelings that one could go about with a secret treaty in one's pocket directed against the very person whom one was about to visit and whom one would overload with endearments. Indeed King Ferdinand had already once before—shortly after the accession of King Peter to the throne—concluded a secret treaty with Serbia at Nish and shortly thereafter disclosed its contents to the Austrian Government, and it will be indelibly written in history that Bulgaria during the régime of King Ferdinand played the traitor toward each one of her allies.

In the meantime there had developed among the allies and particularly in Bulgaria and in Serbia, that high degree of activity which customarily precedes war. All during the summer secret visits and conferences were taking place between the Serbian and Bulgarian General Staffs, the details of a war against Turkey were fixed upon to minutest particulars, the mutual support to be afforded was accurately determined, a secret Military Convention was concluded in the event of a war with Austria and Roumania²⁾, and Military Commissions to place orders for supplies were sent abroad in great number. After the harvest had been

¹⁾ M. von Kiderlen, who, as is well known, placed no check upon his utterances when it was a matter of giving expression to his personal sentiments, answered me that I need have no care, for he knew this "sly fox" and would proceed wth great caution.

²⁾ See Appendix IX.

gathered, there followed the embargo on grain export, the mobilization order and the war.

I bring this all forward as proof of what was afterwards confirmed to me by Serbian Army men, that for the men high in authority in Serbia and Bulgaria, the war against Turkey had been a determined fact already months before, probably as far back as the conclusion of the secret treaty on February 29, 1912. The contents of the secret treaty, as well as of the Military Convention are confirmatory of this view. There are too many details to be found therein which are inconsistent with the view that they had reference to some indefinite war to be conducted at some indefinite future time. It is just among the Balkan States that such foresight as this is not to be presumed, but rather a mutual lack of confidence with respect to any occurrence the inception of which had been foreseen in advance.

In July 1912, during the absence from his post of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I called the attention of the Under-Secretary, M. Zimmermann, but quite in a general way, to the increasing military activities of Bulgaria as well as to the constantly growing threatening attitude of Bulgaria towards Turkey, and I did not conceal my anxiety. This interview came to the knowledge of the Bulgarian Government. I was requested by the then acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, to make a report as to what I had told to the Under-Secretary of State with respect to the attitude of Bulgaria, in view of the fact that the Bulgarian Government had complained of my utterances and had expressed its indignation that I had permitted myself "to warn the German Government with respect to the attitude of Bulgaria, the ally of Serbia, at precisely the moment when Turkey was being engaged in a hard conflict with Italy; the meaning of which was, that there would never again arise a better opportunity for attacking Turkey".¹⁾ I replied to the Serbian Government, that in the interest of the general peace in which Serbia, too, must surely be interested, I had considered

¹⁾ The connection between the Italian policy and the policy of the Balkan States as against Turkey — the conclusion of Peace between Turkey and Italy on the one hand (Peace of Ouchy October 15, 1912) the declaration of war of the Balkan States against Turkey on the other—is now placed in its proper light.

it absolutely necessary to bring my personal observations, with respect to the growing decline in the good relations of Bulgaria and Turkey, to the attention of the German Government which was imbued with the most peaceful tendencies and was prepared to do everything possible, in consideration of the menacing consequences, to prevent a Balkan conflict whose possible issue was so incalculable, and that I felt sure that steps taken in this behalf by Germany at Sofia would not fail to have a restraining influence. As it was impossible for them to maintain at Belgrade that they did not share my views with respect to the necessity of keeping the peace of Europe or to admit, to put it more bluntly, that they did not care a rap about the peace of Europe, provided Serbia's claims be satisfied regardless of the cost, my answer was accepted; but only too soon thereafter there arose another occasion when my utterances proved distasteful to the hazard-playing, chauvinist politicians of Serbia.

How, when and why Greece attached herself to the League does not fall within the scope of this work. Montenegro, too, did what the others did.

Each of the allies sought a pretext for war.¹⁾ Bulgaria led the way, in its provocations to war as against Turkey. Pains were taken to place the blame for the war on Turkey.²⁾ The Governments of the Great Powers with the exception of Russia and perhaps also (but for another reason) of Austria³⁾ were not

1) As is well known Serbia employed as her pretext, Turkey's refusal to permit further deliveries from France of artillery and munitions consigned to Serbia by way of the Straits and which were now to be employed against Turkey. The Turkish Ambassador in Berlin, Osman Nizami Pasha, had up to the last minute most urgently pressed his Government, to cause the prohibition to be removed, and the Turkish Government, in spite of all that had occurred was prepared to do so and only demanded a declaration on the part of Serbia, of her honest intentions toward Turkey. Indeed the Serbian Minister at Constantinople, Nenadowich expressed his personal regrets to the Grand Vizier at this act of his Government's ingratitude.

2) Proclamation of King Ferdinand of Bulgaria to his people October 19, 1912 in which there is even some talk of a contest of the Cross against the Crescent.

3) Austria is said to have secured knowledge of the contents of the treaty from Serbian sources by the payment of a large sum as compensation. In this instance, too, it is urgently hoped that Austria will now disclose nearer

entirely clear in their minds with respect to the premeditation and the singleness of purpose in the plans of the Balkan States. When, at the beginning of the conflict, M. von Kiderlen expressed to me his opinion that the Balkan States in case of a successful war against Turkey would destroy one another over the question of the division of the spoils, I then considered it important to suggest the possibility, yea, the probability (I dared not disclose to him my certain knowledge of it) that the Balkan States had already come to an understanding also as regards the question of dividing the spoils. And again it happened that this communication, which had been expressed merely as a suspicion, became known in another quarter. This time it was the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Poincaré who transmitted it to the Serbian Minister in Paris, Wesnitsch. The latter immediately memorialized the Serbian Government over my presuming to say such a thing to the German Secretary of State. Again my Government demanded of me more explicit details about the matter. I replied that I had regarded it as of advantage that the German Government should receive (rather from us than from any one else) a survey of the probable results of a successful campaign against Turkey, in order that it might thereby perceive that after a successful conclusion of military operations against Turkey no further menace to the peace of Europe was to be feared because of dissension among the Balkan States. And again this argument was found satisfactory at Belgrade, probably however only because of the fact that I was in good faith communicating matters to the German Government which were strengthening the latter in its belief in the possibility of maintaining the peace of Europe, and because I was thereby hiding the bad faith of Russia and her satellites.

details and publish the names of the persons concerned. When the annexation crisis had been happily ended (as was supposed), through Serbia's declaration of her acceptance of it, the Austrian Minister Count Forgach in the course of a conversation with the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Milowanowich, stated that he felt himself in duty bound to thank the latter to whose exertions it was mainly due that Serbia had been restrained from taking a dangerous step, but that he wished to take this occasion to inform him, that he (Milowanowich) would be surprised if he knew how many of Serbia's best social circles could be mentioned as standing in the pay of Austria.

At this point I take the occasion to speak out with entire candour and to publicly reproach my Government for having, during a period of many years, made a systematic misuse of my knowledge of German conditions and my personal relations at Berlin, and now for the first time I perceive therein the one reason why they retained me for so long a time at this post.

M. von Kiderlen was a statesman of the Real Politik school and clearly perceived at once that the Balkan States having picked a quarrel with Turkey, the latter would be defeated. Upon this point he had expressed his convictions to me immediately before the outbreak of the war, and after the first Serbian successes, congratulated me in a truly cordial manner. M. von Kiderlen did, at all events, attempt whatever he could (whether he did the right thing, judging matters from the present standpoint, is another question) to restrain Austria-Hungary from taking any steps which in his judgment might endanger the peace of Europe. Thus, for example, when Count Berchtold was on a visit at Berlin, and had under consideration the re-occupation of the Sandjak because of the Russian intrigues and of the ever growing menace of the situation in the Balkans, M. von Kiderlen, as he himself told me, advised him urgently against the step, because, as he represented it to him, it could lead to new complications among the Great Powers similar to the Bosnian crisis, and because Austrian policy would thereby merely stultify itself. When the Albanian question rose to the surface, M. von Kiderlen, without consulting Vienna (a method of procedure which was accepted with ill-grace by Austria) but acting again solely in the interests of the general peace, arbitrarily caused to be announced in the North German Gazette that the Albanian question was a European question that required to be solved, not by a single Power, but by all the Powers in concert.

It was incomprehensible to me that in Berlin and Vienna they had not as yet seen through the secret designs of Russia. But on the other hand, because of the accurate knowledge at Belgrade, of Russia's plans and mental reservations, I was justified in fearing that my communications with respect to a policy of honest support on the part of Germany of the aspirations of the Balkan States, would on this account not receive sufficient credit, and as I did not want to assume the responsibility alone, I requested

that personal investigation should be made on the spot in order thus to secure a conviction of the truth. And accordingly I requested that there should be sent to Berlin Nenadowich, the former (recalled) Serbian Minister to Turkey, who, because of his family relationship with King Peter, his intimate relations with the Russian Court and his knowledge of the situation in Turkey, was especially fitted for undertaking the task. M. Nenadowich was received privately by M. von Kiderlen in the most cordial manner, who thereupon, with complete candour set forth his views with respect to the policy that would be pursued by Germany, and Nenadowich forwarded to Belgrade a report of the matter that was in complete accord with my own observations.

I am able conscientiously to assert that already in October 1912, at a time when it was not yet known what the issue of all these events would be, Germany's chief object throughout all her decisions in the Balkan struggle was, singly and alone, the maintenance of the peace of Europe.

In contrast to this, how was Russia conducting herself? Montenegro, in order that her ruler might successfully conduct his Stock Exchange speculations at Vienna, had already declared war on Turkey, October 8, 1912, and was the first of the Balkan States to do so. M. Sasonof, who had charge of Russia's Foreign Affairs happened to be in Berlin on his way through to St. Petersburg. And although the Balkan League was the creation of Russia, and was to be employed as an implement of Russia against Turkey and Austria, M. Sasonof tried not to be outdone by the leading statesmen of the other Great Powers in his denunciation of the Balkan States and their way of doing, because of their disturbance and endangerment of the peace, security and order of Europe. By these means he hoped to divert all suspicion of any complicity on the part of Russia¹⁾ In only one respect however

¹⁾ In order that we may establish the duplicity of this leading Russian statesman, it will be interesting to cite certain utterances of Sasonof, which he made to the press in Berlin at the outbreak of the first Balkan war:—

Interview of Sasonof in the National Zeitung, October 8, 1912:

"We have done everything possible that we could do under the circumstances. Of course the situation is still very critical, but there still exists a possibility of causing both sides to retire. I have explained to the diplomatic representatives of the Balkan States with whom I have spoken,

was this demonstration of indignation honestly meant, namely, with respect to the fact that the moment chosen by the Balkan States for letting loose the war, was not considered a favorable one

that the whole business was for them a question *de calcul*, the Great Powers having agreed not to permit of any territorial changes. They can make their own calculation. On the one side the costs of mobilization, and on the other the cost and risks of war. And that which they attain will in both instances be the same thing:—reforms in Macedonia, already promised by the Porte. The Balkan States know that they have nothing to hope for in the way of territorial expansion even in the event of a successful war (and of course this applies likewise to Turkey). Whether with such prospects as these they will allow it to come to war is their own affair and they must carry the responsibility. The Great Powers will, if there is no other way out of it, quietly watch the further development of things, in view of the fact that the localizing of the war is a resolved fact. The final liquidation between the belligerents can not be accomplished against the wishes or without the co-operation of the Powers who are in the position to have the conclusions they arrive at, respected. I am greatly pleased that I have had the opportunity today here in Berlin of meeting the Imperial Chancellor and M. von Kiderlen once again. German diplomacy and particularly the Secretary of State have from the beginning seconded my efforts to bring about solidarity of action on the part of the Great European Powers, in the most loyal and forceful manner. M. von Kiderlen has personally labored most zealously to promote an understanding between London, Paris, Vienna and Petersburg which has now happily been attained. It is therefore not correct to make a distinction, as regards this question, between Triple Alliance and Triple Entente. At this moment it is a question that concerns all Europe which has united itself to assure the maintenance of peace." Compare the report of the Berlin Correspondent of the Frankfurter Zeitung of October 9, 1912, evening edition No. 280:—Minister Sasonof received several newspaper men yesterday evening before his departure, and in general expressed himself much to the same effect as in the already published interview of the National Zeitung. Of the declaration of war by Montenegro which meanwhile attained confirmation, he spoke with some bitterness, but insisted repeatedly that the Great Powers were determined to localize the war with all the means at their disposal—political and if need be military. In an interview with the Local Anzeiger it is stated:—"The foundation of this decision of Europe is the solidarity of the Great Powers which has been made public during the last few days, and above all the Russo-Austria understanding that has been arrived at. The Cabinets of Petersburg and Vienna have again found themselves standing on the same ground with respect to the controlling lines of their Balkan policy as was pursued by them from time immemorial: the maintenance of the status quo and the integrity of Turkey. The mutuality of their points of view had caused them both easily to forget the small mis-

by the Russian Government. By his present attitude, Sasonof came into the good graces of the European Cabinets, who looked upon him now as the opponent of Pan-Slavic tendencies in Russia, an assumption which, as further developments showed, was by no means a true one. If it had really been so, then the breaking out of the European war would not have found him still occupying the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs.

When the Serbian troops advanced through Albania to the Adriatic after their excellent military successes, the Albanian question arose to the surface in a new form. Austria-Hungary and Italy demanded that in accordance with the principles proclaimed by the Balkan States and having regard for the principle of nationality, an independent Albanian State be created and from the very outset protested against a permanent occupation of Albania by Serbia and Greece.

The acquisition of the northern part of Albania by Serbia had indeed been provided for in the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty, concluded under Russian patronage, and it was Russia who had fortified just these Serbian politicians of the Radical party in the pursuit of their plan for a Danube-Adriatic railroad, an economic corridor through the Sandjak, and the occupation of several harbours

understandings (sic!) which had temporarily clouded the old friendship between the two neighbour monarchies, and there was not the slightest doubt that this Russo-Austrian accord would outlive, with the best of results, all of those difficulties which by any possibility might ensue out of any future situation in the Near East. Looked at from this point of view Europe may regard with calmness the further development of things in the Balkans. A Balkan war, even admitting that it cannot longer be prevented at the eleventh hour, is no European war. But united Europe may look upon the struggle with folded arms. A few weeks and all will be again as it was and the map of Europe will keep its former appearance. Whether we have to do with the victors or with the vanquished, there will be no territorial changes in the Balkans. The Russian Minister expressed himself as greatly pleased with his Berlin visit and gave the assurance with especial vivacity that the conclusions which had been drawn from the fact of the Russian trial mobilizations, were entirely erroneous. It was only a matter of a calling out of the troops for muster, a practise which was provided for by law not alone in Russia but in other countries. To ascribe to it any connection with occurrences in the Balkans was to attribute designs to Russia from which it was further removed than ever." See interview with Sasonof in the *Temps* October 6, 1912.

there. As has so often been the case with Russian diplomacy, it had again made a misreckoning. Having regard to Germany's restraining counsels upon her ally, Russia had not counted upon so strong an opposition on the part of Austria and particularly on the part of Italy, and in view of the fact that the moment had not yet arrived for striking at Austria-Hungary, it became necessary to disavow these aspirations of Serbia, which indeed in their essence were Russian aspirations, and to represent the matter as if it were only Serbia's claims to Albania and the Adriatic Sea that menaced the peace of Europe. It was an obvious falsification of the facts in the face of all Europe, and out of it arose, as it seems, certain differences between the Russian and Serbian Governments. I remind the reader, for example, of the obstinately worded interviews of Paschitsch, notably in the *Times*.¹⁾

When a storm of indignation broke loose against Serbia on the Albanian question because of its alleged menace to the peace of Europe, and when danger arose that the most important question of all, namely, the question of the menace to European peace, would be removed still further from the real centre of trouble at Petersburg, I considered it necessary, and that too from the standpoint of Serbian interests, to issue a warning with respect to this distortion of the facts by Russia, and to call it to the attention both of the German Secretary of State and of the representatives of England and France.

This took place at the end of November 1912. In my interview with M. von Kiderlen touching this matter, I started with the assumption that no illusions were being entertained with respect to the real causes of the Balkan war, and with respect to the purposes that were to be attained by means of it. Judging from the history of events immediately preceding this war it was obvious that the conflict of the Balkan States with Turkey was only the first phase of a great plan devised by Russia to bring about, after having attained a successful result against Turkey, a movement of the Balkan States against Austria, and once for all to decide the quarrel with Austria over the hegemony of the Balkans. The whole Adriatic policy of Serbia was Russian-made with an anti-Austrian tendency. It was therefore unjust to reproach

¹⁾ *Times* of November 25, 1912.

Serbia that she alone, because of her Albanian and Adriatic claims, was menacing the peace of Europe. If, now, Russia should desert Serbia because of Albania and the Adriatic ports, her attitude in the matter would not be an upright one. All of those Powers, including the Entente Powers France and England who really wanted peace in Europe, absolutely needed to inform themselves with respect to the designs of Russia, and to demand that Russia should once for all make clear what it wanted in order that they might determine whether it was consistent with their own vital interests to follow Russia in this question through thick and thin, and plunge themselves into a European war. And Austria, too, could no longer endure the constant provocations of Serbia, which it had to meet with counter-measures as a result of which their mutual relations were becoming increasingly strained. Moreover, with respect to Russia, Austria found herself at the turning point where it had to decide whether it had any prospect, by conciliatory measures, of attaching Serbia to her side, or whether it would have to reckon in the future with the opposition of Serbia as the vassal and battering-ram of Russia, and thereby let it come to a conflict with Russia thus drawing into the war States like Germany and France who were not directly interested in the struggle.

The Balkan question as thus unfolded would be a good measuring-rod by which to estimate the peace intentions of the several Powers. Such was, generally speaking, the purport of my representations. M. von Kiderlen had followed me in my observations with attention, and had expressed his agreement with many particulars, but he told me nothing of what he had in mind to do in this connection. From a friendly source—M. Stein of the Frankfurter Zeitung—I learned that my exposition of the facts had made a 'good impression' on the Secretary of State (I make use of his very words) and that in conjunction therewith, representations would be made by the German Ambassador at Petersburg. A few days later I received a telegram from M. Paschitsch to the effect that M. Sasonof was furious at me because of my statement to M. von Kiderlen, but he added in his telegram that nevertheless I was not entirely wrong in informing the Secretary of State that Russia stood behind Serbia in the Albanian question. A short time thereafter there appeared

in the *Wiener Tageblatt* a note inspired by Russia, in which reference was made to the statement made by me to the Secretary of State with reference to Russia's attitude in the Albanian question, and in which it was stated that the Russian Ambassador in Berlin had been instructed to denounce my statement as a falsehood. I requested further information from M. von Kiderlen in this matter. He told me that it would be unnecessary for me to take any steps in the affair, as he had already done what was necessary, had a conference with the Russian Ambassador and had come to an agreement with him to have the Wolff Bureau make public the fact that the report of the *Wiener Tageblatt*, was based upon a purely arbitrary supposition, and that no such conference as regards an alleged statement of the Serbian Minister (he purposely let the word 'Minister' stand, because in the newspaper note in question the same word had been employed, thereby furnishing additional evidence of its untrustworthy character) had taken place between the Secretary of State and the Russian Ambassador. This ended the matter.

The consequences of the representations of M. von Kiderlen in Petersburg were that M. Sasonoff played the injured innocent towards the German Ambassador and affirmed Russia's love of peace, and on the other hand, towards the Serbian Minister he let loose a torrent of unrestrained abuse against me and charged me with the folly of daring to maintain that the Russian Government's sentiments were not upright with respect to its love of peace.¹⁾ And this is the man who presumed as late as March 1916 to refer to the European war in a speech to the Duma as "the greatest crime against humanity."

I likewise talked with the British and French Ambassadors about the ambiguous attitude of Russia. And at that time already Sir Edward Goschen took occasion to inform me, what indeed he often afterwards confirmed in course of time, that he had received direct from the mouth of Sir Edward Grey

¹⁾ I learned these details after the outbreak of the war from the Serbian Minister then serving at Petersburg. Through Hartwig, the Russian Minister at Belgrade who had been an intimate friend of Milowanowich's, Sasonoff must have learned that I was well informed with respect to Russian policies, as this is the only explanation there is for his unbounded bitterness against me.

most binding assurances that upon no consideration would England enter into a European conflict because of Balkan matters, an assurance which England gave likewise to the German Statesmen, nor did the latter have any doubts as to its uprightness. And it was just this situation that made possible a useful co-operation between the two States in the interests of peace. I consider it important to establish these facts in this very connection, because thereby and in contrast thereto, Russia's ambiguous attitude and continued evasions become particularly striking.

The French Ambassador did not believe that Russia would venture to stir up a European conflict without England's assistance, nevertheless he expressed himself at that time as being likewise anxious about 'certain' secret Pan-Slavic influences at the Russian Court, an anxiety which M. Cambon also expressed (likewise as to Iswolski's influence) to the Belgian Minister, as may be noted in his reports made public by the German Government.¹⁾

In the assumption that in the Balkan conflict England, France and Germany were equally interested in the maintenance of peace, and having regard on the one hand to the proposals of M. Poincaré (at that time conducting Foreign Affairs for France), to bring about a declaration (collective declaration) of all the Great Powers with respect to their 'désintéressement' in the Balkan conflict,²⁾ and on the other hand having regard to the firm determination of the German Secretary of State von Kiderlen to localize the Balkan conflict, I considered the moment not unfavourable to sound those members of the two combinations of Great Powers, namely, France and Germany, who were only secondarily interested, as to whether, in the event that Russia and Austria should plunge into the conflict (a danger that lay near), a localization of the war would then be possible. For me the question was the more important, because, as I have already

¹⁾ Belgian documents 1905—1914 Nr. 94, 102, 103, 113.

²⁾ Note Poincarés October 31, 1912: "Les puissances reconnaissant que l'heure approche où elles pourront exercer leur méditation entre les belligerants de la péninsule balkanique et continuant de placer au premier rang de leurs préoccupations la maintien de la paix européenne, déclarent qu'elles s'appliqueront à leur oeuvre commune dans un esprit d'absolu désintéressement."

indicated, it was my conviction that the European conflict could be avoided only in this way.

First of all I spoke with the French Ambassador about it, because I assumed that France particularly, having just concluded an agreement with Germany covering Morocco and the Colonies (with many „ifs” and „buts”, it is true) had no reason to place in jeopardy what she had attained because of Russia’s policy of Expansion, and no wish to haul Russia’s chestnuts out of the fire. M. Cambon was greatly interested in the question but more from the standpoint of what Germany’s attitude toward the matter would be, and without by a single word indicating that such a localization would be advantageous and desirable for France. As a matter of fact the question could be looked at from many points of view. On the one hand, the purpose might be to avoid a general conflagration of the Powers, even though the Balkan conflict should draw Russia and Austria into it, and I believe that I am not wrong in the assumption that both England and Germany would not evade a discussion of this question. But on the other hand, such a localization might be considered desirable for the reason that in a conflict between Russia and Austria, the latter being forced to fight alone would in all probability come off second best, as a result of which Germany would be materially weakened. In such a case Poincare’s formula of *désintéressement* would have meant nothing else than that it was desired to bring the war of the Balkan States against Turkey to a successful conclusion by securing Austria’s non-intervention, so as to make it possible later to attack as per plan, the morally weakened Austria and finally Germany.

In the following pages will be found briefly set forth an account of how occasion was given me to discuss this theme with M. von Kiderlen, and in connection therewith the communication made to me by the latter of a statement that was of great importance to Serbia.

Just at this time, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, San Giuliano happened to be sojourning in Berlin, and M. von Kiderlen sent for me in order that I might, for the further conduct of the business, and after conferring with Count Berchtold and M. San Giuliano, inform my Government of the leading lines of policy of the Triple Alliance with respect to the Balkan conflict.

I thanked M. von Kiderlen and stated that the occasion was very opportune for putting to him a question, an answer to which would place me in a position to pass judgment, whatever his answer might be, on the results that were to follow from the Balkan war; for, a straight and clear answer to the question I was to propose to him, would determine the attitude of the other Great Powers, put an end to a situation full of uncertainty, and put in the right light the obligations, responsibilities and dangers which arose out of the present situation. In connection with the anxiety I had recently expressed to him with respect to the attitude of Russia, and because of the danger that Austria would necessarily have to intervene in such an affair as this (a question indeed in which all the other Great Powers were interested in a far less degree) I took the liberty to put the direct question to him, namely, what would be the attitude of Germany, if it should come to a conflict between Russia and Austria, assuming of course that France, too, the ally of Russia were to be prepared to adopt an identical attitude? Thereupon M. von Kiderlen replied that it was quite agreeable to him that I had touched upon this question, and that in connection with what he proposed to tell me, he wished to give me his views upon the question quite openly, but that I should make use of only a portion of what he said in my communication to my Government. He said: "However much it is to be desired from the standpoint of the peace of Europe to hold fast to the idea of localizing the Balkan conflict, even though Russia and Austria should plunge into the combat, nevertheless it is my view that such a localization of the war is under existing circumstances, alas, impossible, because I do not believe in the uprightness of the French politicians.¹⁾

¹⁾ I was told a great deal by M. von Kiderlen and by various others about the Morocco negotiations that caused me to suspect that the two treaty-making powers did not approach the conference in the same spirit; that Germany strove for an upright and permanent understanding (whether the means chosen for obtaining it were well chosen is another question) but that France wished to escape from her tight corner as a temporary expedient only until the day of reckoning with Germany had arrived. And it was just this feeling among the German Statesmen that they were not dealing with an honest co-contracting party, that had a stifling influence upon the negotiations, and M. von Kiderlen has often expressed to me his regret that such was the case, and did not conceal his personal mistrust of M. Poin-

There would therefore arise in such a case a *casus foederis* for Germany towards Austria. But I hope that just on this account every leading statesman of the Entente will feel the terrible responsibility involved in setting in motion a conflict so incalculable in its consequences. The Triple Alliance are clear in their minds about the fact that the end of Turkey is in sight, and they do not propose to prejudice in any manner the results attained by the upward-striving Balkan States. Austria, however, and Italy and likewise Germany would perceive a menace to their interests by Russia if Serbia should reach the Adriatic. Aside from the Adriatic, they are placing no obstacles in the way of the expansion of Serbia in any direction. Indeed the Triple Alliance would even support Serbia in her efforts entirely justified as they are from the Serbian standpoint, to attain an outlet upon the Aegaean Sea, and even in the case of a design to acquire Saloniki, they would help Serbia, just as they would place no hindrance in the way if the Bulgarians should march into Constantinople. The valley of the Vardar with its outlet into the Aegaean, that is Serbia's natural ground for expansion, that has been created by the geographical facts and is quite in accord with the actual political facts. Also as regards Albania, one must reckon with the sensitiveness of Austria and Italy, and, besides, by the very principles proclaimed by the Balkan States, the Albanian nation has a right to independence. As to whether it will show itself capable of establishing a workable State structure, that is of course another question with respect to which opinions may differ, although it would not be right to utter judgment upon it now".

I did not omit recommending to the very special attention of the Serbian Government this important communication setting forth the leading lines of policy of the Triple Alliance. But, unfortunately, the Serbian Government gave no consideration to this counsel, because it had committed itself in another direction, and because both the ruler and the responsible leaders of the Serbian State possessed too little statesmanlike and moral qualities to promote a national policy that accorded with the actual potentialities and interests of the country, or to make it in-

caré, so that it is probable that Germany would have been ready to make even greater concessions to France, if she could have reckoned upon an honest understanding. See App. XI, XIX.

dependent of Russia. The unreasonableness and immaturity of the Balkan States, particularly Serbia and Bulgaria, have brought it to pass that the natural course of development, which might finally have freed the world from the intolerable Balkan question, was rudely abandoned, and that the development of things in the Balkans has taken an entirely different direction from that which could logically have been foreseen—and has led direct to a world drenched in blood.

M. von Kiderlen died at the end of December 1912 but his successor M. von Jagow in no way altered the peaceful tendency of German policies, and I was in the position during the ensuing period, to present my Government with the incontrovertible proofs thereof, and to communicate further the well-intentioned, upright and friendly counsels of the German Government—counsels which were given no more consideration than the previous ones.

During the peace negotiations in London, and in the course of the conference of Ambassadors meeting simultaneously, the German Government devoted its constant efforts—and this was admitted on the part of both England and France—towards moderating the various conflicts of interests, but it was particularly helpful in taking the edge off the antagonism that arose between Russia and Austria on the Albanian question. And accordingly it is in Vienna ascribed to Germany's restraining influence that Austria gave up her demands to have the towns Djakowa and Dibra placed under Albanian sovereignty.

It was only from the standpoint of maintaining the European peace that no hesitation was felt by Germany in bringing such pressure to bear upon the Austrian Government in connection with several questions as to cause a disagreeable feeling in Vienna so that often in Government circles there they saw themselves obliged to put a good face on a bad bargain. Even the Russian Ambassador at Berlin, Swerbejew, gave me confirmation of the fact (with special reference to the Albanian question) that he, too, was convinced of the unselfish and conciliatory designs of the German Government and of its restraining influence upon Vienna, and he probably reported to his Government along similar lines.

In a spirit of impartiality, I wish to take this occasion to

affirm, that the Austrian Government, likewise, did all it possibly could, already at the time of the first Balkan war, to avoid a war with Russia, and that, having regard to Austria's former aspirations in the Balkans, she showed herself satisfied, comparatively speaking, with a minimum of demands. Who would ever have thought it possible that Austria would permit, through Serbia's occupation of the Sandjak, a direct connection between Serbia and Montenegro thus to be effected, and thereby make it only a question of a short time when the union of the two lands would be complete! Or, to go a step further, who would have believed that Austria would ever allow Saloniki to pass from the hands of Turkey and without causing it to come into her own hands, to leave the matter in such a position that it might come into Greek, Bulgarian or even Serbian hands, or that Austria together with Germany was less interested in the occupation of Constantinople than England. In the light of the above, what remains of Austria's alleged *Drang nach dem Osten* (Chéradame) or 'aggressive advance in the East' with Saloniki as a goal? How could Austria have given it up so easily if this were really the fixed axiom of the Austro-Hungarian policy?

The despatch of Prince Hohenlohe in February 1913 on a special mission to St. Petersburg without a previous consultation at Berlin, likewise shows that Vienna regarded it as of importance to effect an understanding with Russia at that time.¹⁾

The cold reception accorded to this mission at Petersburg shows, on the other hand, that the Russian Government had settled down to carry on an anti-Austrian policy, with the result that the opinion prevailed in Berlin, and quite rightly, that if under any circumstances an understanding could be arrived at between Austria and Russia, it could only be done through the intervention of Germany, in view of the fact that an understanding of Russia with Germany was more within the range of possibilities than an understanding with Austria.

As further evidence of the Russophil tendency, if I may so term it, of Austrian policy at that time, I present the following which I had reported to me from an authentic source:— When

¹⁾ See Appendix X.

the Berlin authorities reproached Count Berchtold with the fact that the attitude of the Austrian Government throughout the whole Balkan crisis had been an indecisive and wavering one (I have reference, among other things to the speeches of Count Berchtold to the Austrian and Hungarian delegations) Count Berchtold offered in his own defence the statement that the conduct of Austrian policy had been made very difficult for him, for the reason that from the beginning of the Balkan conflict his hands had been tied by his instructions received from highest authority to the effect that he might conduct matters as he pleased save that under no circumstances was he to permit it to come to a conflict with Russia.

So far as Germany is concerned, Austria received her honest support. This is plainly established by the repeated declarations of the Imperial Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg in the Reichstag, and was shown particularly in the case of the occupation of Scutari by Montenegro. It was possible to maintain the peace of Europe at that time because Germany stood behind Austria, because England wanted no European war for the sake of Scutari, and because Italy by reason of San Giuliano's partiality for Albania was at one with Austria. Had Germany wished a European war, she had here again, in a political and military sense, a much more favourable occasion than in July-August 1914.

And likewise in the negotiations at London which preceded the Second Balkan War, Germany did not omit to offer her restraining counsels in the capitals of the Balkan States. Prince Wied even, who, as is well known, was domiciled at Potsdam and as German Prince hoped that he had a right to reckon on German support, was strongly advised not to accept the Albanian offer of princely sovereignty, for the reason that complications were feared. But when in spite of this, he determined to accept, he was plainly given to understand by Germany that he was doing it at his own risk and responsibility.

The London negotiations afforded a terrifying picture of the discord among the Balkan States and the aimless character of their demands. Indeed no better proof was needed to establish the absurdity of the aims of Russia's Balkan policies, whose highest object was the creation of a Balkan League under Russian protection. The Rumano-Bulgarian, the Serbo-Bulgarian and the

Turko-Bulgarian negotiations are typical examples of the fact.

In the negotiations between Serbia and Bulgaria which preceded the second Balkan war in the Spring of 1913, Russia made desperate efforts to bring about an accord.¹⁾ And in this connection special reference must be made to the telegram and letter of the Tsar of Russia to the King of Bulgaria.²⁾ They could not possibly have been drawn up in this form, had it not been for the fact that as regards the aims of Russian policy there was danger that they could not be carried out owing to the discord existing among the Balkan States.³⁾

¹⁾ I will never forget how with tears in his eyes and in all seriousness the Russian Ambassador, Swerbejew, asked me, if it were not still possible to avoid the war and to effect an accord, when as a matter of fact the Serbians and Bulgarians had already been fighting terrible battles for fourteen days.

²⁾ See Appendix XX.

³⁾ The attitude of the Russian and French press was significant, particularly an article in the *Temps* of July 4, 1913, probably inspired by Iswolski, in which is plainly shown at the very outset, the unbounded fury which was felt at the failure of the Russian scheme.

„La Démence Balkanique. Les Etats Balkaniques ont commis la folie, dont leurs amis se plaisaient à les croire incapables. Ils n'ont pas osé se déclarer le guerre. A son tour enfin la Roumanie mobilise, et la crainte qu'elle a d'arriver trop tard permet de redouter de sa part de brusques initiatives. Les alliés ont une responsabilité politique solidaire dans cette néfaste aventure. Les discussions de chicane, par lesquelles ils ont compliqué l'un après l'autre la préparation de l'arbitrage, les vaines réserves qu'ils ont accumulées sur la route de la seule solution possible, les alternatives incohérentes de conciliation et de résistance par quoi ils ont retardé l'intervention libératrice de l'empereur de Russie donne la mesure de leur esprit politique. Il serait puéril et fastidieux de les départager. Tous, chacun à son heure se sont mis dans leur tort. Communes aussi leurs sont les responsabilités militaires. Si les Bulgares semblent avoir attaqué les premiers, les Serbes ont aussitôt montré qu'ils ne désiraient qu'une occasion d'élargir en guerre véritable les rencontres d'avant-postes. Les Grecs qui s'étaient plaints légitimement des coups de canon tirés naguère contre leur flotte par les Bulgares de Kavalla se sont infligés par l'écrasement sans gloire des 1200 Bulgares de Salonique un discrédit pareil. Ces agressions successives n'ont rien de la grandeur d'une guerre. Ce sont de mauvais coups de surprise oblique et peu honorables. Que sera la suite? Pour l'Europe elle ne s'annonce pas, sauf complications très redoutables. Car les Etats Balkaniques, par leur façon de procéder, ont fait le vide autour d'eux. S'il leur plait de s'entr'égorguer et de se diminuer eux mêmes, ils détourneront en quelque sens que ce soit, les grandes puissances de les soutenir.

Nevertheless all the efforts of Russia led to no result, because, as the *Temps* at that time remarked, and quite justly, the Balkan States were incapable of understanding the 'higher' interests of Russia that were being put to the hazard, whereas the Bulgarian mentality was incapable of comprehending that every agreement of human origin must rationally, as circumstances change, be subject to alteration, and that profit must correspond with the size of the investment, and that particularly in the case of public law, the rule *rebus sic stantibus* has always played a great part. For there was no doubt of the fact that in the war against Turkey, Serbia had performed greater military services for Bulgaria than she had bound herself to do, and that therefore she had the right honestly to demand and expect compensation. Furthermore, and this point is still more important, the result of the first Balkan war was that Serbia had to abandon her claim to certain territory, particularly in North Albania, although secured to her in the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty, the reason for such abandonment being that Russia saw herself compelled to give up for the present her aggressive designs on Austria and to wait for a more auspicious moment to carry them out, having regard for the fact that discord was a reigning factor among the Balkan States, that Austria had

Car il est désormais acquis que soit dans un sens. soit dans l'autre il est impossible de faire fond sur eux. Une partie européenne engagée dans de telles conditions serait injustifiable. Les grandes puissances, croyons-nous, sont dès maintenant d'accord pour tracer autour des Balkans un cordon sanitaire et se protéger contre les conséquences d'un accès de démence collective, qui ne peut s'apaiser que dans l'isolement. Au point de vue balkanique la situation n'est que trop claire. L'œuvre d'un an d'efforts est à terre. Même si les adversaires se lassent après quelques jours de combat — ce qui est fort probable — ils sortiront de là affaiblis matériellement et moralement, jouets de l'Europe et non plus maîtres de leurs destinées. Pour racheter leur faute et se replacer dans l'estime du monde au point où ils étaient il y a trois mois, combien d'années seront nécessaires ? Le présent détestable qu'ils se sont ménagés pèsera longtemps sur leur avenir. Ceux qui les avaient cru assurés d'un sort meilleur le constatent avec tristesse." See similarly *Au bord de la Folie* of May 29, *La Douloureuse* of July 5, and *La Guerre Fratricide* of July 6.

Nevertheless the Balkan affairs led to the European war.

An examination of the various leading articles of Tardieu in the *Temps*, particularly covering the first Balkan war 1912 and thereafter, offers valuable material for an understanding of the critical judgment passed upon the political developments that led to the Great War.

made numerous concessions, and that England's attitude was not favorable to her plans. And likewise in the negotiations that preceded the Second Balkan War—and this again is important for fixing the responsibility for the European war—Russia was continuously insisting to Serbia (in order to induce Serbia to make greater concessions to Bulgaria) that the acquisition of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Serbia was only a question of a very short time (See App, IV, V, VII.)

In the consideration of the reasons why an agreement could not be arrived at between Serbia and Bulgaria at this time, too little weight has been assigned to this particular point, embodying as it did all that was unsound and unhealthy in the whole basis of the negotiations, and more important still, showing that Serbia and Russia, from their point of view, did not regard the two Balkan wars as a final determination of the development of things in the Balkans (although Bulgaria, Greece and probably Roumania did so regard it) but that they regarded these two wars as only the first step toward a war with Austria—in other words a general European war. How otherwise is it to be explained that the Serbian Government failed to assure itself of an immediate compensation for the greater military exertions it was obliged to make for Bulgaria's benefit? In view of the mutual mistrust existing among the Balkan States. and the tricks and strategems employed in their diplomacy, it was not a natural thing to expect that one could have complete confidence in the breadth of view of one's co-contractors, or that one could rely upon a subsequent arrangement to provide mutual satisfaction to all the parties. It is more likely that in Belgrade and Petersburg they argued as follows: "For the present let us not raise the question of Serbia's claims to compensation; when our program has been carried out, that is to say when we have united the Serbian South-Slavs under Russian protection, then we shall be able to satisfy also the claims of Bulgaria, and it will be an easy thing for Serbia to console herself for the loss of some territory in Macedonia. But if, already now, we satisfy the political claims of Bulgaria, in that case we shall no longer be able to win over the Bulgarians and particularly King Ferdinand to grant Serbia the necessary assistance against Austria." As a matter of fact the affair turned out quite differently. The plans against Austria, for the

reasons already stated, had to be postponed, but the settlement with Bulgaria could not be postponed. The result every one knows. By way of proof, I am in a position to quote a highly characteristic utterance of the Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paschitsch, which he made to me personally in 1913, at Marienbad, immediately after the Serbo-Bulgar war, and which I regarded at that time as an expression of insane megalomania. His words were as follows: "For the sake of acquiring Bosnia and Herzegovina likewise, I might have caused a general European war to break loose already at the time of the first Balkan war; but as I feared that in that case we should find ourselves compelled to make greater concessions to Bulgaria in Macedonia, I desired above all to secure possession of Macedonia for Serbia in order that when that was secure we might then move forward to the acquisition of Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹⁾

That sentence speaks volumes. Is it possible to imagine greater presumption briefly expressed?

Could there be a better proof of the political poverty of all the Great Powers without exception.

This one sentence shows that, due to their mutual feelings of distrust, the Great Powers had come to such a miserable and shameful pass that their very existence or non-existence, the weal or woe of England, France, Germany might depend upon the favour and ambition of a few politicians and fanatics, the representatives of small States which are less advanced in civilization—upon a Paschitsch over whom a Sasonof spread his protecting hands.

States possessed of century-long annals in the works of civilization and political experience were played against one another like trumps in a game of cards.

That Serbian Statesmen were in all seriousness convinced that

¹⁾ Paschitsch expressed himself in similar terms to the Greek delegate at the Bucharest Peace Conference in 1913, M. Politis. After the execution of the treaty, Paschitsch, while passing out of the Conference chamber and adding emphasis by clapping Politis on the shoulder, remarked: *La première manche est gagnée, maintenant il faut préparer la seconde manche contre l'Autriche.*"

the peace of Europe depended upon the attitude of Serbia, is shown by the fact that even a man of the statesmanlike qualities of Milowanowich who was Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs during the annexation crisis in 1909, soon thereafter became a candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize.

King Edward is dead, but Viscount Grey, whose peace intentions were honest, will have his own thoughts with respect to this dark chapter in European history.

I find the explanation of this megalomania in the fact that Russia is a member of the European family of nations, in the difference of civilization and the difference in the spiritual standards that belong to her individual leaders. I regret having to utter so severe a judgment upon Russia, for many of her brave sons have given up their lives for the sake of their race relationship with Serbia. If I do so, it is only in the interest of historical truth and with the sincere hope that the Russian people may emerge purified from their sore trials, and that out of the unfortunate past it may draw a lesson for the future. It is necessary that all countries join in the work of making impossible the return of conditions that have led to this terrible war. All consideration for the events of the past must be abandoned, all that was evil in the past must be disclosed and must be excluded from the new epoch and the new conditions. Thus, and not otherwise, will the streams of blood that have flowed, fulfill some purpose. The nations owe it to their fallen sons to carry this out, cost what it may.

The next important phase to be studied for a critical judgment of the events immediately preceding the European war is the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913.

The tendency of the negotiations, conducted under Roumania's leadership, was to elucidate the necessary consequences arising out of the military successes and failures, with particular regard to the act of betrayal and defeat of Bulgaria and to the creation of a new situation in the Balkans. Without suffering any military sacrifices Roumania had attained important political and territorial results, and it was to be expected that Roumania under King Carol's régime honestly wished a consolidation of the newly created situation, which was for her, as the new leading power in the Balkans, of so advantageous a character. Inspired by

these considerations Roumania laboured for the establishment of relations with Greece and with Serbia, in order to prevent any possible future disturbance of the new balance of power in the Balkans, by Bulgaria and Turkey. There was every reasonable ground for the belief that the Christian Balkan States, including Bulgaria, would be engaged for years to come, in the consolidation of all that had been attained, and that the national aspirations of the Balkan States had been achieved and the period of war-like complications brought to a close.

In order that it might have a free hand also towards Austria, the Roumanian Government (M. Paschitsch told me that this had been told to him on the occasion of the Peace conference at Bucharest) did not wish to renew the Military Convention that had formerly been concluded with Austria. But as against that, those high in authority in Berlin took under account that Roumania, in spite of the most strenuous exertions of the Russian Government, wanted no longer to be bound in any manner to Russia. Nevertheless Majorescu's Government had in the meantime renewed the Treaty of Alliance with the Triple Alliance, the same having been concluded not only with Austria, but likewise with Italy and Germany and under the strictest conditions of secrecy towards Russia. And it appears that the Roumanian Government (no longer, as I believe, the Ministry of Majorescu, but the Ministry of Bratianu), on the occasion of the presence of the Russian Emperor in Livadia, likewise concluded certain secret agreements with Russia. These contradictory occurrences ought likewise now to receive full elucidation.¹⁾

During the peace negotiations in Bucharest, both King Carol and Majorescu repeatedly gave well-meant counsel to the Serbian Government to the effect that it should strive for an improvement of its relations with Austria-Hungary, for it was the view of the

¹⁾ Doubtless in course of time Roumania will furnish further evidence of Russia's secret activities so threatening to the peace of Europe. How far the same have to do with political factors in England and France, will have to be examined separately. But that there can be no doubt that such co-operation existed as between Serbia and Russia, is shown by the fact, among others, that Paschitsch, chief of the Radical Party declared in an election speech in 1911 already, that the fate of Serbia was inextricably bound up with that of the Entente.

Roumanian Government that only in this wise would it be possible for Serbia to found any political permanence on her brilliant military successes. It was again M. Paschitsch who told me this, and I received a confirmation of it from the German Secretary of State, M. von Jagow.

It was a matter of course that Germany should have only feelings of entire sympathy for a Balkan League which was to have so solid and sound a basis as Roumania had in view in the interests (as was well understood) of all the Balkan States.

Acting from the standpoint that from henceforth the Balkan League was composed of States, all of them like-minded and resolved upon maintaining the peace (from the standpoint of their own peculiar interests it would have been absurd to assume anything else), Germany, disregarding the mistrust of Austria, did not shun taking steps with respect to this question which were in conflict with Austria's interests, nor hesitate to block Austria's political activities in Roumania, and to put an end (alas, only temporarily) to the Balkan quarrels by the personal intervention of Emperor William (the well-known exchange of telegrams with King Carol).¹⁾

By this refreshing act, the hope revived once again that the peace of Europe, the more serious dangers having been overcome, was from henceforth assured.

In an interview with the Berlin representative of the New Free Press of Vienna, I gave full expression to this feeling of satisfaction and likewise accorded entire recognition to the far-seeing policy of the Great Powers, particularly Germany, and from a purely juridical standpoint based upon the Treaty of Berlin, regarded as established the requisite recognition of the new situation in the Balkans on the part of the signatory Powers to the Treaty of Berlin.

If also the Governments of the Balkan States, who were interested in the maintenance of the new *status quo*, had adopted this point of view, I have no doubt but that Germany would have converted even Austria, in the interest of the general peace, to formally recognize the new situation in the Balkans

¹⁾ By her conduct at that time in Roumania Austria did great and irreparable harm not only to herself, but to Germany—a fact which the events of the following years fully substantiate.

and its continuing validity. But, as it was, the question remained an open one and the feeling of uncertainty and irresolution was kept alive. There arose at this time a storm of indignation against me in Serbian public opinion. The weak Powers in their self-conceit saw themselves in the 'seats of the mighty'. That they must 'concede' to the Great Powers the right to recognize the new situation, was entirely out of the question. Indeed my Government requested me to deny the interview. But I refused to do so. And I foresaw already at that time, with great anxiety for the future, whither the path was conducting which they were about to follow.

That Germany was prepared to do everything in her power to side-track anything that threatened peace, is shown by an occurrence which in and of itself has no great significance, not at least if compared with another occurrence which it preceded by only a few months, but which just in this connection seems worthy of repetition. The Austrian Government had begun some surveying upon an island in the Danube belonging to her in the neighborhood of Semendria. The Serbian Government, much concerned about this measure, brought the matter to the attention of the other Great Powers. When I came to discuss the matter with the Under-Secretary, M. Zimmermann, who was acting Secretary at that time in the absence of his chief on leave, the Under-Secretary took the matter up with great energy, and through the German Ambassador at Vienna obtained the necessary information. He thereupon told me that I might inform the Serbian Government that there was no reason for it to be disturbed, the German Government had received quieting assurance from the Austrian Government that the measure in question embodied no aggressive designs, and furthermore that in a military sense it was of minor significance. And again upon this occasion the Under-Secretary did not fail to ask that the Serbian Government take seriously to heart the lesson that it was necessary and desirable for both sides to see to it that relations between Austria and Serbia improved; and that Austria wanted nothing from Serbia beyond a true and correct attitude and conduct.

How far Germany could go in her love of peace and also in her honest feeling of friendship for Serbia is shown by the following occurrence, which happened a few months later, in August 1913.

As is well known it was quite against her will that Serbia

conceded the delimitation of the frontiers of Albania to the Great Powers, and she had declared again and again that the delimitation had been an arbitrary one and that Serbia owing to the fact that she had not obtained certain strategical points, was subjected to continual invasions of the Albanians into Serbian territory. A few months after the frontier delimitation, when the Albanians did indeed actually invade Serbian territory, the Serbian Government took immediate steps, but without securing the previous permission of the Great Powers, not only to drive back the Albanian bands, which indeed she had a perfect right to do, but likewise to arbitrarily occupy the strategic points of considered importance. The representatives of Serbia abroad who had become very boastful after Serbia's military successes, as if they themselves had won the victories, now made no scruple of again charging Austria with having incited the Albanian movement. And again Serbian officialdom severely tried the patience of Austria.¹⁾

In the conferences that I had in the course of the month of August 1913 with M. von Jagow when this question was discussed, he counselled the Serbian Government repeatedly to employ greater restraint, in view of the fact that Austria, after all that had happened had grown very sensitive—he had in mind, too, the many concessions voluntarily or involuntarily made by Austria during the Balkan wars—and I overlooked no opportunity, in my reports, to most urgently impress these really well meant warnings upon my Government.

One day I was summoned by the Secretary of State who requested me to most urgently warn my Government to be extremely careful and reserved in its dealings and utterances as regards Austria because Austria's patience was at an end and in all seriousness she was preparing at very short notice to take military measures against Serbia."¹⁾

¹⁾ Interviews Vesnitch. Even the then legation secretary at Berlin, Jovanovich, now Minister at Berne, made use of my absence, without having any inkling of the threatening danger, to pen a criticism for the Local Anzeiger on Austria's Albanian policy, and M. von Jagow complained to me that Serbia was paying no attention to his well-meant warnings.

¹⁾ June 6, 1910, Attentat in Sarajewo against General Wareschanin.

June 8, 1912, Attentat in Agram against Cuvaj.

September 40, 1912, Attentat in Agram against the Banus of Kroatia, Baron Skerletz.

June 18, 1913, repeated attentat against Baron Skerletz.

I at once took train for Belgrade in order that I might in person repeat this exceedingly important communication to the King and to the Government, particularly as I expected a personal conference to have a more powerful effect; but, alas, I found an incomprehensible indifference and the representative of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Spalaikowich—M. Paschitsch had not yet returned from his leave—having lulled himself into a feeling of security, assigned no very great importance to my communication and acted as if there was no longer anything to fear from Austria. In the meantime M. Paschitsch had returned from his leave so that I was able personally to communicate to him likewise the well-meant warnings of the German Government.

As I have often shown in the course of setting forth the views presented in these pages and with the proofs at hand, the Serbian Statesmen, in their political calculations, frequently took stock of factors which had no actual existence. For example, the British Ambassador in Berlin told me that M. Spalaikowich, mentioned above, had told the British Chargé d'Affaires that Roumania would answer any attack by Austria upon Serbia with an immediate declaration of war. This assertion which, even if true, ought never to have been repeated to a third person (because if it was a question of an alliance against Austria only Roumania would have the right to speak of it), must surely have come to the attention of the Roumanian Government, and one can well imagine what an unfavourable impression such assertions must have made upon serious political circles in Roumania. However much Roumania honestly might have wished for a political connection with Serbia, the task was rendered not only more difficult but absolutely impossible even for the most convinced supporter of such a policy, by reason of Serbia's entire political activity (which led to the breaking out of the European war). Or could it be that Roumania had already then bound herself in this wise to Serbia and Russia?

Moreover as regards this period of the history of events immediately preceding the war, Giolitti, the former Italian Premier had spoken in the Italian Parliament before the outbreak of the Italo-Austrian war, and indeed in this wise, namely, that Austria in August 1913 had besought Italy to consent that Austria might

begin military operations against Serbia. Italy, however, had refused her consent.¹⁾

And here again we are given a demonstration of the duplicity of Italy's policy: in the Albanian question standing close to Austria against Serbia and in her attitude toward Serbia on this question often outdoing even Austria, and yet acting in such a way (what M. Paschitsch was able to give me confirmation of during my stay at that time in Belgrade) that it was made to appear as if it were Austria alone who was inciting trouble against Serbia in the Albanian question, Italy utilized every opportunity to arouse the suspicion of the Serbian Government against Austria. For, from the standpoint of Italy's special interests in the Balkans, it was comprehensible that she wished an understanding between Austria and Serbia no more than did Russia. In Berlin on the contrary—and surely, too, in Vienna—the Italian Ambassador Bollati, under instructions from his Government, often made complaints to M. von Jagow as regards the conduct of Serbia in relation to Albania.²⁾

¹⁾ December 1914. See Italian Green Book.

²⁾ See also p. 45. Thus we see the Great Powers stooping so low as to play off one against the other by stirring up suspicion and by indulging in mutual recriminations in the small States. In this case Italy. But what did not Russia say in Belgrade about Austria? And how many years this all lasted! It is not my purpose to discuss the double role which Italy, as the ally of Germany and Austria, played during the entire period of the alliance. I desire only to call attention to a fact disclosed to me from a very authoritative source, in order that I may do what I can to prevent another historical error from creeping into the investigations with respect to the causes of the war, namely, the contention that the King of Italy had been forced into the war against his ally by public opinion in Italy, and against his will. Quite apart from the personal dislike of King Victor Emanuel for Emperor William, a fact well known in the circles of the initiated, and one with respect to which (as indeed with respect to other personal relations and antagonisms) too little account has been taken, the King of Italy had for years taken an active part in the anti-German and anti-Austrian political manoeuvres, a course of conduct to which he may perhaps have been influenced by reason of his family relations with the Russian and Serbian Courts. In times of great good fortune as well as in those of great misfortune, many an utterance is unguardedly let slip which otherwise had remained unspoken. Thus, for example, on the occasion of the visit of the King of Italy, the President of the French Republic, Poincaré, allowed the fact to slip out in his speech of greeting on December 19, 1918, that Italy

The Italian Government made no communication to Serbia as regards Austria's war-like designs, but it was Germany who exhibited friendship by warning Serbia.

After the German Government had warned Serbia, it repeatedly urged upon Austria-Hungary to employ restraint and caution in its dealing with Serbia.

This is a proof that again Germany was doing everything possible, at this period of time which immediately preceded the European war, to prevent a conflict between Austria and Serbia out of which a much wider spread of the war was to be feared. Germany showed further that even if it was true that Austria was cherishing such offensive designs, the German nation was not prepared to support her in her expansionistic appetites, but on the other hand was always disposed as her loyal ally to support Austria in the conservation of her just interests and of her prestige.

Whoever has carefully studied the diplomatic history of the two Balkan wars and gained insight into the diplomatic activities of the Great Powers and of the participating Balkan States, will not be able to maintain, if he is impartial, that Austria was at all lacking in the spirit of concession and in patience. If, in August-September 1913, Austria was proposing to begin military operations against Serbia, it was not, as San Giuliano characterized it, a *pericolosissima aventura*, but it showed simply that Austria was as the end of her patience and had become convinced that sooner or later there would have to be a settlement with Serbia by the rules of force. If the Austrian Government had had aggressive designs on Serbia or if it had been a matter of securing something beyond a tolerable understanding with her restless neighbour, it must be clear that the time for declaring war was truly badly chosen in view of the fact that Serbia had been territorially so greatly enlarged and morally so greatly strengthened by the two wars, and in view of the fact, furthermore, that the Great Powers wished peace to be maintained and greatly longed for a rest after the many disturbances and perturbations of the Balkan wars. The time of the outbreak of

had been bound to France by treaty as against her own allies since 1902, and that thanks were due for this policy above all to the initiative of the King of Italy.

the first Balkan war and at the worst and latest the time of the first Turkish defeats would have been, for an aggressive Austria, the one right and possible moment for an attack upon Serbia.

In the Autumn of 1913 when for the last time I was stopping at Belgrade and after a stay of a few days had returned to Berlin, I had already then taken with me the saddening impression that all hope of maintaining peace based on the Bucharest Treaty was but a hollow illusion. And the reason for this lay in the aggressive complexities of the Russo-Serbian policies and in the megalomania which had seized upon the Serbian Court and the Serbian Government and furthermore in the immature public opinion prevailing in Serbia. I saw, moreover, that the slightest pretext would bring on the severest of conflicts, because the authoritative factors in Russia and Serbia wanted to bring it on.

And, alas, herein again the very near future proved me to be right. For, whatever was done by the Serbian Government from the time of the Bucharest Treaty up to the breaking out of the European war—and in all that it did it received the moral support of the Russian Government—there was exhibited no trace of a policy directed toward the consolidation of the fruits of peace but there was exhibited rather a policy exclusively directed to facilitate new preparations for war.¹⁾

Financially completely tied to France, politically mortgaged out and out to Russia, Serbia steered with rapid pace straight for the conflict with Austria.

1) See Appendix VI, XVIII, XIX, XXI.

IV. THE EUROPEAN WAR.

Having in the foregoing pages discussed those questions which seemed important for the understanding of events immediately preceding the European war, it is now my purpose to refer to those events which were the immediate cause of the war.

It is first of all necessary to consider the political situation in Serbia as it took shape immediately before the outbreak of the war.

As a result of the great successes, both military and political (the latter growing out of the former) of Serbia in the Balkan wars, there had grown up a sharp conflict between the civil and military officials with respect to the question of who was entitled to the credit for these successes. The Radical Party, which felt itself all-powerful and which to this very day has often had the undeserved good fortune to be able to credit the successes of others to themselves, wished at this time to impress the stamp of party politics upon the Army also.

The moment selected for this political test of strength was nevertheless not well chosen by the Radical Party, for the majority of the Serbian nation knew perfectly well that Serbia's successes were owing not to the dynasty, not to the party Governments, not to Serbian diplomacy, but singly and alone to the proficiency of its peasant class and the tried and proven leadership of its officers. An historical examination of the events which led to the first Balkan war will establish that credit for the fact that Serbia went into this war belongs to the Officers' Corps, and that it was to the proficiency of the Serbian Army alone that thanks are due for Serbia's successes. Whereas it was just the Serbian diplomacy, exhibiting its weakness in the lack of juristic precision in the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty and in the mistakes of the Radical Governments in its negotiations with Bulgaria after the war with Turkey, that led to the breach and to the war with Bulgaria, thereby sowing the seeds of inextinguishable hatred between the two blood-related peoples.

The situation in Serbia, as a result of this discord grew so

tense that a political revolution seemed inevitable—the meaning of which was, utter ruin not only for the Radical Party but for the dynasty as well,

In order that the inevitable conflict might be postponed, and responsibility for the present events be evaded, and perhaps, too, in order that he might not have to assume responsibility for future events, King Peter retired from the Government (his state of health being the reason publicly assigned). In doing so, he entrusted the Regency to Crown Prince Alexander—a provisional arrangement which continued throughout the bitter days of trial down to the present—and the Government resolved upon concessions to the Army, and among others, to sacrifice the especially hated Minister of the Interior, Stojan Protitsch, an obstinate, aggressive personality, inaccessible to modern conditions whom it had selected as one of the leaders of the new South-Slavic State.

In order that the activities of Military circles, being aimed at the Government, might be diverted as much as possible in other directions, free play was granted to all agitatory propaganda carried on by Officers and Comitadji against foreign countries, without giving any consideration to the dangers which such agitation carried with it. Indeed, after the successes attained against Turkey, Austria-Hungary was now regarded as the country against whom one might similarly apply 'Macedonian' methods. Can any one, that knows Serbian conditions even partially, believe that the Serbian Government knew nothing of the conspiratory activities of certain circles of officers, professors and comitadji in Bosnia and that it knew nothing of the preparatory measures in Serbia for the attentat upon the Austrian Royal couple?

The story of the connection of the Serbian Government with propagandist circles both at home and abroad will require separate examination.

Had the Serbian Radical Governments known how to retain in their own hands a satisfactory amount of authority while at the same time doing justice to the proficiency of Serbian military circles, there would have been little difficulty in restraining those military men (who were participating in propaganda work and who, as convinced patriots, believed themselves to be acting

for the good of the country) from taking indiscreet measures, and it would have been easy, moreover, to have attached them to the service of the State for the development of ideas of use and value to it.

But owing to the desperate internal situation which confronted the dynasty and the Radical Government, a diversion effected by outside political events could only be welcome. And this was particularly so because in the mental view of these politicians it was possible to attain to union with the Slavs of Austria only by an understanding reached through military measures and by the complete dissolution of the Austrian State. Time, the great leveller, and the political conditions in Austria-Hungary would also have laboured for the union of all South-Slavs. But the politically ambitious willed that the natural course of evolution should be hastened by an act of force, and in their view no more favourable opportunity could have been found than in July and August of the fatal year 1914.

The indifference of the Serbian Government towards anything that might be done on the part of Austria as regards the assassination of the Royal couple, the loquacity and megalomania of Serbian diplomacy displayed in official statements and interviews together with the measureless arrogance of the Serbian press, indicated with absolute certainty that Serbia had already received the assurance of Russia that this time she would not desert Serbia. And what is more important still, Serbia must have been assured that war against Germany and Austria had been resolved upon, and the assassination of the Austrian heirs to the throne, furnished a favourable pretext for the war only because England and France had allowed themselves to be drawn into this conflict by Russia (which in and of itself was but a local conflict between Austria and Serbia).

This was unquestionably a great success for Russian diplomacy, but it also succeeded in establishing the responsibility for this unjustifiable war.

For three full weeks the Serbian Government, although daily expecting Austria-Hungary's demands for expiation, did absolutely nothing to anticipate the Austrian Government by means of conciliatory proposals and other measures and did nothing to

show an upright purpose to go as far as possible to meet the Austrian Government in arriving at some accord.

More than this, the pretence was being carried out in Serbian Government circles, and even towards the people as if nothing was to be feared from Austria, and the head of the Government and of the Radical Party, Paschitsch, set forth on an election campaign in the interior of the country immediately before the arrival of the Austrian ultimatum, as if not the slightest disturbance had arisen in the relations of Serbia to the neighbour monarchy, and, as is well known, the Austrian Minister was obliged to deliver the ultimatum to the Minister of Finance, as acting Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Is it possible to believe that the Serbian Government could have displayed so frivolous an attitude towards Austria if it were not already carrying about in its pocket the most binding assurances from Russia?

If one compares the officially published exchange of telegrams between the Emperor of Russia and the Crown Prince of Serbia immediately before the outbreak of the war, one can read between the lines that we have here to do only with a ratification *post festum* with respect to a matter that had long since been resolved upon.¹⁾

Why did Russia, already in February 1914—it is a notorious fact—begin with her trial mobilizations, and why did she not demobilize the “trial” mobilized troops and why did she continue these trial mobilizations down to the time of the outbreak of war? How was it possible that the Serbian Minister in Petersburg could inform his Government already July 23 (N. S.) and likewise the other legations, by circular message that the Russian Government had ordered the mobilization of two million men and that the enthusiasm for war in Russia was tremendous?

During the critical weeks which immediately preceded the war, I was spending my leave, taking the bath-cure in Carlsbad, and having already in May been appointed diplomatic agent at Cairo, I had already given up the conduct of affairs in Berlin. On July 25 I returned to Berlin, and on the evening of July 27 I had set forth on my return journey to Serbia by way of Russia.

¹⁾ See Appendix XXII.

When I spoke to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, M. Broniewski, about the telegram of Spalaikowich which I had read at the Legation, and gave expression to my fear that such reports coming from Petersburg would only encourage the bellicose elements in Serbia, he, too, said to me that he was surprised that they should say such a thing to the Serbian Minister even if it were true, and that they were doing a poor service to the exertions being made to maintain peace. As to whether this was spoken with sincerity, I shall give no opinion.

On the 28th of July, in company with several Serbian officers, I arrived at Warsaw. As far as the German frontier, not the slightest indications were seen of military measures. But immediately after crossing the German frontier we noticed mobilization steps being taken on a grand scale (assembly of freight cars in the several stations, military occupation of the railway stations, massing of troops in the several cities, transport of troops at night, mobilization lights). When we arrived at Brest, a state of siege had already been proclaimed (July 28). On July 29 the order for general mobilization had already been posted in Kishinef. Everything gave the impression of great offensive preparations by the Russian Army.

If Russia had really not wanted war, it is unthinkable that no correct formula could be found which would have given Austria just expiation and which would not have menaced the existence of Serbia. When we consider that it had been found possible to compel Serbia to recognize the annexation of Bosnia, which indeed was a much more troubrous circumstance for Serbia, and one where the blame, if one can speak of it as such, lay upon the side of Austria, and when we consider further that it had been found possible afterwards to steer clear of the rocks and dangers of the Balkan wars and particularly of the Albanian question, then there is no other explanation for the fact that in the summer of 1914 the war had become unavoidable than this, namely, that Russia would no longer permit postponement of a war which the Entente Powers regarded as inevitable within a not too distant time, perhaps in 1917, a war, too, which they had firmly resolved upon. Russia desired no postponement for the reason that she had no prospect that at any time in the future there would arise a relatively better political and military

constellation of facts (Italy's indolence, the inclusion of England, the relatively best preparedness of Russia, declarations of Suchomlinof).

It is often contended that England would not have taken part but for the violation of Belgium's neutrality by Germany. But already on July 16 I had it direct from Jules Cambon (and this, M. Cambon could easily and quite credibly have learned through his brother the French Ambassador at London, even if his own Government had not officially informed him of it) that Sir Edward Grey had already stated to Prince Lichnowski (this was therefore before the Austrian ultimatum became known) the following, namely, that England could not remain uninterested in the struggle in case it came to a conflict on Serbia's account between France-Russia on the one side and Germany-Austria on the other; in other words, that she would take part in the struggle on the side of Russia and France.

Thereby, Sir Edward Grey encouraged Russia and France to make war, whereas his purpose was to discourage Germany from doing so. If Sir Edward Grey had started with the assumption that Germany was prepared to continue to maintain peace, and had he, on the basis of this assumption, simply declared to Russia and France (Germany need not have heard a word of it) that England was uninterested in this conflict—retaining entire freedom of action as regards what might subsequently arise—the European war would in that case certainly not have broken out. But all this is of course on the supposition that England had not already so bound herself that retreat was no longer possible.

For the maintenance of peace England's strongest card was to keep herself free from binding obligations, and this trump card she played out of her own hand too soon, and into the hands of the very ones who wished the war.

It would not be difficult, perhaps, at some later time to establish the fact that M. Sasonof already had England's promise in his pocket, long before anybody could even think of the violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany.

If Sir Edward Grey, at the beginning of the war, was really opposed to a European war or to a war by England against Germany, then, to put it mildly, he made a mess of it, having

been out-manoeuvred by the Russo-French, the Russian, or perhaps only the French diplomacy.

As regards the Austrian ultimatum, the form of it was certainly extraordinarily sharp, and of a character such as has never before been employed towards an independent State. Unfortunately, Serbia's entire attitude towards Austria before the war (the immediate cause of the war) to a certain extent excuses the form of the note.

As regards the contents and the question of blame, however, I consider it my duty (however hard I find it and however much I regret that matters turned out as they did) to state in the interests of historical truth that the accusations of the Austro-Hungarian Note with few slight exceptions, were just and correct.

This was known in Petersburg. and it was also known in London and Paris, but in spite of all that, they were not able to prevent the war. Strange fact, truly!

As a consequence of the assassination of the Austrian Royal couple Germany saw herself placed face to face with a conflict that had burst forth suddenly, a conflict which was fetching along in its train the danger of a general conflagration which Germany had every interest to prevent, but which unlike England (assuming the good intentions of Sir Edward Grey) she had not the ability to prevent.

Disgusted at having always to be drawn into Eastern affairs only because of her alliance with Austria, disgusted at having to see herself for ever confronted with new faits accomplis (annexation of Bosnia, Mission of Hohenlohe to St. Petersburg, activities in Roumania injurious to the alliance, ultimatum to Serbia), and on the other hand always pushed to the front by Austria whenever it was a case of drawing down the hatred and envy of others (the German demarche in Petersburg on the occasion of the annexation of Bosnia, the Scutari crisis etc.) it was now the fixed determination of the German Government to let Austria-Hungary fight it out alone this time, and particularly in view of the fact that in this special instance the matter was purely an Austrian affair.

The German Government wished under no circumstances to afford Austria anything more than moral and diplomatic support in the Serbian quarrel, quite indifferent to the question of whether

the Austrian Army in Serbia should obtain military successes or defeats, provided only that the struggle was kept isolated.

"To make the punishment fit the crime," the proposed Austrian military expedition (provided one were necessary and could not be avoided) was to be regarded as a punitive expedition for the attainment of a just expiation. It must be admitted that this whole conception of a punitive expedition was an awkward and unfortunate one, in consideration of the modern relations of States and of the present-day idea of the State, and it was this that hurt Austria's ultimatum so much in the public opinion of the whole world. From the German standpoint, it was expected, although wrongly, that only in this way could the conflict be localized. In the spirit of this conception the German Government, even in the last stage of events before the outbreak of war, went so far as to recommend that Serbia offer only a pretence of opposition to the occupation of Belgrade by Austria, in order afterwards to bring it about that thereby Austria would more easily feel herself satisfied in her demands for satisfaction. Under-Secretary of State, M. Zimmermann, expressed himself to me in this wise before my departure from Berlin.¹⁾

It was Germany who compelled Austria by most vigorous representations at Vienna to make a declaration to the Entente Powers, and particularly to Russia (in case the punitive expedition could not be avoided) to the effect that at all events the territorial integrity of Serbia would be respected. Only in the case of the intervention of some third Power would Germany be obligated, under its Treaty obligations, to take part. It was thus they pictured the situation in Germany, only a few days before the outbreak of the war.

The Entente Powers, particularly Russia, instead of taking account of this immovable state of affairs which called upon them to seek a suitable formula of expiation for Serbia, and to try and restrain Austria from a military invasion by securing to

¹⁾ See Belgian Gray Book II (1915) p. 12. In characterizing these counsels as an unprecedented exhibition of arrogance, the French war literature is guilty of misjudging the German Government's conception of things at that time, for the statement referred to, made in the friendliest manner, was evoked solely by the effort to attempt even that which appeared impossible, in order to avert the peril even at the last moment.

her a peaceful satisfaction of her demands, placed themselves at once entirely on the side of Serbia. With conscious exaggeration of Austria's designs, the Entente Powers, with Russia at their head, declared (as if this were the question involved) that under no circumstances would they permit the crushing (*écrasement*) of Serbia—what indeed had never been mentioned, much less proposed—and that they would consider a military invasion by Austria as a *casus belli*. And here it is that we find the first misunderstanding.

It was only at the eleventh hour, when it was perceived that an armed conflict between Austria and Serbia was unavoidable, that a proposal for a conference was made upon English initiative, a proposal which Germany and Austria did not accept. It was now too late and they had been talking over each other's heads much too long. From her point of view, Austria had already experienced bad treatment at the Ambassadors' Conference in London in 1912, and had already on the occasion of the annexation of Bosnia refused to accept a conference so as not to give Serbia an opportunity to place herself behind her protector, to dodge and evade and to win time to accept the demands of her protector and not those of Austria-Hungary. Moreover, according to the Austrian view (a great mistake) there existed a criminal case which could not come within the competency of an international political conference. But aside from this Austria had already wasted enough time in tedious and secretive investigations, whereas Russia still required to gain time.

Whoever has studied the events immediately preceding the war in the same wide compass employed in the course of this narration, must admit, even though he has come to quite other conclusions, that the antagonisms between Russia and Serbia on the one hand, and Austria on the other, had become so intense that it would have been necessary for the Great Powers who were interested in maintaining peace to apply an expedient quite different from that of a conference in order to prevent a Russo-Austrian conflict or at least to prevent it from spreading.

It is a bold conclusion to infer from the refusal of the conference proposal that Germany, too, had aggressive designs. And not less false than this, is the conclusion which sought to maintain that Austria wanted the war likewise against Russia in

order that she (Austria) might satisfy her demands upon Serbia. One thing can indeed be maintained, namely, that Germany (whether rightfully or wrongfully is another question) did not make trial of the above-mentioned expedient so that it could be said that she had exhausted every expedient that was offered to maintain peace — a reproach which is very widely made even in Germany.

On French authority the contention was made (it was M. Jules Cambon who made the statement to me and added that the fact was known only to few persons) that the German Government would never be able to justify itself as regards one point, namely, as to why, in the last days and hours before the outbreak of the war, it had not permitted Austria to try to come to a direct agreement and understanding with Russia after Austria had declared herself at the last moment ready and willing to come to a direct understanding.

The German Government has maintained (and it will not be difficult for it to establish the point) that up to the last moment it had pressed for a direct understanding between Austria and Russia.

But even admitting the correctness of the above contention, it is a fact that the German Government has declared many times in the course of its efforts to show a justification, that it had discerned a possibility of maintaining peace in a direct understanding with England only — but this attempt to reach an understanding failed. Furthermore it had assured itself of the fact as a certainty that Russia was simply playing for time in order to complete her mobilization and concentration likewise against Germany (this has meanwhile been established beyond contradiction) and that in the interests of Germany herself, the German Government could not sanction any further diminution of Austria's prestige.

When it has been historically established that the danger of a menace to the peace of Europe came primarily out of Russia, will the Governments of France and England be able to clear themselves of blame, in that they did not recognize in time the source of the danger, and did not make a sufficient effort to isolate it? Would not the only expedient for the removal of this danger have been, to arrange that all the States, (and at their

head England) who wished to see peace maintained, should have insisted upon the demobilization of Russia? If now, in spite of Russia's demobilization having begun, Germany and Austria in their turn had mobilized against Russia, it would then have become an obligation of England and France to declare that they would not remain out of the struggle in case Russia should be attacked, and that they would permit a demand for expiation by Austria on Serbia but would not permit a violation of her territorial integrity.

If we desire to judge the facts impartially, then it must be admitted that France and England have by this omission laid themselves open to reproach in the same degree at least, as has Germany by failing to accept the proposal for a conference.

What interest could a nationally united Germany, with her unfavourable geographical situation and the necessity of conducting a war on two fronts, have had just in the year 1914 for permitting a European war to break out? Has it not been her interest since 1870 first of all among the Great Powers to maintain the *status quo*? Has she not exerted herself, in spite of the Russo-Austrian antagonism, to maintain friendly relations with Russia (Bismarck's re-insurance treaties, relations of Emperor William with Tsar Nicholas II, the Treaty of Bjärkö 1905)? Had she not afforded Russia valuable services in the Japanese, Italian and Tripolitan wars? Had she not endeavored in 1912 and 1913 without consideration for Turkey or even for Austria to find a just solution of the Balkan question on the basis of her *Real Politik*? Did she not at that time assist Roumania, Serbia and Greece to many of their territorial increases? Has all this been sufficiently recognized?

In all of these cases Germany had performed very valuable services in the interest of maintaining the peace of Europe.

These are all facts which cannot be denied.

The peace loving tendency of the German Government found expression and recognition in the reports of the former Serbian Minister in Berlin, it found its way like a red thread through all of my reports during a period of seven years and up to the outbreak of the war, it was found in the reports of the Belgian Ministers sent not only from Berlin but also from London and Paris, and it was surely present in the reports of the American,

Italian, Spanish, Dutch, Danish, Norwegian, Swedish, Swiss, Greek, Turkish and Roumanian representatives. The love of peace of Emperor William II had never for a moment been called in question by Count Osten-Sacken, for many years Russian Ambassador at Berlin, nor by the Italian Ambassador Count Lanza, nor by the English Ambassador Lascelles, nor as I am convinced, was it ever questioned by Sir Edward Goschen. One reckoned upon it as upon an axiom that one could include in political calculations with absolute certainty.

The German Empire derived only advantages from the peace period in Europe. And I cannot make out how it is possible to infer bellicose designs from Germany's economic growth and expansion.¹⁾ Think of all Germany had attained economically by peaceful competition on five continents! Her markets in Egypt, East Asia, Australia, South America, to say nothing of the United States, were continually expanding and could only further expand in peaceful competition. What enormous commercial interests were at stake for Germany in the declaration of war by the United States. What enormous economic losses she has suffered during these long-years of war. One has only to study the entire new orientation of German trade and industry during the war in order to judge of the tremendous damage in comparison with former peace conditions. And the loss of her Colonies, which she has now to anticipate!

We have to do here only with established facts.

And now, still adhering to our ground-work of facts how did matters stand on the side of the opponents of Germany?

Aside from the fateful Kruger telegram, and particularly in the last years before the outbreak of the war, Emperor William II was striving constantly for a rapprochement with England (whether the means chosen were always the right ones, is another question). King Edward, on the other hand, had felt a personal dislike not only for Kaiser William, but had at every opportunity exhibited his unfriendly feeling for the German Empire. The encircling policy of King Edward, and this history will show, was no phantom, nor an outgrowth of German fan-

¹⁾ See for example B. Maurice Milloud, *La caste dominante allemand* 1915.

tasy (as the English now prefer to represent it) but a plan devised on big lines which has been crowned with success. But even if we start from the assumption that (as the English contend) the Entente policy of King Edward was a defensive one directed against the incalculable designs of the German Kaiser (so greatly feared, because of his temperament), it is nevertheless true that, after the death of King Edward, British statesmen took this tendency of British policy in hand, and without willing it perhaps, robbed it of its defensive character. By so doing, they made it a menace to Europe's security, a fact often given prominence even in the Belgian official reports. One must examine the causes of the war in this connection also.

German commercial competition was, to say the least, a burden for Englishmen.

The mistakes of German policy (period Holstein, Bülow) widened the breach between the two States in spite of numerous efforts to prevent it (Bethmann-Hollweg, Jagow, the February 1914 agreement as regards Bagdad and Africa.) France had never given up her plan to reconquer Alsace-Lorraine; Italy had national aspirations against Austria (Trient, Istria, Dalmatia); Russia wanted the hegemony in the Balkans, Galicia and a free outlet through the Dardanelles into the Mediterranean; Serbia, after having acquired Macedonia, directed its gaze at Bosnia, Roumania at Transylvania. These facts, no less than others already mentioned are not to be slighted without granting them the consideration which is their due.

Germany did not see through the aspirations of this coalition (a great mistake in her politics), did not understand how to thwart them and when they were no longer to be thwarted did not take seasonable measures to obstruct them; furthermore she laboured for her allies as against her own interests, made enemies, lost the sympathy of the neutrals, and during the war caused many States to become her opponents who had previously taken no part. The military successes were not taken advantage of politically, all was staked upon the success of her arms, whereas her opponents, by their unsuspectedly clever publicist and propagandist activities, were able to avert all blame from themselves and foist it all upon the shoulders of Germany.

When we apply historical methods, however, it is not so simple a matter to falsify the truth.

During my two days stay in Berlin, on the 26th and 27th of July 1914, I received the impression that the situation was being regarded more seriously in German Government circles than it had ever hitherto been, in the midst of any former crisis, and that at last they had become imbued with very great mistrust of the attitude of Russia.

In consideration thereof, it was decided to employ the following method of handling the situation.

Immediately upon his return from his trip to the Northlands, the Emperor was to have personal recourse to the Tsar of Russia, and inform him that he had received information of the secret mobilization in Russia, that he regarded it as a great menace to peace, and to ask him urgently to put an immediate stop to it.

In case this request should be disregarded on the part of Russia, the German Government was resolved to accept the consequences thereof and to take such steps as, in their view, the interests of the German Empire required.

I considered it extremely important to draw the special attention of the French Ambassador to this unqualified resolution of the German Government, and most urgently to warn him of the seriousness of the situation, owing to the ambiguous attitude of the Russian Government. I told him plainly that in case Germany became convinced that the war was not to be avoided, she would astonish the whole world by the swiftness of her decisions.¹⁾ She would likewise not hesitate, if it should seem necessary, to declare war on France. Now was the last moment to negotiate, if it was desired to prevent the catastrophe. I went still further and declared to him with straight-out clearness and emphasis, that, in my view, war was inevitable owing to Russia's attitude, that Germany would therefore attack France likewise, and I

¹⁾ In a similar sense are to be understood two telegrams of the Austrian Ambassador in Berlin cited by Vesnitch in the *Journal des Débats* of March 13, 1919. Furthermore the purpose of this publication is too transparent, namely, to incite Austria against Germany, so as to prevent union with the German Empire.

requested that he notify the fact to Paris in order that, if possible, Petersburg be held back at the eleventh hour.

And what was M. Cambon's reply thereto?

M. Cambon, who, under other circumstances and in the case of much slighter occasions, for example the Scutari crisis in 1913, had always shown great agitation, received my communication quite calmly and said only: If Germany wishes to have war, she will have England against her likewise; the English fleet will blockade the German ports and in three weeks force its way into the harbour of Hamburg. The French Army men affirm that they will batter the German army to the ground (l'Angleterre ne restera pas désintéressée, la flotte anglaise forcera Hamburg, nous batterons sec les allemande). When I took my leave of him, his last words were "bonne chance."

No words of friendly caution to Serbia or counsels of restraint were uttered by him on this occasion, not a syllable as regards the usefulness or even necessity of French representations at Petersburg. He made upon me the impression of a man who had already come to accept the inevitable fact of war. I carried away with me from this, my last conversation with M. Cambon before the outbreak of the war, the certainty that the war had been decided upon, if not before, then certainly upon the occasion of the meeting between Poincaré and the Russian Tsar in Petersburg.

I cannot understand how it is possible for the French to maintain that they were completely taken by surprise by events in Germany which led to a declaration of war likewise against France, whereas as a matter of fact, they were quite accurately informed of how the situation was looked at and judged in Germany. Nor can I understand how they can contend from the purely formal act, namely, that Germany first declared war on Russia and France, that thereby was established proof of Germany's guilt as instigator of the war. The fabulous successes of the first days of the war, particularly in Belgium, did in fact cause Germany to appear in the eyes of laymen as the aggressor who had prepared for the war a long time, and had therefore 'willed' it.

V. WAR INCIDENTS.

War had burst forth upon us, the laws of force now 'had the floor', and the time was not opportune for impartial discussions as regards blame and responsibility for the war, so fateful for Europe in its causes and consequences.

The following impressions, to be sure, are devoted to incidents which occurred only after the outbreak of war. Nevertheless, their inclusion within the scope of this narrative is justified in view of the fact that, as an effect, they admit of conclusions *a posteriori* with respect to the extraordinary lack of foresight, as well as lack of a sense of responsibility and consciousness of guilt on the part, above all, of the Governments of Russia and Serbia. Their inclusion is justified furthermore because they place in the right light the question of the readiness and willingness of the several States to conclude peace during the war.

The policies of Tsaristic Russia had led not alone to a collapse of the régime, but likewise to a convulsion in the State and people, of a dimension without parallel in history.

It is true that, by the war, the South-Slavs have attained to a possibility of union. But the road of misery which the Serbian Kingdom and the Slavs of the Austrian monarchy had to traverse, the uncertain political, social and economic perspectives of the future, the treaty of the Entente Powers with Italy in 1915, and with Roumania in 1916, show that the hitherto ruling Serbian Government have arrived at certain results, not however in accordance with any previously designed plan, nor by means of its own strength and energy but because of circumstances which it had not foreseen. But these results had been pictured entirely otherwise, and for that reason, in spite of an apparently attained success, we must expect the fall of the old régime in Serbia with as much certainty as in Russia. The collapse of Russia must have evoked apprehension in the Serbian dynasty and in the Radical Party Governments (because of the complicity in the political dealings of the two States) that the policies hitherto pursued by Serbia had now been robbed of their main

support, and the occurrences at the Paris Conference confirm the fact that this apprehension will actually prove to be well founded. ¹⁾

Already at the outbreak of the war, the Serbian Government's anticipations as regards the attitude of Roumania and Greece were not fulfilled. Both States remained neutral. The dictates of good sense would not allow of their obligating themselves for a policy of Serbia, as a result of which they would have to become involved in a war with Austria and Germany. And even when the great concentric attack of September 1915 took place, leading to the conquest of the whole country, these two States remained neutral and thereby escaped the danger of having to suffer a fate like unto Serbia. ²⁾

¹⁾ See interview Vesnitch in the New York Herald of March 9, 1919: "I cannot understand it," confessed the Minister. "During the war we were continually spoken of as 'Heroic Serbia', 'Martyred Serbia', and no term was too high to express people's admiration for our military effort and endurance in the common cause. During the war the Allies proclaimed that they were fighting for principles, not interests; for the principles of justice and the right of every people to choose its own destiny and pursue its own ideals. But now! Have those principles been found inconvenient or undesirable and tucked away in Time's locker?"

²⁾ In this connection, the Atlantic Monthly published in February 1919 an interesting memorandum of Lloyd George's of September 4, 1916 to the British Cabinet as follows:—

War Office, 4. 9. 1916

I have just seen the telegrams announcing the declaration of war by Bulgaria against Roumania. This is an additional ground for anxiety which I expressed to you on Saturday as to the possibilities in the immediate future in the Balkans. I then expressed some apprehension that Hindenburg, who has strong Eastern proclivities and has always been opposed to the concentration of Germanic forces in the West, would direct his attention to the crushing of Roumania, and that we ought to be thinking out every practicable plan for giving effective support to Roumania in the event of her being heavily attacked. We cannot afford another Serbian tragedy. We were warned early in 1915 that the Germans meant, in confederation with the Bulgars, to wipe Serbia out. In spite of that fact, when the attack came we had not purchased a single mule to aid the Serbians through Salonika. The result was, when our troops landed there, owing to lack of equipment and appropriate transport, they could not go inland and Serbia was crushed.

I hope that we shall not allow the same catastrophe to befall Roumania through lack of timely forethought.

To keep these two States in line, required further great exertions on the part of the Entente who had caused Roumania likewise an irrecoverable loss in blood and treasure, and who failed to drag Greece along in the same manner only because King Constantine had known how to resist the demands of the Entente until 1917.

It surely should not have been necessary for these States to go to war in order that their national aspirations might be fulfilled. In view of the oft proclaimed principles of the Entente, and still more because of the acceptance of the fourteen points of President Wilson, these States were entitled to complete fulfillment of their aspirations, if not before, then certainly after the war. Greece, with comparatively much smaller sacrifices, will attain equally as great national and territorial results. One does not carry on war to lose it, nor to offer up to destruction the entire male population capable of bearing arms, nor to permit all one's territory to be devastated, only to find that subsequently—

There are three disquieting facts in the situation:—

1. Hindenburg's well-known Eastern inclinations.
2. The declaration of war by Bulgaria against Roumania. I cannot believe Ferdinand would have taken this risk where it was quite unnecessary, unless he had received substantial guaranties of German assistance in the attack on Roumania.
3. The slackening of the German attack on Verdun. Hindenburg will certainly give up this foolish attack at the earliest possible opportunity. The abandonment of this operation will release hundreds of heavy guns and hundreds of thousands of good troops. If in addition to this he were prepared gradually to give ground on the Somme, making us pay for it as he retires, he could transfer several more divisions from the West to the East. He could give up four or five times as much ground as we have won during the past two months without surrendering any vital positions.

4. I can hardly think that the equipment of the Roumanian Army would enable it long to resist an attack from an Austro-Germanic-Bulgarian force, armed with hundreds of heavy guns, and I doubt whether their supplies of ammunition are sufficient to enable them to get through a continuous fight lasting over several weeks.

I therefore once more urge that the General Staff should carefully consider what action we could, in conjunction with France and Italy, take immediately to relieve the pressure on Roumania if a formidable attack developed against her. There may be nothing in my fears, but no harm could be done by being prepared for all contingencies.

(sd) D.Ll.G.

years later—through entirely unforeseen circumstances, one is allowed to recover possession of that which was lost through one's own fault.¹⁾

The course of events has shown, that the participation of the small nations in a struggle between the Great Powers, must necessarily have a fatal outcome for them, regardless of how the final result turns out for the Great Ones. Belgium, Bulgaria, Roumania, Serbia and Turkey are miserable enough instances on either side.

The Entente were not able to protect the small nations who fought on their side. Good-will alone was not sufficient for the purpose. To wish to protect, is not, to be able to protect. To be protected, only to be destroyed, is really no protection.

Likewise as regards what is meant to be done about the freedom of the small nations. and the restoration of violated Right against Might, we have had in very recent history many examples and shall have many more also after the Paris Conference.

The internal conditions in Serbia at the outbreak of and during the war were not of such a character as would increase the prospects of a favourable outcome of the same. The conflict between the civil and the military forces still continued. It unsettled Government decisions, disintegrated the unity of the Army and led to a fraternal warfare on the Saloniki front. With the aid of French troops, this latter was resolved favourably to the Government who again made use of an alleged conspiracy against the Crown Prince as an excuse for passing the death sentence upon officers who, though out of favor, were otherwise very proficient men. They were the men who, at the risk of their own lives, had helped King Peter and his dynasty to the throne. King Peter did nothing to prevent the executions; Crown Prince Alexander signed the decree of execution. Both of them thereby set up a monument of their own base ingratitude.

Internally rent, and resting upon no high level of civilization, the dynasty, which had exhibited many evidences of a lack of

¹⁾ Serbia lost over half of her male population during the War. If one adds the women, the aged and the children who were lost in the retreat through Albania and during the three years' occupation, through disease and ill-nourishment, we reach a grand total that is terrifying for a population which originally counted scarcely 4,500,000 million inhabitants.

character, now stood, in the most perilous of times, at the head of the Government, under the Regency of a youthful, inexperienced, insignificant and poorly advised Crown Prince.

Was it to be expected that a Government, which even during the war put personal and party interests in the first place, which could not even maintain the internal peace (so indispensable in time of war), could posses sufficient authority to give effect to the will of the entire people? ¹⁾

With such a system and by means of such moral qualities, it was proposed to realize the union of the South-Slavs.

It is an undeserved tragic fate of the Serbian people that the odium for the world war will rest upon it and that its recent history consists of a chain of sanguinary incidents and public scandals which has so unfavourably influenced the sentiment of foreign countries against Serbia. The assassination of Prince Michael Obrenovich by followers of the Karađorđevich dynasty in 1868, the forcible separation of the Crown Prince Alexander from his mother Queen Nathalie at Wiesbaden in 1887, the abdication of King Milan in 1888, the arbitrary proclamation of his majority by King Alexander and the forcible setting aside of the Regency in 1894, the marriage of King Alexander with Draga Maschin in 1900, the feigned pregnancy of Queen Draga, the assassination of King Alexander and of Queen Draga in 1903, the scandals as regards Prince George, the assassination of the Austrian heirs to the throne.

It is to be hoped that the martyrdom of the Serbian people will now at last receive just appreciation and that this people, recognized by both friend and foe as a really brave nation, will not only fix their thoughts upon a more happy future but that such a future will actually be allotted to it.

When the Austrian offensive was started in November-December 1914 it was still the proficiency of the Serbian Army and its officers which was to avert the danger of a collapse. But soon, indeed, there was again to be launched, a new and much more menacing peril against Serbia.

In March 1915, I informed my Government, from Cairo, upon the basis of very reliable information received from Constanti-

¹⁾ See New Europe No. 97, August 22, 1918.

nople, that the Turkish Government was persistently urging and the German Ambassador Wangenheim incessantly demanding of the German Government that in the interest of its military prestige, it should square the accounts for what Austria had suffered in Serbia, and restore direct connection with Constantinople in view of its great importance, particularly now that military transport connections by way of Roumania seemed impossible owing to the hostile attitude of the Bratianu Ministry. The inauguration of the undertaking was to be a question of only a short time.

Instead of demanding (what at that time would probably no longer have been of any use in view of Germany's determination to force her way through at what ever cost) and receiving from the Entente at least 300,000 men to protect her rear flank against Bulgaria (i.e. an army such as Sarrail commanded later), the Serbian Government lulled itself to sleep, (intoxicated by the successes against Austria) considered it as out of the question that Bulgaria should venture to attack Serbia, and did not believe in a Germanic-Austrian-Bulgarian offensive even after the great Russian offensive in Galicia had finally broken down. And although Bulgaria had already ordered mobilization and the Serbian General Staff had proposed to the Government to invade Bulgaria in order that mobilization might be prevented and the war against Bulgaria, at least, be decided in Serbia's favour before it had even a chance to break loose, nevertheless the Serbian Government would not decide to take even this step. It thereby loaded itself with still more blame.

The German break-through at Gorlice had destroyed the only hope Serbia had of a military success, namely, the crossing of the Carpathians by the Russians and their invasion of the Hungarian plain.

The failure of the Dardanelles expedition, the impossibility of a break-through by the French and English on the West front, the refusal of military support on the part of the Entente, must have awakened the conviction that for Serbia the psychological moment had arrived to reach some sensible understanding with their opponents. What in 1918 was conceded to Roumania, namely to close a separate peace, would already in 1915 have had to be conceded to Serbia, if the Entente could really not

help Serbia and if it was really concerned about the welfare of the small nations.

In spite of its extremely favourable military situation at that time, the German Government made Serbia a peace offer.

Through the mediation of the Greek Government, the Imperial Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg caused it to be brought to the attention of the Serbian Government that Germany saw herself compelled to restore direct connection with Constantinople through Serbian territory. It was further declared that to this end certain military measures had been taken, the result of which could scarcely permit of doubt, but that to save unnecessary loss of life it nevertheless in advance, made offer, of peace upon the basis of the *status quo ante*, with the single exception that Serbia surrender to Bulgaria the disputed territory which had been accorded to Serbia in the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of 1912. Prince Nicholas of Greece personally delivered this proposal to Crown Prince Alexander on the Serbian front. The Serbian Government, however, declined this peace offer.

In view of the fact that Serbian Government circles had no comprehension of the daily more menacing danger of invasion and destruction and themselves would do nothing to avert the danger, the only salvation for Serbia lay in the question of the possibility of an early conclusion of peace by Germany with France and England.

Was there at that time any prospect of ending the war which, as regards the West front particularly, had called for such an extraordinary sacrifice of lives without delivering any result?

In order that I might examine more closely into this question — so decisive a one for the future fate of Serbia — I arbitrarily quitted my post at Cairo at the end of July 1915 and betook myself to Switzerland.

My route of travel led me across France where I hoped to receive nearer information as regards sentiments and views of French Government circles on the above question through the former French Ambassador at Berlin, Jules Cambon.

I imparted to M. Cambon my anxiety with respect to the desperate situation of Serbia as well as, what, in my view, was the only possible salvation. I affirmed that I was acting at my own risk and without commission from anybody and therefore

had broken off all relations with my Government. I offered my services for the purpose of entering upon an examination, in Switzerland, of points of contact with respect to possible peace prospects between the French and the German point of view. I begged him to aid me and to communicate to me the views and expectations of the French Government in this regard.

After having informed himself on the subject, M. Cambon informed me that, although speaking only in his private capacity, he was able to give me the following information about the matter: "It has come to the attention of the French Government from various directions that Germany was attempting through various intermediaries to sound the situation in France as regards any possible inclination to make peace. We do not, however, consider these peace efforts as sincere, but only as a manoeuvre to sow discord between ourselves and England. We do not in any regard consider ourselves as defeated, nor did we begin the war, and for that reason it is first of all Germany who must come forward with peace proposals. If the German Government should desire to take any steps in the peace matter, I would most urgently counsel it not to do so again through the medium of financial circles, for it was just these circles who extraordinarily increased the difficulties in the way of former efforts made for an understanding between the two countries."

In Switzerland, I had opportunity in the course of a few weeks to inform myself more fully with respect to the conditions and the sentiment in Germany. In order that I might be able to judge of the attitude of the German Government towards the objects I had in mind and to learn of the possibility of obtaining an exchange of views thereon, I determined to seek a direct conference with German Government circles. So as to avoid any appearance of speaking in an official character, I caused inquiry to be sent through an acquaintance, to the Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office, M. Zimmermann, as to whether he would be willing to receive me. M. Zimmermann immediately forwarded to me, at Zurich, the necessary pass-papers and received me immediately after my arrival at Berlin—at the end of August 1915.

After I had stated the purpose of my trip and had informed him of the sentiment and views in Paris, he expressed to me his regret and his fears that all efforts to make peace would con-

tinue to be fruitless so long as such men as Poincaré and Delcassé remained at the head of the enemy Governments, whose aim was the destruction of Germany, and so long as the enemy refused in any manner to reckon with the real facts and results attained by the German Army. The German Government was prepared however to take under serious consideration peace offers from whatever direction they might come, and he offered every assurance that in this regard all authoritative factors in Germany would exhibit the greatest degree of conciliation. Until recently, certain scruples of the Court as regards Russia had to be overcome, and only lately had a free hand been granted to proceed against Russia with every expedient, and, as he thought, with every prospect of success. M. Zimmermann asked me if I wished to see the German Chancellor and M. von Jagow. But as I had no official commissions to carry out and had nothing further to advance, I did not wish to take up their time unnecessarily, and accordingly I expressed my thanks and begged M. Zimmermann to make use of my services in case there should be any prospect within a reasonable time of preliminary peace negotiations.

After having returned to Switzerland, I deliberated as to how I might be able to communicate to M. Cambon the impressions I had gained in Germany in a manner most proper to the end in view.

In consideration of the magnitude of the events and the greatness of the goal, the attainment of which it was everyone's duty to seek so far as lay within one's strength and capacity, I disregarded all scruples, journeyed to Paris and told M. Cambon that I had been in Berlin. (September 1915).

I informed him of the moderate views of the German Government I told him that the whole German nation had become convinced of the sad necessity of carrying through to the end this war which had been forced upon it. I stated that it was for this reason that the great majority of the Social Democrats were supporting the Government, that they had Reserves in over-abundance, that the technical and industrial organization was accomodating itself to the demands made upon it by the war, in a remarkable manner, that the submarine warfare would cause great damage to commerce at sea, and that the economic and military strength of Germany was still being greatly underestimated.

I told him further that I had gained the impression from my conversations in Berlin that the Germans would very soon bring their operations in Russia to a conclusion, so to speak, and that thereafter they would throw themselves, in co-operation with Austria and Bulgaria, with all fury upon Serbia in order to restore direct connection with Constantinople. I begged him most urgently to picture to himself the peril that was confronting Serbia, and not, without some good reason, to break the frail threads of intermediation which could do only good, and at all events no harm. I am unable to understand why the relations of individual men who in peace time have personally esteemed one another and who could continue to act for the advantage of their countries, should be broken off. I am further unable to understand why the struggle must be carried on to the point of complete mutual exhaustion and to the advantage of no one but a third party. M. Cambon insisted that Emperor William was to blame for the war, that the war would have to be carried on even in case of Russia falling out, however great the cost or duration of the war might be, and that the Germans would not break through on the West Front. He admitted that Serbia was done for in case she should be occupied, but did not seem to believe in it nor in an attack by Bulgaria.

He did not understand my intentions.

This interview I shall never forget. It showed me the terrible abyss into which individual statesmen had plunged their peoples in order that their political combinations might be realized.

We parted, it is true, as friends, but I had the feeling that M. Cambon did not meet my candour with the trust that it deserved.

In the meantime the great offensive against Serbia had been started; Bulgaria, too, had declared war on Serbia.

Again I went to Paris, at the end of October 1915, after M. Cambon had been appointed permanent Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

He declined to receive me. In answer to my telegram that I was coming to Paris he had answered that I should not come, but the telegram had not reached me in time in Zurich. Subsequently M. Cambon wrote me and offered his excuses for not having received me. That, too, was no longer necessary. Under ordinary circumstances it would have pained me very much to

see a personal friendship of many years standing, and one which I esteemed very highly, go to pieces without blame on my part. In these times, which it is our duty to live through and endure, it only pained me that there was not the slightest prospect that the two great Kultur nations, who for so long had mercilessly slaughtered each other, were unable to accomodate themselves to a mutual understanding and that M. Cambon had not been a noble exception among all those whose conduct was dictated by hatred and passion rather than by good sense.

In the meantime I was placed on the retired list by my Government.

Subsequently I learned that the French Government had informed the Serbian Government that through the French Legation in Berne it had learned that I had gone to Berlin to inaugurate peace negotiations. The Serbian Government wished to prosecute me, but was satisfied to place me on the retired list.

I have the consciousness of having done my duty, and am indifferent to any other considerations.

APPENDICES — DOCUMENTS.

I. THE RUSSO-BULGARIAN MILITARY CONVENTION OF DECEMBER 1909.

Very secret.

The Imperial Russian Government and the Royal Bulgarian Government have found it to their mutual interests to conclude the following secret agreement.

Article 1.

In case of a simultaneous armed conflict of Russia with Germany, Austria-Hungary and Roumania or with Austria-Hungary and Roumania, and likewise in case of an armed conflict of Russia with Turkey—regardless of who has taken the initiative in the conflict—Bulgaria agrees, upon the request of the Russian Government to mobilize all her armed forces, and immediately institute military action in accordance with previously prepared plans, and not suspend the same until complete attainment of the aims indicated in the plans drawn up and hereinafter set forth.

Article 2.

If Austria-Hungary in combination with any other Power should attack Bulgaria, without provocation on the part of the latter, Russia agrees to provide Bulgaria with active armed support.

Article 3.

If Turkey should institute military action against Bulgaria, without provocation by the latter, Russia agrees to mobilize the necessary number of troops of the military district of the Caucasus, and if necessary, also of the Odessa military district, in order to ameliorate in every way the situation of the Bulgarian Army in the European theatre of war. While reserving freedom of further action, Russia, in any event, assumes the obligation to provide Bulgaria active armed support, if, in a war

between Bulgaria and Turkey, a third power should take the field against Bulgaria, without provocation by the latter.

Article 4.

In case of a favourable outcome of the armed conflict with Austria-Hungary and with Roumania or with Germany, Austria-Hungary and Roumania, Russia agrees to afford Bulgaria the greatest possible support for the purpose of attaining expansion of Bulgarian territory in the district which is peopled with a Bulgarian population, lying between the Black Sea and the right bank of the lower Danube. Furthermore Russia promises actively to support Bulgaria, through diplomatic channels, in her wishes respecting as great as possible a reformation of the other frontiers of the Bulgarian Kingdom. In addition, Bulgaria will be entitled to a part of the contribution (indemnity) corresponding to her participation in the war operations with armed forces and to her expenditures.

Article 5.

In view of the fact that the realization of the high ideals of the Slavic peoples upon the Balkan peninsula, so near to Russia's heart, is possible only after a favourable outcome of Russia's struggle with Germany and Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria accepts the holy obligation, both in the event mentioned, and also in the event of accession of Roumania or of Turkey to the coalition of the above-named Powers, to make the utmost exertions to avert every provocation to the further expansion of the conflict. As regards those Powers whose relations with Russia are those of allies or friends, Bulgaria will adopt a suitable friendly attitude towards them.

Article 6.

In case of a favourable outcome of armed conflict with Turkey, Russia agrees to afford the utmost possible support to the wishes of Bulgaria as to expansion of the territory of the Bulgarian Kingdom in districts with a preponderating Bulgarian population, approximately within the territorial bounds which were established by the Preliminary Treaty.

concluded at San Stefano on February 19, 1878
between Russia and Turkey.

Article 7.

In the event that the results of the war in the instances which have been anticipated in Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the present Agreement, do not completely reach the goal set, Russia accepts the obligation to do her utmost to preserve Bulgaria within her present frontiers and to limit as much as possible any contribution (indemnity) that may be imposed upon Bulgaria.

Article 8.

Immediately after the execution of the present Agreement, the Russian War Minister and the Bulgarian War Minister or expressly chosen persons with full powers from their respective Governments, shall establish the mutual objectives of the armed forces of both States in the theatres of war bordering on Bulgaria for the purpose of attaining as complete and as swift a success as possible. These objectives may from time to time, if circumstances render it necessary, be altered, but only after mutual agreement. The detailed plans of the provisional war preparations, shall be independently worked out by the Bulgarian Ministry of War within the limits of the general plan that has been adopted, but with the unconditional observance of the basic requirement that the chief body of Bulgarian armed forces shall be employed against the common foe. In furtherance of this matter, the Bulgarian Government will keep the Russian Military Attaché in Bulgaria advised of all preliminary labours and all proposed alterations in detail.

Article 9.

After the outbreak of hostilities, the Bulgarian Army shall act quite independently, being guided however by the objectives previously agreed upon, which may not be departed from save with the consent of the Russian Commander-in-Chief or because of superior force. If, in the course of the war, the Russian Commander-in-Chief should consider it necessary to alter the objectives originally fixed, in that case the Bulgarian Army is obligated to pursue the directions corresponding thereto. Only in

consideration of complete fulfillment of this requirement so necessary for the success of the war, is the present Agreement with all its consequences binding upon Russia.

Article 10.

In the event of joint operations of the Russian and Bulgarian Army upon one and the same theatre of war, the chief command of the forces shall be held by the Russian Commander-in-Chief. In all other cases the upper command will be held, where joint operations are being conducted by various detachments of mixed troops, by the military commander of the higher military unit according to his rank (in the following succession: Battalion, Regiment, Brigade, Division, Corps, Army). Where detachments of troops of the same rank are united, the upper command shall be held by the commander who holds the superior rank.

Article 11.

There shall be assigned to the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Bulgarian Army, a specially chosen General or Colonel of the Russian General Staff, as Chief Military Plenipotentiary. He shall be the only mediator for establishing mutual relations between the two Commanders-in-Chief. The Russian Government reserves the right, likewise to maintain Military Plenipotentiaries in the smaller military units of the Bulgarian Army, who shall severally be immediately subordinate to the Chief Plenipotentiary; in the determination of the various strategic or other questions with respect to which the reciprocal Russo-Bulgarian interests might in any manner clash they are to have the right to act in an advisory capacity. The Bulgarian Commander shall decide questions independently, in accordance with his own opinion, but he has not the right to refuse to give his reasons in writing in case his opinion is in conflict with the opinion of the Russian Military Plenipotentiary. As regards the most important questions, a final decision of the said questions shall in principle belong to the Russian Commander-in Chief. The Russian Chief Military Plenipotentiary and the Military Plenipotentiaries are to be kept completely informed as regards all operations, plans and designs.

Article 12.

As regards the appointment of a Commander-in-Chief of the Bulgarian Army — in case King Ferdinand should not desire to take over the supreme command in person — and likewise as regards the selection of a Chief of Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, the Bulgarian Government is obligated to reach an agreement in advance with the Russian Government.

Article 13.

The allied troops shall enjoy equal privileges and general support at the hands of Russian and Bulgarian Military and Civil Officials, without distinction as regards the territory upon which the troops are operating; this condition applies to the billeting of troops, requisitions of every sort, the sanitary, post and telegraph service etc. Furthermore, the Bulgarian Government is obligated to place at the entire disposal of Russian Military and Marine officials, all of its Sea and Harbour Works.

Article 14.

The present Agreement shall remain in force for a period of five years, and thereafter until the expiration of one year reckoned from the day when either of the contracting parties gives notice of his election to renounce the Agreement.

Article 15.

The present Agreement is to be considered secret, and both Governments are obligated to take whatever measures are within their power to maintain the secrecy hereof.

In case the present Agreement ceases to remain valid, the original exemplars of the same shall be destroyed: the Russian exemplar in the presence of the Bulgarian Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in Petersburg and the Bulgarian exemplar in the presence of the Russian Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in Sofia or in the presence of representatives of the same. It is self-understood that both Governments accept the moral obligation to keep secret the contents of the same, likewise after its destruction.

II. REPORT OF THE RUSSIAN CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OBNORSKI
IN CETINJE, FEBRUARY 10, 1914, TO THE MINISTER
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN PETERSBURG.

No. 5.

Under order No, 1002 of November 28 of last year, Your Excellency was pleased to inform me that the Imperial Government had decided to continue to vouchsafe Russian military support and military instruction to Montenegro upon a new basis, which is to be worked out by our Foreign Office and the Ministry of War. I have not failed to communicate this decision to King Nicholas, who has long been awaiting it with impatience. In expressing his sincere and heartfelt thanks to the Imperial Government, he declared, as I have already reported under No. 57 of December 15, that he was fully prepared to submit to all conditions imposed by Russia upon Montenegro. In the new order, No. 61, of Your Excellency, recently received, there was communicated to me the calculations as regards expenditures for the military support of Montenegro prepared by our Ministry of War, and the same seem to me somewhat exaggerated. According to the computations of our military officials these expenditures are to amount annually to 4,000,000 rubels for the maintenance and provisioning of the Amy and 500,000 rubels for the instructors, Furthermore, 15,000,000 rubels are provided for the equipment of Montenegrin troops with artillery and war material.

These figures are so large that the War Ministry found it necessary to call attention to the fact that it would be very difficult for Russia to grant Montenegro any military support whatever, upon a new basis, and has apparently returned to its former views, namely, to abandon military support and instruction in Montenegro and to hand over this task to the Serbians. But aside from the fact that the Imperial Government has already made a definite decision in the matter which has been communicated to King Nicholas, it would be entirely impossible under present political conditions to hand over the business of military instruction to the Serbians. For, aside from the energetic opposition of the Royal House of Montenegro, which would be justified under such conditions in fearing for its own political existence, the admission of Serbians into the Montenegrin Army would create

very great embarrassment in the neighboring State of Austria, which could not permit, without seriously contesting the matter, the conduct of the affairs of Montenegro to pass into the hands of Serbia, as would inevitably result in such a case. This control by Serbia will probably come sooner or later anyway, in view of the fusion of the two States through the melting away of their frontiers, but naturally, only in course of time. As I respectfully reported, Austria likewise reckons with this fact, but nevertheless is striving to prevent, if possible, the inception of such a situation until she has chosen the means for fixing the boundaries of her own interests. From this point of view our presence in Montenegro is in the character of leader which is of advantage to our prestige and assures the peaceful fusion of Serbia with Montenegro, if it should take place. And this would be regarded by Austria as the lesser of two evils; and a Regulator of the status quo in this part of the Balkan peninsula is not only desirable for Austria, but also, as your Excellency knows, for the other Great Powers, and particularly for Italy — see report on the colloquy between San Giuliano and M. von Giers, reported by the latter to Your Excellency in the report of October 21st ultimo. In order to obtain an elucidation of the financial side of the question in as accurate a form as possible, I requested the Montenegrin War Ministry, to provide me with a Budget proposal formulated upon the new basis above referred to and which takes into consideration not only the new enlarged contingent of troops but also the amount of Russian support required for the military needs of the country. In addition to presenting herewith the said proposal together with the proposal for the organization of the Army, I respectfully submit the following general estimates of both proposals: — It is intended to organize six Divisions, whereby, for peace times, provision is made for doubling the size of the contingents as compared with the size of present contingents, up to 6000 men as permanent cadres which in case of war can be increased to 50—60.000 men, by recruiting from the Militia. This figure is quite within the possibilities in view of the fact that the population of the country has more than doubled, even without the help of the Albanians. In ordinary times, therefore, 6000 men are to be maintained. As regards the military Budget covering the new

formation of the troops, the same has been expressed in accordance with my instructions in two sets of figures: Minimum $7\frac{1}{2}$ and Maximum $9\frac{1}{2}$ million florins. The amount of the minimum estimate, moreover, of which the Montenegrin Government assumes the payment of two millions, is, in the opinion of the persons who have prepared the Budget, entirely sufficient to cover all necessary expenditures for the maintenance of the Army. An allotment of so great a share of the burden to Montenegro, is quite possible for the Montenegrin Government to carry out, in view of the fact that the State income for the current year amounted to $9\frac{1}{2}$ million florins. Our share would accordingly amount to $5\frac{1}{2}$ million florins, that is to say, somewhat more than two million rubles. Provision is made in the proposal for the organization of artillery and other technical troops. This makes it possible for our Military Administrative Department to estimate the expenditures for equipping the Army with arms, which can be carried out, not all at one time, but in the course of the next few years, and would therefore substantially lighten our financial operations as regards the technical equipment of the Montenegrin Army. As regards the number of instructors, this is placed at 17 officers and 79 non-commissioned officers. And finally I desire to refer to the recent requests of M. Paschitsch, referred to in the order of Your Excellency, to introduce at least a few Serbian non-commissioned officers into the Montenegrin Army. These requests seem very singular to me, in view of the fact that M. Paschitsch approved of our reasons as regards the necessity of organizing the Montenegrin Army under our co-operation. (See telegram of Hartwig, No. 1390 of November 17, 1913). Such requests seem inexplicable from a man so experienced in political affairs as is the Chief of the Belgrade Cabinet who cannot evade recognizing how difficult, under present political conditions, the realization of this idea is, — if he did not, perchance, with the cunning and indifference as to choice of means common to Eastern politicians think to make use of our powerful support in what would then be an unavoidable and premature struggle of Serbia against the Austrian monarchy. Your Excellency will know from the report submitted by me in January, that I am a convinced supporter of energetic assistance to the revived Serbian Kingdom; but it

is just for that reason that I consider it necessary to safeguard not only Serbia but likewise the related State of Montenegro from the precipitate plans of their politicians. Talented men though they be, like Paschitsch, they are nearly always characterized by a lack of broad outlook, the result of a sort of provincialism common to politicians of small countries. It is to this provincialism that I attribute the phenomenon I have frequently noted, namely, that the best Balkan diplomats from an intellectual point of view are greatly inferior to European of only average talents. For this reason, in affording the small States support and aid, as our Fatherland always does, the Great Powers must never lose control of the leadership and the initiative.

III. REPORT OF THE SERBIAN MINISTER IN PETERSBURG, POPOWITSCH, FEBRUARY 17, 1912.

Pov. No. 24.

"M. Nelidow came to see me to day; I made use of his visit to inform myself as regards two matters which interest me: as regards the visit of the King of Montenegro and as regards Russo-Austrian relations. As follows, what he, in chief, communicated to me: In pursuance of what was intended, King Nicholas was given some energetic counsels to pursue a quiet line of conduct and not 'let himself in' for any adventures. The King promised to follow this counsel, and gave assurance that he would do nothing against the interests of Russia. He told M. Sasonof that his attitude towards Russia was that of a private soldier to his superior, and several times repeated in Russian 'do you understand?' I am, said he, King in Monienegro, but as regards Russia I am the executor of her commands."

IV. TELEGRAM OF THE SERBIAN MINISTER RISTITSCH,
SENT FROM BUCHAREST TO THE MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN BELGRADE,
NOVEMBER 13, 1912.

The Ministers of Russia and France advise, as friends of Serbia that we should not 'go the limit' as regards the question of an outlet upon the Adriatic, for if a European complication should arise out of it, we would be hazarding all the extraordinary achievements we have hitherto made. They are of the opinion that we should declare ourselves satisfied with a guaranty of an unconditional free use of an Adriatic port, and the time will come when we shall be able to retain some such port as our own. It would be better that Serbia which would be at least twice as large as formerly, should strengthen herself and gather herself together, in order to await, with as great a degree of preparedness as possible the important events which must make their appearance among the Great Powers. Otherwise, if a European war is started, Europe will make Serbia answerable for the catastrophe. It seems to the Russian Minister that Italy is opposing our demand more than Austria, for she calculates, that at the favourable moment, she will be able to tear possession away from Austria more easily than from us. This evening, at the Diplomatic reception, the Roumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs spoke to me along the same lines, repeating his former counsels to the effect that we should not take the risk of losing our present gains which will make of Serbia a factor with which Austria would have to reckon in quite another manner than has hitherto been the case. From a very trustworthy source I learned that Osman Nizami Pascha, the Turkish Ambassador at Berlin, who has been chosen for the Peace negotiations, endeavored to win Roumania over, on his way through to Constantinople. They told him that efforts would be made to bring Peace negotiations to a conclusion as quickly as possible, that Roumania's attitude was definite and clear, that the Turks should give up any idea of retaining what the allied Balkan States had conquered and that they should try to strengthen themselves in Asia. This was also told to

the Pascha in Berlin, and he left there in a dissatisfied mood. The Roumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs said to a Minister of Legation, that he would rejoice if Hartwig would take a leave of absence."

V. TELEGRAM OF THE SERBIAN MINISTER IN PETERSBURG
TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN
BELGRADE, DECEMBER 27, 1912.

After reporting an interview with the assistant of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, as regards the Serbo-Albanian frontier, namely, the question of how Russia proposed to present the matter at the Ambassadors' Conference in London, the Serbian Minister continues in the following words: "I told him as I had yesterday told the Minister of Foreign Affairs that any further yielding might be fatal in view of the bad effect on the sentiment of Army and people. The Minister of Foreign Affairs had replied that in view of our great successes he had confidence in our strength and believed that we would be able to deliver a shock to Austria. For that reason we should feel satisfied with what we were to receive and consider it merely as a temporary halting place on the road to further gains, for the future belonged to us. The main thing was to come to an agreement with Montenegro. Bulgaria, meanwhile, would bring her ethnic mission to a close."

VI. TELEGRAM OF THE SERBIAN MINISTER AT PETERSBURG,
POPOWITSCH, FEBRUARY 4, 1913.

"....Upon this occasion, the Minister of Foreign Affairs told me that Serbia was the only State in the Balkan in which Russia had confidence, and that Russia would do everything for Serbia . . ."

VIII. TELEGRAM OF THE SERBIAN MINISTER AT PETERSBURG
TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN BELGRADE,
APRIL 29, 1913.

"Again Sasonof told me that we must work for the future

because we would acquire a great deal of territory from Austria. I replied that we would gladly give Bulgaria Monastir (Bitolia) if we could acquire Bosnia and other territory of Austria.

VIII. BULGARO-SERBIAN TREATY, FEBRUARY 29, 1912.

His Majesty Ferdinand I, King of Bulgaria and His Majesty Peter I, King of Serbia, believing in the community of interests and the similarity of the destinies of their States and of the two brother-nations, the Bulgars and the Serbs, fully determined and firmly resolved to guard these interests with united strength and to promote their general development, have agreed to the following:

Article 1.

The Kingdom of Bulgaria and the Kingdom of Serbia mutually guarantee to one another the political independence and permanence of their national domains, obligating themselves unconditionally and without reservation to mutually aid one another with all the forces of the State if one or more other States should attack one of these countries.

Article 2.

Both contracting parties agree to support one another with all forces in case any one of the Great Powers should make the attempt to forcibly acquire, even though temporarily, any territory situate in the Balkans and at present under Turkish suzerainty, or to occupy the same with troops—and in case only one of the two States considers such act injurious to its interests or as a *casus belli*.

Article 3.

Both contracting parties agree to make peace mutually only, and after a previous understanding between the parties.

Article 4.

To the end of securing the most complete and practical fulfill-

ment of this Treaty, a Military Convention shall be concluded, in which provision shall be made not only for what is necessary to be agreed upon, as regards the military organization, the transport and mobilization of troops and the relations of the upper commands in times of peace, but also as regards every thing that concerns war preparations, state of war and successful conduct of war. The Military Convention shall be considered as an integral part of the present Treaty. Preparation of the same shall be begun within at least fifteen days after the execution of the present Treaty, and the same must be completed within a maximum period of two months.

Article 5.

The present Treaty and the said Military Convention shall remain in force from the day of their execution until December 31, 1920, inclusive. The same may be extended for a longer period, but only after a supplementary understanding, which shall be confirmed by both contracting parties. If, however, on the day of expiration of the Treaty and the Military Convention both parties are engaged in war or are in a situation arising out of war, in such case the Treaty and Military Convention shall remain in force until the conclusion of a peace and the liquidation of the situation created by the war.

Article 6.

The present Treaty shall be executed in duplicate, in exemplars drawn up in the Bulgarian and Serbian languages. They shall be executed by the rulers and by their Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The Military Convention, likewise drawn up in duplicate in the Bulgarian and Serbian languages, shall be executed by the rulers and by their Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Special Military Plenipotentiaries.

Article 7.

The present Treaty and Military Convention may be published and communicated to other States, but only after a previous understanding between both contracting parties and only mutually and simultaneously. Likewise, only after previous understanding

between the parties, shall another State be admitted to the alliance.

(Drawn up in Sofia February 29, 1912.)

VIIIa. SECRET SUPPLEMENT TO THE BULGARO-SERBIAN
TREATY OF 1912.

1.

In the event that internal troubles break out in Turkey, which shall menace the political and national interests of one or both contracting parties, and in case that, due to the outbreak of internal or external difficulties in Turkey, the status quo upon the Balkan peninsula is violently disturbed, in such case the contracting party who is first convinced of the necessity of armed interference, must apply to the other party by means of a written proposal setting forth his reasons. The second party is thereupon obligated to enter into an exchange of views and in case of disagreement with the first allied party, to give the latter an explicit answer. If an agreement as regards a proposed armed operation should be concluded, Russia is to be informed, and if the latter has no objections, the allies shall carry on the military operations agreed upon, in which they shall be guided by a sentiment of solidarity, and shall safeguard their mutual interests.

In the contrary instance, that is to say, if an agreement should not be arrived at, the question shall be presented to Russia for examination. Russia's decision shall be binding upon both contracting parties. In case Russia should not wish to give a decision and thereby it should result that no agreement is reached between the contracting parties, and in case the party who has decided upon armed interference, should nevertheless, alone, begin hostilities against Turkey, in such case the other party is obligated to maintain a benevolent neutrality toward its ally, immediately order mobilization as provided in the Military Convention and with all forces hasten to the assistance of its ally in case a third party should take part on the side of Turkey.

2.

The entire territory referred to in the joint operations in §§ 1 and 2 of the Treaty and in § 1 of this Secret Supplement, shall, in case the same be acquired, be administered by joint officials of both allies (condominium) and immediately, but in no event later than three months after restoration of peace, be liquidated upon the following basis.

Serbia recognizes the rights of Bulgaria to the territory to the East of Rodope and the Struma river and Bulgaria the rights of Serbia to the territory to the north and west of Schar-Planina.

As regards the territory lying between Schar-Planina, Rodope, the Archipelago and the Sea of Ochrida, in the event both parties consider impossible the creation of a separate autonomous State out of this territory, owing to general Serbian and Bulgarian national interests or owing to other external or internal causes, in such case such territory shall be dealt with as follows:

— Serbia is obligated to claim no territory that lies outside the line indicated upon the accompanying map. This begins at the Turko-Bulgarian boundary at Golem Wrh (northerly from Kriwa Palanka) and from there runs as follows: — in a southwesterly direction to the Ochrida Sea, thence over the elevation Kitke between the villages Meteschew and Podrschikonj, thence over the elevation east of village of Neraw and the water-shed as far as the elevation 1000 northerly of Baschteswo (Gradatz Planina) through the village Baschteswo between the villages Ljubentzi and Petralize, through the elevation of Ostrizi 1000 (Lisatz-Planina), to the elevation 1050 between the villages Dratsch and Opile through the village Talschimanzi and Schiwalewo, to the elevation 1050 and 1000, through the village Keschani along the chief water-shed of Gradishte Planina to the elevation Gorischte, over the elevation 1023, along the water-shed between Iwanokawatz and Loginatz, through Weterskog and Sopot to the Vardar river, over the Vardar, along the chain of mountains to elevation 2550, then to the mountains of Perepol and along their water-shed between the villages Krape and Barbarasa to the elevation 1200 between the villages Jakrenow and Dranow, to the elevation Tschesma (1254), along the water-shed of Baba-Planina and Krusch-Katepesi between the villages Sopa and Zrske

to the summit of the mountain of Protaj easterly of the village Belize, through Breschana to the elevation 1200, along the watershed over the elevation 1330 to elevation 1217 and between the villages Liwanischta and Gorentzi to the Ochrida Sea as far as the Cloister Gubowzi. Bulgaria agrees to accept these boundaries, if His Imperial Majesty, the Tsar, to whom the request shall be directed to act as supreme arbitrator in this matter, shall give a decision in favor of the designated line. It is self-understood that both parties are obligated to accept as final frontier such line as His Imperial Majesty, the Tsar, shall deem it proper to establish in the above named frontiers, as conforming to the rights and interests of both parties.

3.

A copy of the Treaty with this secret supplement and likewise the Military Convention shall be delivered to the Russian Imperial Government, jointly by the contracting parties, with the request to take cognizance of the same and to adopt a benevolent attitude towards the objectives therein set forth, and furthermore to request the Tsar, that His Imperial Majesty may be pleased to accept and approve of the task imposed upon him and his Government

4.

Every difference that may arise in the interpretation or fulfillment of any article of this Treaty, the secret supplement and of the Military Convention, shall be referred to Russia for final decision, so soon as either the one party or the other shall declare it impossible to attain an agreement by immediate negotiations.

5.

No article of this Secret Agreement may, without the previous agreement of both contracting parties and the consent of Russia, be made public or communicated to any other Power.

(Drawn up in Belgrade February 29, 1912.)

IX. BULGARO-SERBIAN MILITARY CONVENTION OF 1912.

In pursuance of the principles of Article 2 of the Treaty of friendship and alliance between the Kingdoms of Serbia and

Bulgaria, and in order to make war more successfully and to fully attain the objectives which are indicated in the alliance, the following provisions are hereby confirmed, and the same are to have the same binding force and signification as the conditions of the Treaty itself possess.

Article 1.

The Kingdoms of Serbia and Bulgaria agree, in the instances provided in Article 1 and 2 of the Treaty of Alliance, as well as in Article 1 of the Secret Supplement to the said Alliance to mutually provide each other aid and to wit:—Bulgaria, an armed force of at least 200,000 men; Serbia, an armed force of 150,000 men who are to be fitted out for military operations on the frontiers and likewise beyond the frontiers of the said States. In the above mentioned calculation, there shall be included neither Reservists, nor reserve contingents, nor Reservists of the third Serbian levy, nor of the Bulgarian 'Landsturm'. The said troops must concentrate upon the frontiers or outside the territory of the said State in the direction which is prescribed by the requirements and problems of military operation, and this must take place not later than a period of 21 days from the declaration of war or from the communication by one of the Allies that a *casus belli* has arisen. Each of the Allies is nevertheless obligated (before expiration of the above designated period) if it conforms to the nature of the military operations and can promote to a successful conclusion of the war, to conduct individual contingents of its troops, corresponding to the progress of mobilization and of concentration, to the theatre of war, and to begin doing so not later than the seventh day after the declaration of war or the initiation of a *casus foederis*.

Article 2.

In the event that Roumania should attack, Serbia agrees to declare war on Roumania at once and to send troops against Roumania to the number of not less than 100,000 men either to the middle Danube or to the theatre of war in the Dobrudscha. In the event that Turkey should attack Bulgaria, Serbia agrees to invade Turkish territory and to send not less than 100,000 men of her mobilized troops to the theatre of war on the Vardar,

In the event that Serbia is already at war at this time (alone or together with Bulgaria) she agrees to send all the troops at her disposal against Roumania or Turkey.

Article 3.

In the event that Austria-Hungary attacks Serbia, Bulgaria agrees at once to declare war on Austria-Hungary and to send her troops to the number of 200,000 men upon Serbian territory and jointly with the Serbian Army to conduct offensive and defensive operations against Austria-Hungary.

These obligations on the part of Bulgaria in favour of Serbia continue to remain in force in the event that Austria-Hungary, either with or without an arrangement with Turkey, and under any pretext whatever, should advance her troops into the Sandjak of Novi-Bazar and thereby should compel Serbia either to declare war on Austria-Hungary or to send her Army to the Sandjak for the defense of her interests there, whereby Serbia would bring about a conflict with Austria-Hungary.

In the event that Turkey should attack Serbia, Bulgaria agrees, immediately to advance into Turkish territory and to send to the theatre of war on the Vardar an Army of at least 100,000 men out of the number of mobilized troops provided for by virtue of Article 1 of the present Convention. If Roumania should attack Serbia, Bulgaria agrees to take aggressive action against the Roumanian Army, so soon as the same have crossed the Danube and have invaded Serbian territory.

In the event that Bulgaria, in one of the instances provided for in this article, should already, either alone or in combination with Serbia, be at war with another Power, Serbia agrees to aid her with all the troops still at her disposal.

Article 4.

In the event that Serbia and Bulgaria should, pursuant to the foregoing agreement, declare war on Turkey, each one of the Allies agrees, in case there are no other special covenants between them covering such contingency, to send an Army of at least 100,000 men to the theatre of war on the Vardar out of the number of those provided for by virtue of Article 1 of this Convention.

Article 5.

In the event that one of the contracting parties, without the previous knowledge and consent of the other party should declare war on a third Power, in such case said other party shall be released from the obligations of Article 1 of this Convention; it agrees, however, to observe towards its ally an attitude of benevolent neutrality during the war and likewise immediately to mobilize at least 50,000 men in order to provide its ally with all freedom of movement.

(The further articles have to do with military questions that concern armistice, upper command, care of troops, transport of the wounded etc.)

X. LETTER OF EMPEROR FRANZ JOSEPH TO TSAR NICOLAS II,
DATED FEBRUARY 1, 1913.

"My dear Friend:—I consider it my deepest duty in the critical times through which we are passing, to have recourse immediately to you, in order to remove the misunderstandings which, as it seems, are on the point of arising in Russia with respect to our policies, and to put an end to the tales being circulated which might cause damage to the good relations that now happily subsist between our countries. With this purpose in mind, I have commissioned Prince Hohenlohe-Schillingsfurst, who has become personally known to you ever since his stay in Russia, to journey to Petersburg in order that he may deliver you this letter and to transmit to you my feelings of unlimited friendship. It pained me greatly to learn that the policy of my Government, which from the outset was imbued by the sole desire to add no new horrors to the jumble of affairs that has been created in the Balkans—that this policy has been regarded with cynicism in Russia. If we have withheld ourselves from every interference in the conflict, if we have obeyed the summons of the Powers, 'jointly' to discuss the questions in which we were chiefly interested, and if finally we have, in the course of these conferences, been imbued solely with the sentiment of conciliation, it is owing alone to our desire to avoid everything which could

create the slightest excuse for discord between our countries. You, yourself, know the heavy responsibility that rests upon us, if it is a matter of safe-guarding the interests of our peoples in the political crisis which is taking place in the vicinity of our frontiers. It would be a sin against our holy mission, if we failed to take into account, what reaction this sort of evolution will have upon our countries. If I, during the present crisis, in my concern for the maintenance of friendly relations with Russia, have preserved a conciliatory attitude, I trust you will appreciate the extent of my efforts and that you will make use of the great advantages of a European peace, in promoting a good feeling of harmony between our peoples. I pray you to believe in the sentiments of true friendship of your brother and friend, Franz Joseph."

XI. REPORT OF THE SERBIAN CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES GRUITSCH
IN LONDON, OF SEPTEMBER 8, 1911, TO THE SERBIAN
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS MILOWANOWICH.

p. No. 144.

Mr. Minister:—The French Ambassador accredited to this country, Paul Cambon, returned here recently from Paris whither he has frequently betaken himself during the past two months in order to report and to advise upon the Morocco affair. Two days ago, in conversation with a local personage he expressed his views as regards the present situation and its further development. I have the honour to inform you of these remarks of M. Cambon, which were confidentially imparted to me from a most trustworthy source. M. Cambon is of the opinion that the present negotiations with Germany will be conducted to a conclusion and that an agreement will be reached. But this agreement will not permanently be able to prevent the peril which is menacing, owing to Germany's policy of sudden attack. The agreement has the one result that the war will be postponed three or four years. If, however, contrary to all expectation the present negotiations are broken off, France will propose a conference which will certainly be declined by Germany. As a

result of this tension that will ensue between France and Germany, war will actually break out in the spring. France is convinced that the war will be forced upon her. But both France and her allies are of the opinion, that the war—even at the expense of greater sacrifices—must be postponed to a later time, that is to say until the year 1914—15. The necessity of this postponement is required less by France's material preparedness for war, which is complete, than by the organization of the upper command, which is not yet finished. This delay is wanted also by Russia. England alone will derive no advantage from this arrangement, because the superiority of her fleet over that of Germany decreases each year. Out of consideration for the preparedness of her allies, France urges that an understanding be reached with Germany for the present.

**XII. TELEGRAM OF THE RUSSIAN CHARGE D'AFFAIRES
OBNORSKI IN CETINJE, MARCH 26, 1914.**

“King Nicholas has, within the last few days and after long hesitation, given orders for the delivery to the King of Serbia of an epistle prepared by his own hand which was forwarded to Belgrade some time ago, in which Serbia is invited to come to a prompt understanding with Montenegro as regards the union of both States on military, diplomatic and financial matters, under the irrevocable condition of the reservation of the independence and individuality of both States and their dynasties. In conclusion, King Nicholas advances the argument that the union will be ‘very useful to a not yet liberated Serbdom’, and that it answered to the intentions of Russia, the eternal protector of the Slavs”.

**XIII. TREATY OF ITALY WITH ENGLAND, FRANCE
AND RUSSIA, APRIL 26, 1915.**

Note:—

The text of this Treaty is here omitted as it has already been sufficiently commented upon in the public press.

XIV. TELEGRAM OF THE SERBIAN MINISTER MILOWANOWICH (CHARGED WITH AN EXTRAORDINARY MISSION AT LONDON) TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN BELGRADE. LONDON OCTOBER 16 (O.S.) 1908.

Yesterday afternoon I was first received by Hardinge, with whom I remained for a half hour. I then accompanied him to Grey and we conferred more than an hour. Both listened to me most attentively and exhibited a very lively and sympathetic interest for our affair. They could assure me without reservation, that the national-Serb question, accorded, as it had been, a prominent place not only in the English Press but promoted likewise by the positive attitude of British policy toward the Serbian Government and toward me personally, had awakened the best of feeling and the liveliest sympathy. As regards the question of territorial compensation they doubt whether any success will be had, owing to the fact that Austria-Hungary positively refuses assent. I explained that this was the main question for Serbia, Montenegro and the future of the entire Balkan peninsula; that therein lay the one possible security against a further advance of Austria-Hungary, and that accordingly it furnished a barometer of Austria-Hungary's future designs, who would have neither cause nor interest to refuse assent if she honestly contemplates no further annexations in the Balkans. Grey conceded this as correct but returned to the observation:—In view of the fact that Austria-Hungary refuses, are we on that account to hold a fruitless conference with the prospect that Austria-Hungary stands by the annexation and at the same retains the Sandjak of Novi-Bazar. I replied, that they need not fear to leave this question open, for Austria-Hungary would not dare to permit the present tension to continue for long, and it might happen, that if this situation continued, she might be abandoned by Germany. We must stick to this demand to the end, and so long as England did not abandon us in our demand, the prospect of success still remained. England's attitude will likewise encourage Turkey, who is not inclined to yield anything further, and with whom we could easily and quickly succeed in reaching a positive understanding in the matter. I explained how Austria-Hungary's

opposition could be broken, and if this succeeded, how the Bulgarian question could be separated from the main, and its solution be separately approached—what Grey confirmed by nodding his head. 'We must', I exclaimed, 'prepare for the war which is inevitable in the near future, if they refuse us this compensation'. In reply to my renewed and forcible insistence, Grey and Hardinge finally gave me their word, that they would persist in supporting our territorial compensation demand for so long as Russia should give it her support. I explained also our other demands, namely, as regards a guaranty for the erection of Bosnia as a single autonomous unit, but with the understanding, which they apparently accept, that temporarily these demands shall not be introduced into the discussion, because we must put all our weight into the demand for territorial compensation. If this is accepted, then everything else can be presented only for discussion. But in the event that it is rejected, then we must unquestionably compel the acceptance of everything else without however being satisfied with any such concessions. The King is not in London, and it is not certain that he will return before the end of next week. I can therefore not wait for his return. I have begun making calls at the Embassies and shall also call upon Lansdowne, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs. The entire Press sympathizes greatly with Serbia and with me; I am granting information and interviews to the representatives and reporters of important British and foreign papers. I leave here for Paris on Sunday. I have telegraphed the matter to Paschitsch.

Milowanowich"

XV. TELEGRAM OF MINISTER PASCHITSCH (CHARGED WITH AN EXTRAORDINARY MISSION AT PETERSBURG) TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN BELGRADE, NOVEMBER 12, 1908.

Yesterday I had a special audience with the Tsar, which lasted a half hour. The Tsar expressed great sympathy for Serbia, advised a quiet line of conduct, for our cause was just, but our preparations weak. The Bosnia-Herzegovina question

will be decided by war alone; in his opinion Austria-Hungary will consent neither to autonomy nor to a territorial compensation. Russia will not recognize the annexation. He approves the understanding with Turkey and is displeased that Bulgaria has broken away from Slavdom, although he believes she will return. He expressed his sympathy for the dynasty, and requested me to present his hearty greetings to the King. He believes that Austria-Hungary will not attack Serbia, but we must give no provocation. He attributes little importance to the Sarejewo deputations in Vienna, for he knows what the Bosno-Herzegovinian people wish and think. Our line of conduct should be:—an understanding w^fth Turkey, a calm attitude, military preparation and watchful waiting. The rest I shall report upon my return.

XVI. TELEGRAM OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
KOSCHUTITSCH TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS IN BELGRADE, MARCH 6, 1909.

Chamjakow informed me very confidentially that the appeal of the Duma members directed to the European Parliaments is in entire accord with the well-known views of the Tsar as regards the present situation. In the audience which took place on Monday, the Tsar said to him, that the Serbian skies were heavily clouded by this blow, the situation was terrible because Russia was unprepared for war and the defeat of Russia would be the ruin of Slavdom; the Tsar has the feeling that a conflict with Germanism is unavoidable in the future and that preparations should be made for it. In answer to the question as to what attitude Russia would take in case Austria-Hungary should attack Serbia, the President of the Duma answered: We did something which up to the present day no other State has ever done, namely, we have proclaimed to the whole world that we are not now in a position to carry on war, but we shall consider any attempt to coerce Serbia as the beginning of a European conflagration, in which we cannot at present join; but it will flame up in the future when we are in a situation to have our say.

XVII. VIEWS OF RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY, NAMELY
 ISWOLSKI'S, AS REGARDS THE ANNEXATION
 OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA.

Interview of the Serbian Minister Vesnitsch with Iswolski.

Vesnitsch writes from Paris October 5, 1908 (N.S.):— “ . . . I continue my report after returning from M. Iswolski's whom I visited at noon-time, and with whom I conversed for a half hour. M. Nelidow and M. Louis had already informed him of our agitation, so that he immediately opened the conversation, assuring me, that Serbia and the Serbians would not only lose nothing by this step of the Austro-Hungarian Government, but effectively gain by it. You Serbians surely cannot be thinking of driving Austria-Hungary out of Bosnia and Herzegovina by force of arms. And we Russians on the other hand cannot wage war on Austria on account of these provinces. It is self-understood that I cannot admit that we are not now in a position to do this, and yet that is the main reason. Austria-Hungary gains really nothing by this step, but does indeed lose an established acquisition, for she disclaims her rights to the Sandjak of Novi-Bazar and withdraws from there, which is bound to elevate the spirit of the Serbian people, for it opens up the prospect of bringing closer together the frontiers between Serbia and Montenegro. This disclaimer, Austria will proclaim upon our demand, and M. Milowanowich was already informed of this in our interview at Carlsbad at which he himself expressed the view that the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was acceptable to Serbia because of this disclaimer. I have foreseen this step of Austria-Hungary's and it did not surprise me. For that reason I made our acceptance of it dependent upon the above-mentioned condition. The proclamation of annexation will be issued simultaneously with the notice of disclaimer of rights to the Sandjak Novi-Bazar, and then will follow the revision or alteration of the Treaty of Berlin, which we shall demand, and upon this occasion Serbia, too, will be able to present her wishes as regards the rectification of her frontiers. I have declared this winter in the Duma that I am an optimist, and I still remain

such. I did not protest during the winter after Aehrenthal's attack as regards the Sandjak Railroad project, but immediately supported the proposal with regard to the Adriatic Railroad. And I now believe that it was more advantageous to put through the withdrawal from the Sandjak in Serbia's favour, than simply to protest. In the year 1878 Austria put Russia and her allies into the dock, and now we shall put Austria there. M. von Schön, who was the first one to whom I disclosed Austria-Hungary's purpose to sacrifice the Sandjak in exchange for the annexation, was extremely surprised at such rashness in the policies of Vienna. In Vienna it is desired, singly and alone, to provide a source of satisfaction to the old Emperor at the close of his régime. Russia has hitherto supported Serbia and will continue to support her, however and wherever she can. You must, however, soon come to an understanding with Montenegro. The scandalous discord that exists between Belgrade and Cetinje must first be cleared off the carpet. We have most urgently pressed this upon Prince Nicholas, when he was in Petersburg. Furthermore, you must come to an understanding with Bulgaria, and in this work we shall honestly support you. We no longer desire a great Bulgaria. Such a notion we now look upon as a mistake.¹⁾ Bulgaria will have other occasion to feel the consequences of not considering our wishes. Among the other alterations which we shall demand in the revision of the Treaty of Berlin, will be the alteration of Article XXIX. One thing more: I do not understand your state of agitation. In reality you lose nothing, but gain something: our support. I trust the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue as heretofore to labour at its renaissance, and awake as it is, it will never be possible to denationalize it.

In answer to the question put to him as to whether we might at least have something to expect, as regards the Adriatic Railroad, from his conference with the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs—in view of the fact that Austria-Hungary by her withdrawal from the Sandjak had lost the ground over which to run her Railroad—he replied to me that he had spoken about it with Tittoni and

¹⁾ But see p. 92 article 6.

that this affair would have to be taken up anew so soon as the situation in Turkey would permit it.

Interview of the Serbian Minister Simitsch with the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, Prince Urusoff.

Simitsch reported from Vienna October 10, 1908 (N.S.):—“In reply to my question as to whether the Russian Government had been informed of Austria’s purpose as regards annexation, Prince Urusoff replied that Baron Aerenthal had spoken in Buchlowitz (Buchlau) with M. Iswolski about the possibility of annexation but that he had not indicated it as immediately impending. Iswolski had answered him that, in principle, Russia would not oppose such an alteration of the Treaty of Berlin, as Russia had no reason for coming forward as the champion of that Treaty and of its maintenance, but he was of the opinion that such an alteration could not be attempted without the consent of the signatory Powers of the Treaty of Berlin. This consent had not been sought by Aerenthal, and to this extent therefore his action had been unexpected by Russia.

In answer to my question as to whether Russia had already raised the question of calling a conference which should give its attention to the new development in the political situation, and as to whether there was any prospect that this Conference would assemble and Austria-Hungary take part in it, Urusoff answered that the Russian proposal for a Conference should have left Petersburg a day before yesterday, but that up to yesterday he had not received it. As regards participation of the Powers at the Conference it was already known that France, Italy, and Germany would take part; England had not yet definitely expressed herself, but it was hoped that she would take part likewise. Baron Aerenthal had told him that in principle, Austria-Hungary approved of the Conference, but he wished only that its working-program should be determined in advance—a demand, indeed, which seems quite natural; but in view of the fact that the determination of the program may possibly require a long time, it would seem that there must be some delay before the conference can take place.

Referring to the excitement which the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina had caused in Serbia, Prince Urusoff told me

that this excitement was in his opinion overdone; in reality nothing had changed as regards the question of the comparative strength of forces in the Balkans. No sensible man could have thought that Austria-Hungary would ever voluntarily give up the occupied provinces and that they would fall to Serbia. If we Serbians had reckoned upon this eventuality as a consequence of some unfortunate Austro-Hungarian war, or as a consequence of a successful revolution in Bosnia, was it not a fact that this possibility still remained open in the future? He was able to understand the protest which we had made to the signatory Powers against the act of Austria-Hungary, for we had to make such a protest—indeed this was the only thing that small States could do in such cases; but to go further and to instigate an armed conflict against Austria-Hungary would be unpardonable and fatal to Serbia. He knew that they were very unfriendly to us here, and therefore believed that it would be very dangerous to continue the manifestations which were daily taking place in Serbia. This would contribute greatly to the advantage of Austria-Hungary and her wishes. Already they are justifying the necessity of the annexation by pointing to these demonstrations. And if it came to a war between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, this would be an affair of Serbia's, which would later, indeed, after its conclusion burden us with heavy obligations. Therefore Prince Urusoff advises the utmost caution and the avoidance of every provocation. At the time of his last visit to Baron Aerenthal he had found him very much vexed at Serbia and indeed at almost everybody else. As regards the compensation which we demand in our protest note in case the annexation should be sanctioned likewise by Europe, Urusoff does not see how it can fail to be granted. According to his view, Austria-Hungary's disclaimer of rights to the Sandjak ought to afford a satisfactory compensation to us for the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, for it opens the prospect of an eventual expansion of Serbia in this direction, in the future, and removes the danger of a further expansion of Austria to the South. Moreover Urusoff does not see what compensation can be given to Turkey in return for her final surrender of Bosnia and Herzegovina and for the proclamation of the independence of Bulgaria."

Interview of the Serbian Chargé d'Affaires
Gruitsch with Iswolski.

Gruitsch reports from London October 13, 1908 (N. S.).

"As I had the honor to inform you by telegraph, I had a rencontre with M. Iswolski today, who very graciously granted my request for an audience. After greeting me, his first words were that it pleased him to have a conference with me, for, under present circumstances, conferences could be useful generally. Our conversation lasted forty minutes, and I report herewith its most important details.

M. Iswolski did not conceal his vexation at Austria and protested most energetically against the contention that he had consented to the annexation. Not only once, said he, but at least ten times up to the present, Austria has sounded us as regards the annexation, indeed the negotiations that were held in this connection remained entirely undetermined, and we replied at all times that this question could not be settled without the previous consent of the Signatory Powers.

As regards Bulgaria, Iswolski said that she had lost more than she had won, for she had lost the sympathy of Europe and particularly the sympathy and aid of Russia which she would feel in the future to be greatly to her damage. I know, said he, that you Serbians believe that we are well disposed towards the Bulgarians and favour them particularly. I admit that such was really the case at one time, and the explanation of it is that Bulgaria was our creation, and we considered ourselves obligated on that account, to assist her in her development. Her present conduct, however, has released us from that obligation, and she will have occasion to feel this altered attitude of ours.

As regards Austria M. Iswolski condemned her recent conduct and said he did not understand Baron Aehrenthal's policy. From a purely Austrian point of view, the annexation is a mistake, because on account of it, Austria is going to lay herself open to great embarrassments within her own territory, and the consequence in foreign politics will be a still closer Entente between Russia, France and England.

As regards Serbia, M. Iswolski considers that the annexation

question must be calmly dealt with by us, from the practical, but not from the sentimental point of view. He understood the bitter feeling of the masses, and the manner in which the same is manifested, but he can not understand how any of our statesmen can permit themselves to be carried away by it. And right here he took the occasion to say that he was greatly, surprised at M. Vesnitsch when he met him at Paris recently 'par ses vues violentes'. Indeed it should have been perfectly clear to us that Bosnia and Herzegovina were lost to us long ago, for Austria would certainly never have returned these provinces to Turkey, and still less to us, without a war. And neither Turkey nor any other Great Power would have risked a war with Austria on their behalf, and Serbia cannot even think of war. War would signify for Serbia *un coup de tête, un suicide*. And for this reason, all preventive measures hitherto taken by us could do us no good, but only compromise our affair. I read in the papers, said he, that the Skupschtina has placed a credit of 16,000,000 francs at the disposal of the Ministry of War. Such a measure can only serve to further agitate the feelings of Serbians and confirm the conviction abroad that you do not wish to listen to *les conseils de la raison*, for I hope you don't think that war can be conducted with 16,000,000 francs.

If we Serbians could look at the annexation, now that it has been consummated, more calmly, we would have reason to be satisfied with it, for it is a fact of the highest importance to us that Austria has surrendered the Sandjak to Turkey, and has thereby forever cut herself off from an advance to Saloniki. When order is restored in Turkey and so soon as her development takes its natural course, she herself will constitute a great obstacle to Austria's advance; but if the hopes that are being cherished as regards Turkey, should not be fulfilled, if *le moment du démembrement de la Turquie* should arrive, the Sandjak, natural succession to which is ours, will fall to us. With the surrender of the Sandjak we are gainers, moreover, in the fact that thereby Austria has lost her rights to her Railroad, and ours (the Adriatic) is assured, though for the moment nothing must be said about it. Furthermore the result of the annexation is that it has stirred up the national consciousness

among us and among the other Serbians outside the Kingdom, and has at least morally united us. It is due to it (the annexation) that we have forgotten the petty interests that have divided us from Montenegro, and have made up our quarrel. And finally we may hope to receive certain other compensations, which will assure to us our economic and political future, and Iswolski is convinced these promise much for our future. In any event we may rest assured that he is doing and will do everything possible to protect our interests to attain certain compensations. In this connection he by no means rejects the idea of territorial compensation, but he is emphatically not in accord with our wish for a reformation of the north frontier of the Sandjak in the interests of Serbia and Montenegro. His reason is that the agitation in Bosnia will undoubtedly continue, which is a matter of long standing there, and that the more our frontiers touch her own at these new points, the more blame will Austria put upon us. The same thing will be the case with Turkey, if any troubles break out in the Sandjak; it is therefore just the thing, in our own interests, that the frontiers of Turkey and Austria touch, but not that we and Montenegro should come in between them.

Naturally I could not let this curious mode of reasoning pass without interjecting some objections, but in reply M. Iswolski merely repeated his arguments anew and said that he was convinced that a reformation of the frontier would be injurious to us in this instance. Likewise, I did not omit in the course of our conversation, to explain our point of view and the reasons why we could not be satisfied. My chief task was to demonstrate to him that the great anxiety of our Government and the unrest of our people were not due alone to the fact that the annexation had disappointed our hopes of territorial expansion in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but chiefly to the fact that the annexation placed in jeopardy, if not immediately, then surely in the future, the existence of the Serbian nation. For that reason, said I, we hope that the Great Powers will take under consideration our protest and our just claims to compensations by means of which we would at least receive some real guarantees of our existence and of our independent and normal development. It was only in this way that any effect could be produced upon our nation so that it may patiently await the

determination of the Great Powers. But one must not expect that the excitement among the people will pass over; on the contrary it will be given still stronger expression if the Powers refuse us that satisfaction, which we rightfully expect from them.

M. Iswolski, who was not to be persuaded to abandon his arguments, answered my remarks by repeating several times that he was doing everything possible to help us, and he could the more easily and the more honestly champion our cause in view of the fact that Russia sought no compensations for herself; but, said he, the compensation question will depend upon our conduct; we Serbians must understand that in this connection we shall attain most advantage if we put an end to our military preparations and oppose the warlike sentiment among the people."

Telegram of the Serbian Minister Milowanowich (despatched upon an Extraordinary Mission to Berlin) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Belgrade. Berlin October 12 (O.S.) 1908.

Iswolski has received exactly the same answer here and the same impression as I have. Germany leaves the decision entirely to Austria without wishing to influence her by her counsels; the negotiations as regards the program and the summons to the Conference will accordingly be conducted between Petersburg and Vienna. Iswolski is convinced that Austria-Hungary will have to come to the Conference, and he assured me positively that in case she did not, Russia would not recognize the annexation. We agreed to insist upon the demand for territorial compensation for Serbia and Montenegro to the uttermost limit of the possible, and secondarily to try and bring it about that the territory in question be conveyed to Turkey which in turn is to transfer it to Serbia; and if we are driven to extremities, that is to say, in the event that we have to renounce the foregoing project, we must insist all the stronger that Bosnia and Herzegovina shall constitute an autonomous single unit in order that Serbia be assured of connection with the Adriatic and an open territory as regards the Sandjak. Iswolsky continues to stoutly condemn Austria-Hungary which has entirely lost the confidence of Russia and of

the Western Powers; he expressed the conviction and the hope that her action in this affair would be revenged upon Austria-Hungary in a sanguinary manner: the Austrian question will accordingly soon be more acute than the Turkish; his policy was directed towards a goal, which, after liquidation of all Russian questions outside of Europe, would lead Russia on to her European objectives; Serbia was an important factor in this policy, said he, as a centre of the Southern Slavs. Bosnia was, in the opinion of Russia and Western Europe, now more certainly assured to Serbia than ever, even if the annexation should be recognized; Serbia must take the first steps towards the realization of her national tasks in the direction of the Sandjak and Bosnia. For the present a conflict must be avoided, as the ground had not yet been prepared either militarily or diplomatically. If Serbia brought on a war, Russia would have to abandon her, and she would be vanquished, although this would be a very severe blow not only for the Russian national sentiment, but also for Russian interests and future plans. We agreed as to what I should say to Grey as regards the attitude of Germany; he agreed to keep me informed of all that was going on, and with thanks, I made him the same promise in return. Tomorrow he journeys to Petersburg. Russia and England are striving to detach Bulgaria from Austria-Hungary, and the Bulgarians are beginning to realize that that would be safer for her. Austria-Hungary, even though it contends the contrary, is striving to maintain a community of interests with Bulgaria. We must continue without fail to observe our hitherto reserved but correct attitude towards Bulgaria, and not permit the Bulgarian question to be amalgamated with the Bosnian.

Milowanowich."

XVIII. REPORT OF THE SERBIAN MINISTER POPOWITSCH IN
PETERSBURG TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MILOWANOWICH, DECEMBER 4, 1911.

Pov. No. 392.

"Mr. Minister,

I waited for two or three days until M. Sasonof felt rested after his return to Petersburg, and until he had gotten back into the swing of affairs after his long absence: Yesterday I had an interview with him, and made an effort to learn his views as regards matters that are of particular interest to us. His views are in the main, as follows: He fears that in the Spring there will again arise disorderly conditions in Albania and Macedonia. He fears the small intriguers like Montenegro who, inspired by jealousy of Serbia and by a desire to outflank her, are lying in wait for a chance to obtain an advantage, and to this end may give rise to complications in Albania. Of course Russia has ways and means to discourage such desires in King Nicholas, but it is not impossible that attempts will be made to influence Montenegro from another quarter. The Minister had in mind by this remark, not Italy, but Austria-Hungary; meanwhile he did not believe that the latter would undertake to do anything in Albania, at least not openly.

As is well known, there subsists, as between Italy and Austria-Hungary, a 'désinteressement-agreement', and if Austria-Hungary takes any action contrary to this, it would mean a conflict with Italy which could not look on indifferently at any such conduct on the part of Austria and on her successes in Albania. A conflict between these two countries would accordingly mean the destruction of the Triple Alliance and as a result an overthrow of the entire political system of Europe. But this is too difficult and dangerous a matter to permit of anyone touching it, in view of the risk attached, without weighty reasons. That is the situation at present, and one does not know what condition Italy will be in later; if in an unfavourable and weakened condition owing to a long war with Turkey, then Austria-

Hungary may take advantage of it in the hope that Italy will not be able to oppose her.

The Italian Ambassador with whom I have recently spoken about the matter has very much the same idea of it. He himself has no confidence in Baron Aehrenthal, although he perceives from certain remarks of Marquis San Giuliano, that the latter trusts him. Count Aehrenthal, who, as the Ambassador said, is also not trusted in Petersburg, is a restless politician and will even take risks. Just as he took advantage of Russia's weakness at the time of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, just so he may fasten his hopes on the weakness of Italy which is occupied with the Tripolitan question, and finally again on the weakness of Russia which is not yet strong enough to conduct her foreign policy quite as she would wish. Furthermore, the Ambassador believes that Count Aehrenthal has no need of an open and honest policy in the Balkans. For, indeed, he can find means to provide himself an opportunity for interference along side-paths and by secret incitements and thus justify his actions. The Ambassador, too, told me that there was great prospect of disturbances breaking out here (the Balkans) in the Spring.

I had the honor to report to you what M. Neratow communicated to me as regards rumours in the Vienna papers to the effect, namely, that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has returned to Petersburg from his leave, charged with the Special Mission of working upon a rapprochement of Russia with Austria-Hungary, and perhaps with an autograph letter of Emperor Franz Joseph. What M. Neratow told me, has now been confirmed by M. Sasonof, namely, that Count Thun has been holding conferences with him but within the limits of usual daily conversation, and he has neither communicated nor done anything of importance. M. Sasonof has likewise no knowledge of an autograph letter of the Emperor. I asked him further whether the journey of the former Ambassador Berchtold to Russia had any political significance; whereupon Sasonof said, that Count Berchtold had only come here to hunt, and his trip here was of an entirely private character and he had not even seen him.

As regards the visit of King Ferdinand in Vienna, I learned with certainty that he had come to Vienna upon the invitation

of Austria-Hungary. M. Sasonof told me this and also another entirely reliable political personage. M. Sasonof has the impression that Count Aehrenthal desires to attach the King to himself, and particularly for the reason that a rapprochement had recently been remarked between Serbia and Bulgaria. In order to avoid exciting attention, he tried to attain his goal indirectly, namely, by bringing Bulgaria into closer relations with Roumania which is well-disposed towards Germany and Austria-Hungary. How far Count Aehrenthal had succeeded in this effort, and what real profit there was in King Ferdinand's visit, M. Sasonof could not tell me. But I remarked that the very fact of the invitation of the King to Vienna did not please him, and the less so, in view of the fact that the latter's inclinations and opportunistic political methods are well known. At any rate, M. Sasonof fixes his hopes on the Slavic sentiments of the Bulgarian people. But has not every Slavic nation its own special interests outside of its general interests, which are not always in accord with the general and may be promoted by opportune support from a non-Slavic source? And has not Bulgaria proven this for three years?

As regards the Dardanelles question the situation as disclosed by his inquiries is in my judgment as follows:—M. Tscharikow, whom many regard as a somewhat confused politician, knows that this question is of great importance to Russia, and that any politician who has success with it will cover himself with glory. In view of the fact that until a few days ago M. Neratow was in charge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, M. Tscharikow took advantage of the interim, when there was no one in authority in charge, to gather laurels for himself, and personally stirred up this question in Constantinople. But with the return of Sasonof, the matter at once took on another aspect, perhaps because Sasonof could observe, during his stay in Paris, that the time was not ripe yet for this matter, but perhaps also, because he had already thought so before. The main thing is that Sasonof immediately denied categorically that Russia had raised the question, and explained that this had been a personal undertaking of Tscharikow's which the latter had set in motion without any authority from Petersburg. M. Sasonof told me furthermore that Russia's enemies had dished up the matter because Tscharikow had not been cautious enough to declare

that he had taken up the question on his own initiative and not in consequence of instructions from the Ministry.

Accept, Sir, etc. etc. D. Popowitsch."

REPORT OF THE SERBIAN MINISTER IN PARIS, WESNITSCH,
TO THE SERBIAN MINISTER-PRESIDENT PASCHITSCH.

MARCH 27, 1913 (O.S.).

Pov. No. 177.

"Mr. Minister-President:— Continuing my last report from London I have the honour to report that from the inquiries I subsequently made here I have discovered from reliable sources that Sir Edward Grey was, so to speak, compelled to deliver his speech in the Lower House, of which you have been informed, because Germany intervened energetically in London (and likewise in the capitals of Russia and France.) In much the same manner as in Petersburg in March 1909, Germany declared that it stood firmly by Austria and that it could not permit that her position in Europe should be still further weakened. This declaration, as you may have already learned, was repeated even though in a different form, by M. von Bethmann-Hollweg in the Reichstag.

A competent person with whom I recently had confidential converse here about the matter, informed me that in the middle of the foregoing week we had stood face to face with the danger of a general European war, and that the reason why this war, at a cost of certain moral sacrifices, was now averted, rests upon the fact, among others, that it is desired to assure the Balkan allies an opportunity for recuperation, concentration, and preparation for eventualities which may emerge in the not too distant future.

Aside from this I have learned from a very trustworthy source, that the effect which the presence of the British Royal couple at the marriage of the Kaiser's daughter will have upon public opinion, is soon to be paralyzed by another manifestation which the Triple Entente have in mind, and that this latter will have a much greater political significance.

Accept, Sir, etc., etc. Dr. Mil. Wesnitsch".

XX. TELEGRAM OF THE TSAR OF RUSSIA TO
THE KING OF BULGARIA, JUNE 8, 1913.

The meeting planned of the Minister-Presidents of the four allied States in Saloniki, which could then have been followed up by a meeting in Petersburg, gave me the greatest pleasure, for the reason that this purpose seemed to indicate a wish on the part of the Balkan States to come to an understanding with one another and to firmly establish the alliance which has until the present exhibited such glorious results. It was, therefore, with painful feelings that I learned that this decision has not yet attained fulfillment, and that the Balkan States are apparently making ready for a fraternal war, which is capable only of tarnishing the glory which they have jointly acquired. At so serious a moment I turn direct to Your Majesty, as I am obligated to do, equally as a matter of right and of duty, for the Bulgarian and Serbian nations have transferred to Russia, by their Treaty of Alliance, the right to determine each difference of opinion as regards the execution of the conditions of the Treaty and of the Agreements which are founded upon it. I therefore beg Your Majesty to remain faithful to the obligations you have accepted and to submit to Russia's determination, the settlement of the present differences between Bulgaria and Serbia. In view of the fact that I regard my position as arbitrator not as a privilege but as a foremost duty from which I should not be able to withdraw, I believe that I am in duty bound to inform Your Majesty that a war between the allies would not permit me to remain a disinterested bye-stander. I wish to state most emphatically that the State which should start this war would be answerable to Slavdom for it. I reserve all freedom of action as regards the attitude Russia will take with respect to the outcome of so criminal a conflict".

XXI. REPORT FROM PETERSBURG OF MINISTER-PRESIDENT
PASCHITSCH AS REGARDS HIS AUDIENCE WITH
THE TSAR, FEBRUARY 2, 1914.

The audience lasted a full hour. The Tsar received me in his cabinet. When I entered, the Tsar was already there and

at my entrance he came to meet me at the door stretched out his hand without waiting for my greeting, and invited me to be seated. He, too, sat at a table.

First of all I expressed my thanks that I had been so fortunate as to be accorded an audience so as to convey personally to him the thanks of the Serbian King and of the Serbian people for the support Russia had afforded us during the entire period of the Balkan crisis, and for the fact that she had stood guard and in this way prevented the interference of Austria in the Balkan war. The Tsar replied that Russia had only performed her Slavic duty, in keeping her army at the Austrian frontier, for she did not wish to permit Austria to prevent the liberation of the Balkan States. I then thanked the Tsar for the recent sign of his favour in having bestowed upon me the Alexander-Newski order set in diamonds.

Thereupon I set forth the policy of Serbia, which amounts to this, that it desires the maintenance of peace in the Balkans, and that new complications be avoided, for Serbia needs peace in order to recuperate, and in order that she may arm herself afresh for the defense of Serbian national interests. I also set forth the difficulties which Serbia will have to meet in the pursuit of her peaceful policy. Bulgaria, Turkey and Austria are dissatisfied. Turkey, because she had lost the war with the Balkan States; Bulgaria, because it could not retain or acquire all that she wished; and Austria because she had lost the prospect of an advance to Saloniki. For this reason Turkey does not wish to conclude peace with Serbia, threatens Greece and demands the islands, fosters the sentiment in Albania which is asking for a Mohamedan sovereign, and concludes a treaty with Bulgaria. In all this, added the Tsar, Turkey is supported by Austria: likewise by Germany. If peace should be concluded, we would be of the opinion that we should have to work to realize the following:

1. Greece must avoid a conflict with Turkey, and in this wise, namely, that the latter shall submit the question of the islands and of the frontiers of Albania to the Great Powers, as was resolved at the Ambassadors' Conference in London. We must accept the frontiers decided upon at London and withdraw from Albania; Montenegro must likewise accept the decisions

of the London Conference and withdraw from Scutari. The same is true of Turkey. If she refuses to accept the London decisions, the Great Powers can then take the affair in hand and compel Turkey to accept them, just as they compelled Montenegro to give up Scutari, and us to withdraw to the frontiers set by the London Conference. If all the Great Powers do not wish to accept responsibility for the execution of these decisions, then let the Powers of the Triple Entente assume the task, or one of them, just as Austria-Hungary forced Montenegro and us to accept the decisions of the Great Powers. In this way the question in dispute will be taken out of the hands of Greece and Turkey and placed in the hands of the Great Powers. We have given our allies, the Greeks, advice in this matter and they have accepted it; if then they wish to acquire more in Epirus, they must under no circumstances allow a conflict to arise over the matter.

2. The second expedient for maintaining peace is that no loans be granted to Bulgaria and Turkey, until all questions that have arisen out of the war have been settled.

3. Thirdly, that all the Great Powers occupy Albania with small contingents of troops, restore order and maintain the peace; in this way the Young Turk elements and the Comitadjis will be prevented from stirring up trouble or from inciting the people in Albania against Serbia and Greece. And in this way, likewise, the Austro-Italian joint occupation will be avoided, for peace would thereby be only more greatly compromised, because both the one and the other Power would agitate against Serbia and Greece, on the one hand, in order to influence us to seek their friendship, and on the other hand in order to stir up the unruly elements against Serbia and Greece and to show that they are champions of the Albanian irredenta.

4. The fourth expedient would be to influence Roumania to take a more decisive stand on our side and to declare to Bulgaria and Turkey, that it cannot remain neutral if the peace should be disturbed and the decisions of the Bucharest Peace Treaty should be called in question.

These are the objectives towards which we must labour, and which will aid greatly in maintaining peace.

Theureupon the Tsar answered: — We have confidence in

be new Roumanian Government that it will attach itself as closely as possible to Russia; he did not believe that matters would be allowed to go so far as to call in question the Peace of Bucharest, but he, too, admitted, that we must be active along the above lines. I then took occasion to remark that at the time of my stay in Bucharest I had a conference with Bratianu and that at that time Bratianu was very enthusiastic over the idea of an alliance with Greece and Serbia, and that I had the intention to return home by way of Bucharest in order to find out whether Bratianu still retained the same willingness and views in the matter that he had disclosed to me when I was in Bucharest. The Tsar said that would be good and that Roumania had three and one half million co-nationals in Austria-Hungary, and that these desired union with Roumania; thereupon I said to him the Transylvanian Roumanians were better nationalists than the Roumanians in Roumania, and King Carol had said to me that public opinion in Roumania in favour of a rapprochement with the Balkan States had changed, and that he had to reckon with this fact, and had ordered mobilization and action of the Roumanian Army to maintain the balance of power in the Balkans and better frontiers in the Dobrudscha.

Thereupon I remarked that we had learned from various sources that Turkey had concluded an alliance with Bulgaria, in accordance with which Bulgaria was to permit the Turkish Army to cross Bulgarian territory for an attack on Greece, in return for which Turkey is to cede to Bulgaria whatever she acquires from Greece in exchange for the transfer of Thrace. The Tsar said, that they also had heard something of such rumours, but he did not believe it as yet; meanwhile there might be some truth in it, because the Bulgaro-Turkish frontiers in Thrace have not been established; but he could not believe that Bulgaria would take an active part in the conflict because she was too much exhausted and the people were averse to any further action.

As regards the occupation of Albania by international troops, he said that this was a possibility if the other Powers agreed to it. He was surprised at the Prince of Wied for permitting himself to be chosen as the ruler of Albania, for the reason that in the Prince's view the Albanians were not a vital race, and ought to be divided between Greece and Serbia. Perhaps Al-

bania may become an apple of discord between Italy and Austria. Thereupon I stated that Italy and Austria had been in conflict for a long time and that they had concluded the alliance only because they feared a military conflict, and that even now it was only because of a fear of war among themselves that they had ventured to agree upon a joint occupation of Valona.

Thereupon I led the conversation around to a discussion of Austria's deliveries of arms to Bulgaria, namely, that Austria had furnished arms and munitions out of her magazines and that Bulgaria had received cannon also. And again the Tsar added that Germany, too, was supporting Bulgaria. I begged him that Russia should likewise aid us and that out of her magazines she should deliver to us 120,000 rifles and munition and a few cannon, particularly howitzers, if they could spare them, as the Turks had held up delivery of our heavy guns when they were in transport immediately before the war. The Tsar asked me if I had spoken about the matter with any of the Russian Ministers. I said, with the War Minister Suchomlinow and with Sasonof and that the War Minister had said, it would be all right if the Russian policy permitted it. And here I took occasion to tell the Tsar how pleased we were that Russia had armed herself so thoroughly; it gives us a feeling of security and hope for a better future. The Tsar said that they had done a great deal and were still doing much. For that reason their establishments could not assume the task of manufacturing arms for us. This gave me occasion to say to the Tsar that immediately upon my return from Tsarskoje Selo I would furnish Sasonof with an estimate of what we needed. He said that was all right for he would receive Sasonof on the morrow and would see what we needed. They would do all they could to lighten the situation for us. He asked me what we needed: I told him what I had noted down on a slip which I had prepared for Sasonof.

Thereupon the conversation turned to the subject of Montenegro, Bulgaria and Austria. As regards Montenegro, he said that he knew that there the entire nation was on our side and wished union with us. I related what had been done during the war and later, and what the Montenegrin Minister in Belgrade, Mijuskowitsch says about it, and that Mijuskowitsch would speak

about it with King Nicholas and would advise him that he himself should take up the question of a personal union with Serbia, because after his death the matter might be difficult and dangerous for the entire dynasty.

The Tsar very strongly criticised the attitude of Montenegro, that Montenegro was not dealing honestly, that even now Montenegro was in accord with Austria, and that he had heard by chance from his Minister only yesterday that Montenegro had in contemplation certain intrigues against Serbia and her dynasty and that therefore we must be careful that she did not concoct something of a harmful nature. And he, too, considers that it is only a question of time as regards the matter of the union of Serbia with Montenegro, and that the matter must be solved with the least possible disturbance and noise. I told him that we, too, were for the union; we had simply told Mijuskowitsch that we could not raise the question for we were the stronger party, and they might say that we had coerced Mijuskowitsch; we are waiting therefore until they make the proposal, and then we shall accept it and settle the matter in such a way that the existence of the Montenegrin monarchy shall be assured.

Hereupon we discussed the Montenegrin Army, her lack of preparation and her failures, and that this had been a decisive influence on the Montenegrin people to create the union for they saw the enormous difference between the Montenegrin and Serbian Army, and that we had transferred to them a much larger territory than they deserved.

He then discussed Bulgaria and her King. The Tsar strongly condemned King Ferdinand for subordinating himself to the policies of Austria and for beginning the war against Serbia. But God had punished him. The Tsar believes that it will be difficult for him to retain his throne, for the people are against him, and only so long as the present Government remains at the helm, and by straining every force, can he maintain himself. I repeated to the Tsar what the captured Bulgarians had said, when they were asked why they were making war on their allies and brothers: they had not wanted the war, but it was the King, for he was not Orthodox nor a Slav. The Tsar said that this was a proper judgment of the matter. I thereupon added that for our part we believed we ought not to be sulky towards them, but take thought

of the fact that a state of harmony between Bulgaria and Serbia might be useful to both, and that perhaps the time would come when we might even be willing to make some concessions to Bulgaria in case she was willing to be of assistance in the solution of the Serbo-Kroatian question. Thereupon the Tsar inquired how many Serbo-Kroatians lived in Austria-Hungary, and what they were now believing and desiring. I replied about six millions and told him where they lived. I also told him of the Slovenes, that they, too, were gravitating to the Serbo-Kroatians and that they would adopt the Serbo-Kroatian language, owing to the fact that their dialect is bad and they have long lost their national independence; then I told him that just at this time there was a Slovene stopping in Petersburg who was working for the establishment of a Southern-Slav Bank and was trying to win over the Russian banks to the project. This was quite agreeable to the Tsar and he said that it was very necessary that the Russian banks should take a greater interest in the Slavic countries and that it would be a good thing if Hribar should have success with his mission.

I then told the Tsar how great a reverse in sentiment had taken place among the Slavs of Austria-Hungary, how many Starcevic followers there were who formerly expected salvation from Austria, but now comprehended that this salvation could come to them only from Russia or Serbia, and that they could scarcely await the opportunity to see their desires fulfilled; and then I told him that for every rifle we received, we would have a soldier from these countries to carry it.

The Tsar himself maintained that Austria treated the Slavs badly, and referred to the Hungaro-Russian trial and expressed his sympathy with this unhappy section of the Russian people who were suffering persecution because of their religious faith. If Austria does not cease her anti-Slavic policy, nothing good will ever come of it for her. Then he asked how many soldiers Serbia could now put into the field. Serbia, said the Tsar, had astonished the world when she marched out 400,000 men. I replied: We believe that we can put a half million well clothed and armed soldiers into the field. 'That is sufficient, it is no trifile, one can go a great ways with that.'

Thereupon we discussed the following:—We must foster the

alliance with Greece, for, aside from other considerations, we shall thus safeguard our incoming and outgoing commerce. Furthermore we must labour to bring about an alliance upon a broader basis with Roumania, and not alone upon the basis of safeguarding the Treaty of Bucharest.

Thereupon I referred to the matter of the marriage of our heir to the throne in the following words:—I pray Your Majesty may graciously permit me to propose a wish and a request of our King and not to be angry if I do so. Our King wishes to marry his son to one of the Grand Duchesses. The duty which he owes his country and his successor impels him to express this wish to Your Majesty through me, for he is convinced that no one will know or hear of it. If, for any reason, Your Majesty should conclude that this cannot be, our King will continue to cherish his sympathy for Russia and his loyalty to the Slav policy, and he would have the consciousness of having fulfilled his duty toward Serbia and Russia. The Tsar replied smiling: that he was not at all ill-disposed to the request of the King, and it was a quite proper one; his principle was, however, to permit his children to decide matters of the heart for themselves, and he did not wish to influence them in their choice of a future life partner. He, too, considers that it will be unnecessary for any one to know about the matter. He had noticed that when the Crown Prince had been to dinner with the family of the Tsar, he had often glanced at the Grand Duchess and tried to avoid having the others notice the fact. He found the Crown Prince quite 'smart'—he did not boast about his war experiences—he seemed brave and 'smart'. I thereupon thanked him and promised to tell no one not even the King what the Tsar had told me, only the Crown Prince was to know of it. The Tsar said that the Crown Prince had not mentioned the matter when he was visiting there; to which I answered that he had feared a refusal.

Thereafter we spoke of other things after I had said:—If it should be decided that we are to have a daughter of the Tsar of Russia for our Queen, she will enjoy the sympathy of the whole Serbian nation, and she will be able, if God and conditions permit, to become the Tsarina of the Southern-Slav, Serbo-Kroatian people. Her influence and her lustre will encompass the entire Balkan peninsula.

The Tsar listened to my words with apparent pleasure. The impression of this entire incident was a good one. I noticed not the least sign that the Tsar was ill-disposed toward the marriage, and I added yet that the Crown Prince could remain here a few days longer, for there was no other pressing business that called for his presence at home, but for myself I must depart on the following Friday. The Tsar said: 'He may, oh, he may remain here yet, he has plenty of acquaintances here and can enjoy himself very well.' I had said this purposely so that the Crown Prince might still have time and opportunity to meet the Tsar and his daughters a few times. I did not inquire when we might receive the answer of the Tsar, I regarded it as superfluous, to inquire into the ways and means of the Tsar's reply. If he receive a satisfactory report from his daughter, he himself will easily find ways and means to give his answer; moreover he can easily summon the Crown Prince and tell him what he has in mind. Upon my taking leave, the Tsar accompanied me to the door and asked me specially and repeatedly to present not only greetings to the King from himself but also from the Tsarina and his family and wished him good health.

For Serbia we shall do everything, greet the King for me and tell him (in Russian) 'For Serbia we shall do all.'"

XXII. TELEGRAM OF THE TSAR TO THE CROWN
PRINCE OF SERBIA JULY 27, 1914.

"Your Royal Highness is not deceived, in turning to me in this extraordinarily difficult moment, in the feelings which I cherish for you and also in my heartfelt affection for the Serbian nation. The present situation invites my most serious attention, and my Government is making every effort to clear up the difficulties which stand in the way. I do not doubt that Your Highness and the Royal Government are imbued with the desire to lighten this task, cost what it may, and to arrive at a solution which, while upholding the dignity of Serbia, would avert the horrors of a new war. So long as there is the least hope of avoiding a sacrifice of blood, we must direct all our efforts to this end. But if, contrary to our most upright wishes, we have no success,

Your Highness may rest assured that under no circumstances will Russia remain indifferent to Serbia's fate."

REPORT OF THE RUSSIAN CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES IN BELGRADE
JULY 29, 1914 (RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK p. 57).

"I communicated the text of the All-Highest's reply telegram to Crown Prince Alexander, to Paschitsch, who after he had read it through, crossed himself and said 'Great God, great and merciful is the Russian Tsar.' He thereupon embraced me, unable to master his emotion."

REPLY TELEGRAM OF THE CROWN PRINCE OF SERBIA
TO THE TSAR OF RUSSIA, JULY 29, 1914.

Deeply moved by the telegram with which Your Majesty was pleased to gladden me, I hasten to express to Your Majesty my most heartfelt thanks. I pray Your Majesty to be assured that the cordial treatment which Your Majesty bestows upon my country, is of particular value to us, and fills our soul with the hope that the future of Serbia is assured in having become the object of the benevolent care of Your Majesty. These serious times must make firm the ties of affection, which unite Serbia with holy Slavic Russia, and the sentiments of deep gratitude for the help and protection of Your Majesty will be preserved in the souls of all Serbians as something sacred."

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